President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 5 by Browning, Robert X
The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research 
Volume 5 Article 1 
2-15-2020 
President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives 
Research, Volume 5 
Robert X. Browning 
Purdue University, rxb@purdue.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse 
 Part of the American Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Browning, Robert X. (2020) "President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 
5," The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research: Vol. 5 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse/vol5/iss1/1 
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. 
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information. 
President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 5 
Cover Page Footnote 
To purchase a hard copy of this publication, visit: http://www.thepress.purdue.edu/titles/format/
9781557538826 
This article is available in The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse/vol5/iss1/1 
“For almost 25 years I have watched the C-SPAN Video Library evolve into the 
nonpareil of data on congressional institutional behavior. Most instructors of the 
legislative process have utilized the C-SPAN’s material in the classroom with great 
success. Here, in this volume, Robert X. Browning once again demonstrates the 
myriad ways scholars can advance conventional wisdom on the U.S. Congress 
and institutions with the C-SPAN Video Library’s seemingly unlimited data. 
Debates, hearings, and floor speeches are just a few fascinating resources that are 
brilliantly used in this volume. These research studies offer several exiting new 
directions for scholars to consider in the future.”
—Jonathan S. Morris, Department of Political Science, East Carolina University
“The value of the C-SPAN Video Library as an incredibly rich research resource 
shines through in the breadth of analysis and insight on display in this latest 
collection of studies in the Year in C-SPAN Archives Research series. The range 
of congressional, presidential, and procedural footage of American political life 
available in the library is simply unparalleled in its depth and scope. What re-
searchers make of these archives, and the insights they continue to yield, is only 
limited by their collective imagination and analytical ingenuity. Series editor and 
archives maestro Robert X. Browning must be commended for his tireless efforts 
to make these materials accessible to the wider research community.” 
—Erik P. Bucy, Marshall and Sharleen Formby Regents Professor of Strategic Communication,  
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The C-SPAN Archives, located adjacent to Purdue University, is the home of 
the online C-SPAN Video Library, which has copied all of C-SPAN’s television 
content since 1987. Extensive indexing, captioning, and other enhanced online 
features provide researchers, policy analysts, students, teachers, and public offi-
cials with an unparalleled chronological and internally cross-referenced record 
for deeper study. The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research presents the finest inter-
disciplinary research utilizing tools of the C-SPAN Video Library. Each volume 
highlights recent scholarship and comprises leading experts and emerging voices 
in political science, journalism, psychology, computer science, communica-
tion, and a variety of other disciplines. Developed in partnership with the Brian 
Lamb School of Communication and with support from the C-SPAN Education 
Foundation, this series is guided by the ideal that all experimental outcomes, in-
cluding those from our American experiment, can be best improved by directed 
study driving richer engagement and better understanding.
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With the publi cation of this fifth collection of essays whose video analysis 
and data are derived from the C-SPAN Archives, we have the opportu-
nity to once again appreciate and assess the contribution the Archives has 
made to our understanding of the political process, as well as to appreci-
ate the changes that have occurred over time. As with the creation of the 
C-SPAN networks themselves, the nation and the scholarly community 
are indebted to the vision of Brian Lamb. Lamb recognized the potential 
of archiving C-SPAN programming and the power of making the archive 
available to the public. He presented his idea to Professor David Berg, the 
then head of the Department of Communication at Purdue University, 
who consulted with me, and we agreed that Professor Robert Browning, 
a specialist on Congress, would be an excellent fit to meet with Lamb 
and a group of Purdue faculty. At the time, I daresay none of us realized 
that Lamb’s successful recruitment of Browning as a willing collaborator 
would result in not only the enormous growth and success of the Archives 
but also a more than 30-year partnership.
The C-SPAN Video Library began within the Purdue University School 
of Liberal Arts in 1987 under the leadership of Dr. Browning, who sought 
a way to archive and index the thousands of hours of congressional cover-
age produced by the network every year. In the early days of the archive, 
because of the nature of the technology of the time, this meant physi-
cally inserting and ejecting each videotape and tagging the contents for 
future retrieval. Currently, the Video Library records all three C-SPAN 
networks 7 days a week, 24 hours a day. The digitalization of video re-
cording has dramatically transformed the recording, encoding, retrieval, 
and distribution processes, with the result that hundreds of thousands of 
hours of video have been made available to the public and the database 
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of C-SPAN programming has become an unparalleled chronological re-
source on Congress and governmental affairs, with more than 250,000 
digital hours of recording available. As of this writing, in this year alone 
more than 35 million videos have been viewed. C-SPAN’s achievements 
have not gone unrecognized. In 2010, following Peabody Awards in 1992 
for its “ongoing service” of “providing access to information indispensable 
to an intelligent citizenry” and in 2000 for the series American Presidents: 
Life Portraits, C-SPAN received a third Peabody Award, this one for the 
Video Library. 
Reviewing the contributions to this volume and the four previous 
volumes, one cannot help but be impressed by the variety of scholarship 
included. The volumes feature contributions on discovery, learning, and 
engagement. Authors from a wide variety of epistemological approaches 
and disciplines employ the Video Library to explore an extraordinary 
range of subjects — for example, presidential debates, climate change, gen-
der, judicial appointments, immigration, and crises — in a wide variety of 
contexts, floor debates, committee hearings, and town halls. And they do 
so with the full panoply of methodological approaches: traditional dis-
course analysis, linguistic text analysis, video bite analysis, experiments, 
framing, and media effects, among others. This latest volume is no ex-
ception, and it very nicely illustrates the contribution that the C-SPAN 
Video Library brings to the analysis of these issues. The linguistic analysis 
of debate, discussion, and presentation can be and is linked with visual 
cues, which enables much deeper dialogue about the role of emotion and 
the impact of video communication. The Archives has already produced 
much knowledge that would not have been possible without it. As new 
computational social science and visual data analysis tools are developed 
and applied to this rich resource, even greater advances in our under-
standing of government and public policymaking will emerge, and we 
can anticipate that the C-SPAN Archives will continue not only to pro-
vide the base video but also to assist scholars in the exploitation of this 
remarkable resource.
Michael Stohl
Professor of Communication, Political Science, and Global Studies
University of California, Santa Barbara
xi
PREFACE
In this the fifth volume of The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, we fo-
cus on Trump’s first year in office. As the C-SPAN Video Library grows 
and the indexing reaches deeper in the archive, scholars are approaching 
questions with more sophisticated research tools to explore important 
questions in political science and communication research. These ques-
tions include a wide range of topics from climate change to moral authority 
rhetoric, to Trump’s support among African Americans. In addition to 
the strongly empirical pieces, there are essay pieces about political debates 
and rhetoric of judicial nominations that use the C-SPAN Video Library 
for examples. What unites these studies is that they all use video or data 
derived from the C-SPAN Video Library.
Stephen Llano’s chapter begins the volume with a critical examination 
of candidate debates. The elements of his analysis consists of Framework, 
Principle, Vision, and Action. So many critics lament how debates have 
become empty contests of gamesmanship. Llano concludes instead that 
these debates have distinct value in political discourse.
A different approach is taken by Farah Latif who looks at “gaslight-
ing” in congressional discourse on climate change. She examines members 
of the Congressional House Climate Solutions Caucus to see the extent 
that their rhetoric is designed to confused people on climate change. She 
is interested in how these contradictions become part of the debate as 
obfuscation.
While her quantitative research does not support this contention, 
she illustrates the idea through some quotes from the C-SPAN Video 
Library. The idea is a worthwhile one to pursue perhaps with a different 
group of members.
xii PREFACE
While Block and Haynes note Barack Obama won with strong African 
American voter support, they are interested in African American support 
for Trump. They present data on Trump’s support and develop a typology 
to describe African American Trump supporters. Their categories are en-
trepreneur, iconoclastic, doctrinaire, and complicated. After presenting 
numerous studies on the 2016 election, they use the C-SPAN Video Library 
to find anecdotes from each of these categories. It is part of a larger proj-
ect, but has interesting insights for anyone wanting to understand African 
American support for Trump.
Jennifer Hoewe and Mohammed Ziny’s chapter looks at moral rheto-
ric of members of Congress just prior to and after Trump’s inauguration. 
In a time-separated design, they hypothesize a change in rhetoric after 
the president takes office. They describe types of moral rhetoric that they 
search the Video Library for from Republican and Democratic members. 
They do not find a difference, but illustrate the type of moral rhetoric 
they do find. It is an important topic and design that effectively uses the 
Video Library.
Schmitt and Bergbower also study immigration in the 115th Congress 
following Trump’s election. They look at congressional rhetoric and find 
that a few culturally conservative Republicans are responsible for a lot of 
the rhetoric on the Republican side, while many Democrats respond to 
Trump’s initiatives on the Democratic side. They look to districts with 
strong support for Trump and members of the Freedom Caucus to find 
support for Trump’s immigration policies. Using the Video Library, they 
coded floor speeches during debate on immigration bills. In their analysis 
they find that largely Republicans avoided talking about Trump immi-
gration policies.
Joseph Sery uses the Video Library in a different way to study rhet-
oric, and in particular rhetoric on judicial nominations. He builds on 
long- standing traditions in communication to argue how these nomi-
nations are used by politicians as a “means to construct and signal their 
ideological commitments to key democratic values for their constituents.” 
He uses the judicial debate, not as legal arguments, but as way that politi-
cians can use to create an ideological divide in the public. He then draws 
on the C-SPAN Video Library for examples of how the concept of judicial 
activism is used in the political debate.
PREFACE xiii
Russell, Johnson, and Stewart examine a familiar feature of the Trump 
presidency. President Trump does not favor solo news conferences. Instead 
he holds many joint news conferences with foreign leaders. In these news 
conference there are U.S. and foreign reporters asking questions. This al-
lows the president to be evasive, to take questions from foreign press, and 
to give nonreplies.
Another look at Trump’s rhetoric comes from Cann and Jett. They ex-
amine President Trump’s speeches on climate change from the C-SPAN 
Video Library over a three-year time period from 2015 to 2018. Essentially, 
they examine how President Trump frames climate change. They find a 
difference in how Trump approaches climate change in his Tweets ver-
sus his speeches. The speeches are more policy oriented while the Tweets 
tend to denigrate climate change.
Lusvardi and Tower look at nonverbal congressional behavior in video 
clips tweeted out by C-SPAN. They coded for smiles, torso movement, 
hand gestures, and visual aids such as posters. They find that retweets, 
their measure of engagement, was driven more by content than nonver-
bal cues. Since they examined only one session, there were not enough 
charts to conclusively analyze their engagement.
These studies collectively demonstrate the type of research that can be 
conducted using the C-SPAN Video Library. Each has a different design 
and hypotheses. They all draw on C-SPAN videos to make their point. 
There are many different methods and approaches. Together they give us 
a picture of the first year of Trump’s presidency as seen through analysis 




This book contains papers initially presented at the 2018 Center for 
C-SPAN Scholarship & Engagement conference at Purdue University. 
That conference could not have happened without the skillful assistance 
of the managing director of the Center, Connie Doebele. She and her stu-
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well as with all the printed materials and designs.
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Department of Political Science, was also a strong supporter of the Center 
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The C-SPAN Education Foundation supported the research with an 
award that allowed us to give research stipends to those presenting pa-
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of C-SPAN and the Foundation, have been ardent supporters of our ef-
forts to enhance the research and education uses of the C-SPAN Archives 
through the CCSE.
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1PART 1
C-SPAN and Historical Research
Edited by Kathryn Cramer Brownell
On March 19, 1979, the recently elected representative from Tennessee, 
Albert Gore Jr., took the floor of the House chamber and addressed both 
his colleagues and a national cable audience. The Cable Satellite Public 
Affairs Network (C-SPAN) had just launched, bringing television cov-
erage of the House of Representatives to the homes of cable subscribers 
across the country. As the first representative to appear on C-SPAN, 
Representative Gore delivered a hopeful speech about how cable televi-
sion could serve as an antidote to media coverage that overwhelmingly 
favored the president over Congress. “Television will change this insti-
tution just as it has changed the executive branch,” predicted Gore. He 
anticipated that the “good will outweigh the bad” because the “solution 
for the lack of confidence in government . . . is more open government 
at all levels.”1
He and other supporters of C-SPAN agreed that a central problem 
in American political life stemmed from the narrow coverage of politi-
cal events that appeared on network broadcast television. With less than 
an hour each day dedicated to public affairs, the network news programs 
determined what events counted as “news” and how such stories were 
framed and packaged for national audiences. As one telecommunications 
policy maker from the Nixon administration noted, television networks 
harnessed a tremendous amount of power because of their “ability to con-
trol the flow of information and of ideas to the people” (Brownell, 2017). 
Activists on the Left and the Right and politicians from both parties could 
all agree on one thing by the late 1970s: a new approach to television that 
could provide more comprehensive media coverage of the news was needed 
(Gitlin, 1980; Hemmer, 2016).
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Scholars have debated the ways that the 24/7 news cycle that C-SPAN 
helped to spawn has shaped politics. It has expanded civic debate and par-
ticipation while also elevating the place of performative media politics 
in American government in ways that have brought new challenges to 
democratic governance (Brownell, 2015; Smith, 2012). But the range and 
depth of the events that C-SPAN has since captured — from congressio-
nal proceedings and committee hearings to campaign stops and partisan 
gatherings — have created a wealth of resources for scholars. By studying 
material from the C-SPAN Video Library, historians, political scientists, 
and communication scholars can follow in the path forged by C-SPAN 
programming innovations. Notably, they can study people, movements, 
policies, and ideas that may have gone unnoticed in a national news cycle, 
which may now extend for 24 hours but remains driven by ideological and 
market agendas that continue to infringe on providing nuance and com-
plexity (Hemmer, 2016; Jamieson & Waldman, 2003; Ponce de Leon, 2015).
These first three chapters on political debates, political gaslighting, 
and African American Trump supporters demonstrate a variety of ways 
in which scholars can use the C-SPAN Video Library to better understand 
the nuances behind the 24/7 news narrative and even pierce holes into the 
accepted political logic it frequently advances. Stephen Llano’s chapter, 
“Congressional Election Debates: Between the National and the Local,” 
offers an antidote to the problematic coverage of political debates while 
Farah Latif breaks down the misleading media narratives some Republicans 
have created on climate change. Ray Block Jr. and Christina S. Haynes 
use content from political rallies and oral histories to explain how and 
why a variety of prominent African American supporters stumped for 
Donald Trump in 2016. These essays demonstrate how scholars can use 
the C-SPAN Video Library to advance research in political science and 
communication that has tremendous potential to continue the project of 
transparency and diversity of perspective that C-SPAN itself elevated in 
politics over 40 years ago.
Do we still need political debates when they fail to inform voters on 
specific issues and simply have become staged press conferences? This is 
a question that Stephen Llano poses before he examines the valuable role 
that debates play in the democratic process. The challenge, he contents, 
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hinges on a better understanding of what exactly debates reveal, and this 
demands an overhauling of the dominant ways in which we currently 
analyze these events. Rather than viewing debates as time during which 
candidates dispute “superior facts or truths” and battle one another to 
present a more powerful image of a leader, Llano presents an alternative 
rubric for watching and judging debate performance. “The way forward,” 
he argues, is to see them less as “contests of facts, policy, and formal rea-
son” and more as “contests of advocacy: Can they prove they are the best 
advocate for the values of the constituents while at the same time proving 
they can act on those beliefs in Washington?”
By analyzing a range of congressional debates that took shape during 
the 2016 election, Llano provides an effective model for how scholars can 
use the C-SPAN Video Library to study the intersection of local and na-
tional politics. From the beginning, C-SPAN programming provided a 
more comprehensive look at national political events — legislative proce-
dures, presidential addresses, and party conventions starting in 1980. But 
programs also valued local politics, like its Grassroots ’84 coverage of state 
political races and issues (Brownell, 2014). Moreover, media-savvy politi-
cians — from Al Gore to Newt Gingrich — have long recognized the ways 
in which C-SPAN has connected local and national issues, and they have 
used coverage of the legislative process to elevate their national reputa-
tion and transform debate in the House of Representatives into national 
discussions of issues that have ranged from tax policy to regulation to for-
eign policy (Smith, 2012). C-SPAN became a tool to advance a modern 
local-national legislative strategy; thus its archives are essential for scholars 
seeking to understand this process. As Farah Latif argues, this legislative 
strategy has, at times, invoked “political gaslighting.” Her examination of 
Republican conversations about climate change issues reveals a recent ef-
fort “to construct populist narratives and stringent attitudes toward climate 
issues” that advance partisan principles rather than scientific facts. By de-
constructing political communication on the cable dial, scholars like Llano 
and Latif are advancing a new way of understanding and evaluating the 
changes embedded in political communication in the age of 24/7 news.
The C-SPAN Video Library also provides material for scholars to ex-
plore questions that have simply befuddled contemporary pundits, notably, 
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why would a variety of African Americans mobilize for Donald Trump, 
a candidate known for cultivating support among White nationalists in a 
party that has long valued White supporters over Black constituents with 
its policies and rhetoric? By analyzing a “small but outspoken group of 
African Americans who once backed, or currently endorse the president 
and his policies,” Ray Block Jr. and Christina S. Haynes have excavated 
speeches, interviews, and oral histories of individuals who identified as 
part of #Blacks4Trump. A range of scholarship has shown that for White 
voters, race was a motivating factor in their decision to vote for Donald 
Trump. This builds on a strategy that the Republican Party has cultivated 
since the 1960s as it turned to the South and to the suburbs in an appeal 
to traditional Democratic voters who had become disgruntled that the 
party had endorsed and fought for the civil rights agenda (Crespino, 2012; 
Kruse, 2005; Lassiter, 2006). Racial concerns have made African Americans, 
notably women, very loyal to the Democratic Party for the same reasons. 
And yet, a small, but consistent, demographic of Black voters have cast 
ballots for the GOP, professing a belief in conservative ideology or sup-
port for the GOP economic platform (Wright Rigueur, 2015). Block and 
Haynes examine C-SPAN footage to explore these voting decisions and 
how they played out in the contentious 2016 election. With their research, 
they outline how Black Trump supporters fall into four different catego-
ries: “entrepreneurial, doctrinaire, iconoclastic, and complicated.”
This research pierces a variety of holes into dominant assumptions 
about partisanship and identity politics. As Block and Haynes argue, the 
political orientation and racial motivators of their subjects “show the fra-
gility of the presumably strong bond between Black Americans and the 
Democratic Party.” Party operatives on both sides should take note, rec-
ognizing that voter loyalty can change and outreach strategies do make 
a difference. By making sense of seemingly unexplainable moments, like 
Kayne West’s 2018 controversial visit to the Oval Office, this research 
advances a better understanding of the connections between race and 
party politics that forces a more complicated understanding of voting 
behavior today.
Nuance is overwhelmingly missing from political narratives today, 
and this has contributed to a more polarizing discussion of current affairs 
as simply a liberal versus conservative debate (Hemmer, 2016; Kruse & 
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Zelizer, 2019.) But while this makes for accessible and highly rated televi-
sion, it obscures other political realities (Cebul, Geismer, & Williams, 2019). 
To truly combat political polarization, a deeper understanding of the com-
plexity and even the overlooked consensus behind divisive issues is needed, 
and the C-SPAN Video Library is a useful place for scholars to begin. Over 
40 years ago, Al Gore saw C-SPAN as a solution to public cynicism and 
distrust in government. Television itself did not solve the grave problems 
facing society then, and in fact, the reliance on television shifted attention 
toward performance and away from actual governance. But C-SPAN cap-
tured the process by which this happened, and its archives might just be 
the solution for understanding and then advancing new solutions, to solve 
the pressing political challenges of today.
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7CHAPTER 1
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION DEBATES: 
BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND THE LOCAL
Stephen M. Llano
DEBATE: THE SUSPECT PRACTICE
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Figure 1.1) surprised everyone with her vic-
tory in the New York District 14 Democratic primary over incumbent 
Joe Crowley. Her socialist platform gained a lot of national media atten-
tion, with some favorably calling her the future of the Democratic Party. 
In early August conservative commentator and Internet personality Ben 
Shapiro asked Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez if she would “have a real con-
versation . . . about the issues” (Barrett, 2018). Shapiro offered to donate 
$10,000 to Ocasio-Cortez’s congressional campaign if she would agree, 
suggesting that “if you want to raise charity and we can do it as a debate, 
we can do that too” (Barrett, 2018). Ocasio-Cortez’s campaign responded 
on Twitter: “I don’t owe a response to unsolicited requests from men with 
bad intentions,” the Tweet read. “And also like catcalling, for some reason 
they feel entitled to one” (Relman, 2018). Shapiro responded by calling 
the tweet “slander,” and since hasn’t said much about it. OpenSecrets, the 
nonpartisan center for Responsive Politics, pointed out that a $10,000 
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campaign contribution would violate campaign finance laws. So much 
for the American tradition of free and open debate.
Small disputes over definition are often shadowboxes for ideology. 
What understanding of debate is being shopped here? Ocasio-Cortez 
seems to view debate as a Trojan horse — a gift from an enemy that deco-
rum mandates you accept but could be filled with enemies ready to catch 
you sleeping. Ocasio-Cortez did not accept it; she is indecorous. Shapiro 
wasn’t offering a clean gift; he was sinister. As he said about the debate, 
“I would love to debate her because I have one question for her: Name an 
industry you would not nationalize; which ones should the government 
not run and why? Alright, can she name any of them?” (Concha, 2018). 
Such distrust of debate is well warranted in an environment where it is 
little more than a thinly veiled attempt to expose someone as a phony or 
fraud. For Shapiro, debate is an exposé of the poseur, not a deep investi-
gation of ideas.
Ocasio-Cortez had no obligation, political or otherwise, to debate a 
media figure like Shapiro. But if this were her opponent, would the sit-
uation change? Congressional candidates don’t have to debate with any 
regularity, like the expectations for U.S. presidential debates. Crowley and 
Ocasio-Cortez suggested they might have debates in their contested pri-
mary, but debates never happened. Clearly, debate was not essential in 
FIGURE 1.1 Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez at a congressional hearing.
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determining who should represent the 14th district — the voters did just 
fine without it. But the obligation to debate haunts all politicians. The ghost 
usually appears in the dramatic moment of the “empty chair” debate where 
Jimmy Carter declined the invitation to jointly debate John Anderson and 
Ronald Reagan in 1980. This event eventually led to the presidential de-
bates being removed from the League of Women Voters and turned over 
to the newly formed Commission on Presidential Debates, a bipartisan 
commission composed of former elected representatives and elites from 
both parties (Kraus, 2000). If debates are obligated, those who have the 
most to lose should control them.
The result has been events that we feel obligated to have but don’t fully 
understand how to evaluate. We see debate in a chaotic swirl of potential 
meanings, most of which are incommensurable. In this chapter I try to 
establish a new understanding of how election debates might be able to 
function productively within elections. I rely heavily on the understanding 
of argumentation presented by Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca 
who in their vastly underrated masterpiece The New Rhetoric (1969) out-
line an inductive theory and understanding of how argument in context 
functions. I propose a new critical approach for election debates to reveal 
them as contests, but not contests of argumentative correctness. I believe 
election debates are best seen as contests of who should be the voice of 
the values of the community on the national stage. Election debates at 
the congressional level pit candidates in a contest where voters can see if 
the candidates can represent their values alongside national values within 
the particularities of the contexts and situations given to them by jour-
nalist and moderators. These debates are not about accuracy or truth but 
about who can best articulate national or local values in the grammar of 
the other. Candidates who can articulate national values in terms of the 
local, or vice versa, are those whose performances we could call success-
ful in the terms of election debating.
Popular conceptions of debate are fraught because of irreconcilable 
tension between the two narratives of election persuasion and where de-
bate is a tool for the discovery of superior facts or truths. This tension 
discourages serious consideration of election debates as places where can-
didates and audiences can explore political identity, community values, 
and the importance they have in national and local identities. As each 
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election approaches, we are haunted by this tension. By centering election 
debates in a context different from ideological demand, we locate elec-
tion debates in their own appropriate context.
WHAT’S WRONG WITH ELECTION DEBATES?
There’s no shortage of criticism of election debates at the presidential level. 
Most famously, Sydney Kraus called them “joint press conferences,” a 
not-so-subtle indication that presidential debates are not “really” debates 
(Kraus, 2000). This criticism appears in all treatments of presidential elec-
tion debates as a sort of “structural” criticism of these events.
Most scholars cast serious doubt that election debates are debates 
in the traditional sense. As Jamieson and Birdsell (1990) write, these are
not really debates at all. Much can be said from this point of view. 
In the most common of the current formats, moderators and/or 
press panelists come between those who might otherwise argue 
directly among themselves. Sustained consideration of important 
issues is at best difficult when the topics shift rapidly, the emphases 
are determined by non-contestants, and the time is short. (p. 6)
Indeed, these elements are copied seamlessly into congressional election 
debates as well. The fallout from such a structure is that election debates 
are hard to evaluate. Jamieson and Birdsell continue: “Candidate debates 
do provide politicians with a national forum in which to take their cases 
to the people. . . . Debates in some senses and individual performances in 
others, these moderated confrontations defy simple classification” (1990, 
pp. 6–7). Neither candidates nor viewers are certain how to evaluate the 
discourse they hear during these debates. Jamieson and Birdsell conclude 
that debates “remain powerful vehicles both for informing and for ex-
posing an often-maligned but nonetheless important characteristic of 
candidates disparaged as image” (p. 15). Often candidates have 90 sec-
onds or 60 seconds to make an argument, or 20 seconds for rebuttal. These 
short time restrictions are put in place to allow moderators and journalist 
panels to explore a very wide range of issues. But there is no space or time 
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to allow candidates to create necessary depth and articulate supporting 
evidence for their points.
George Farah (2004) goes the farthest of structural critics and argues that 
election debates keep particular kinds of arguments in play at the expense of 
others by design: “With the exception of the 1992 debates, which included 
Perot, presidential debate content has increasingly consisted of fundamental 
issues and narrow issues, at the expense of systemic issues focused on the dem-
ocratic process” (p. 126). Candidates are forced to split their arguments in 
their limited time, unable to make more helpful, sustained arguments to the 
audience. This is not accidental; on the contrary, Farah tells us that “rigid for-
mat requirements implemented by the Commission on Presidential Debates 
(CPD) seem designed to stifle, rather than inspire, actual debate between 
the candidates” (p. 90). Farrah concludes that the debates should be hosted 
by citizens and not political organizations. Sydney Kraus furthers this claim 
by pointing out that in 1988, the Markle Commission recommended that 
federal funding for campaigns be tied to debate participation (2000, p. 249). 
Debates, despite all of their restrictions, are considered to somehow still be 
valuable. Most debates are composed of very short speeches and rebuttals, 
often a minute or less, controlled ruthlessly by journalists who spend time 
quieting the crowd and cutting off candidate speeches. Within this environ-
ment, candidates are forced to be isolated, quick, and direct on the question 
at hand. The events are chaotic, designed around bizarre expectations that 
seem opposed to our normal assumptions of good debate.
Yet scholars are unwilling to give up the idea that these events are 
valuable. Preston (2005) examines the Clinton and Lazio debate in New 
York using a rubric derived from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s con-
cept of dissociation, but does not analyze the debate directly, discussing 
what would appeal to voters. Other studies are more on the right track, 
such as Robert Rowland (2018) who suggests that presidential debates 
can be valued by looking away from who made the better argument to 
the norms of public deliberation. Majdik, Kephart, and Goodnight (2008) 
make a similar claim, speaking of the debates as a place where political 
leadership is performed that shores up the limits of the democratic pub-
lic sphere. There appears to be great variety in defending the presidential 
debates, even if Farah and the structural critics are right that they are not 
“actual” debates.
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After examining all of this research, we are left with events that do 
not engage in what they aspire to, that are controlled and filtered by or-
ganizations not interested in open debate, that are constrained by the 
technical and optic limits of what television will tolerate — and yet they 
are thought of as so essential that missing one would be disastrous, or 
perhaps lose a candidate access to federal funding. How are we to make 
any sense of them? The way forward in redeeming election debates is to 
see them less as contests of facts, policy, and formal reason and more in 
the frame of the epideictic, the modality of ancient rhetoric responsible 
for praise, blame, celebration, and value. Candidates are engaged in con-
tests of advocacy: Can they prove they are the best advocate for the values 
of the constituents while at the same time proving they can act on those 
beliefs in Washington?
Sadly there doesn’t seem to be much hope in altering what we get 
from the media in terms of debates; as Kraus (2000) observes correctly, 
“power over format ultimately resides in the candidates’ camps” (p. 44). 
It’s simply true that a debate cannot happen if the candidates refuse to 
turn up. I suggest we should examine election debates as a different kind 
of argument-performance, one that relies very little on the assumed pres-
ence of the features of “normal” argument. From these contests, we get 
a sense of who we would like to identify with, who is our rhetorical co-
author of the story of this election. Rowland (2013) notices this when he 
laments the lack of argumentative reason in the Romney-Obama debates. 
Such a decline may be less novel than it is noticeable. The goal of election 
debates is not to be right, but to be convincing. Election debates are not 
about facts and truth, but about representation, and how well candidates 
do that for audiences.
ALTERNATIVES TO REASONED ARGUMENTATION
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric (1969) can speak to this 
question through the modality of the epideictic speech, something not 
traditionally considered a part of argumentation. Speeches of commem-
oration, commiseration, celebration, and dedication seem like frivolous 
traditional exercises that would have little to do with moving audiences 
toward argumentative conclusions, yet “epideictic oratory has significance 
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and importance for argumentation because it strengthens the disposi-
tion toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds” (p. 50). 
Audiences who hear such discourse are primed based on shared values, 
often conveyed in a narrative. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write:
Unlike the demonstration of a geometrical theorem, which estab-
lishes once and for all a logical connection between speculative 
truths, the argumentation in epideictic discourse sets out to in-
crease the intensity of adherence to certain values, which might not 
be contested when considered on their own but may nevertheless 
not prevail against other values that might come into conflict with 
them. The speaker tries to establish a sense of communion centered 
around particular values recognized by the audience, and to this 
end he uses the whole range of means available to the rhetorician 
for purposes of amplification and enhancement. (p. 51)
This seems to fit the typical election debate speech: relating the self to 
the community, demonstrating adherence to recognized audience values, 
and attempting to establish some communion around those values. This 
is very similar to Kenneth Burke’s (1969) suggestion that rhetoric is cen-
trally about identification and division — the quest of people to appear to 
be consubstantial with the places, ideas, and things they find most valu-
able. As Burke writes,
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests 
are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with 
B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they 
are, or is persuaded to believe so. (p. 20)
Rhetoric’s function is to create moments of identification through lan-
guage, symbol use, and persuasion. Once identification is made, Burke 
says that consubstantiality may occur. Rhetorically, it’s what the persuader 
wants to have happen:
You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by 
speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying 
your way with his. Persuasion by flattery is but a special case of 
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persuasion in general. But flattery can safely serve as our para-
digm if we systematically widen its meaning, to see behind it in 
the conditions of identification or consubstantiality in general. And 
you give the “signs” of such consubstantiality by deference to an 
audience’s “opinions.” (p. 55)
Burke suggests here the speaker is positing those “opinions” — in our 
case, the terms of value, while deferring to them via signs of agreement. 
Election debaters must choose and refine relevant values and suggest them 
not as a change of mind, but as present and established already. Candidates 
use these values to then connect their own actions and beliefs to prove 
they will be a good advocate.
Epideictic arguments are made in a quasi-logical form. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) write, “Only an effort of reduction or specification 
of a nonformal character makes it possible for these arguments to appear 
demonstrative” (p. 193). For quasi-logical argumentation to work, one 
must move discourse away from the formal to the informal. The speaker 
“is justified in visualizing each one of his listeners as simultaneously be-
longing to a number of disparate groups. . . . In such a case, he will, by 
a kind of fiction, insert his audience into a series of different audiences” 
(p. 22). By doing so, the speaker then creates arguments based on the 
conception of unity injected rhetorically into the audience’s conception 
of who they are and why they are listening. The speaker in an election 
debate seeks consubstantiality with the audience by positing both the im-
portance of the identity and values of the audience and how they represent 
that combination. We expect to see powerful amplifications of value that 
are peppered with rich descriptions of various positions one could hold 
within the community, while still connecting them into a whole the can-
didate can articulate, advocate, and defend.
The audience, as a site of judgment and consideration of the value and 
importance of the arguments made by the rhetor, necessarily becomes a 
source for the creation of argumentation by the speaker. With a concep-
tion of who the audience is, and the insertion of that identity into the 
audience by a call for unity around values or beliefs that define the group, 
the speaker has a much better chance of persuasion:
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The great orator, the one with a hold on his listeners, seems an-
imated by the very mind of his audience. This is not the case for 
the ardent enthusiast whose sole concern is with what he himself 
considers important. A speaker of this kind may have some effect 
on suggestible persons, but generally speaking his speech will strike 
his audience as unreasonable. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyeteca, 
1969, p. 24)
Here we find the central danger to candidates around this formula-
tion. Speaking about what one thinks is important without enough varied 
contextualization is worse than being boring. Candidates who fail to con-
nect are wrong, unreasonable, unpersuasive. Once the audience’s values 
are evoked and amplified, the speaker must connect everything they say 
to that whole. Charland (1987) calls this “constitutive rhetoric,” where 
the audience is theorized as a construction of the speaker rather than ad-
dressed as something external to the speech.
When speaking in an election debate, one speaks for and about the 
audience in terms of values: “In the epideictic, more than in any other kind 
of oratory, the speaker must have qualifications for speaking on his subject 
and must also be skillful in its presentation, if he is not to appear ridicu-
lous. For it is not his own cause or viewpoint that he is defending, but that 
of his entire audience” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 52). Failing 
to do well is seen as a poor parody of the audience, or worse — someone 
who is pandering, who isn’t really interested in the shared values of the 
community at all, using the values to get a position they don’t deserve.
We should see election debates as referenda on our celebrated vir-
tues and values. In doing so, a potential rubric for evaluating candidates 
begins to take shape. We expect candidates to perform commitment to 
them in order to pass judgment. If we don’t like what we see, we no lon-
ger believe in that candidate as a representative of our values. Candidates 
lose debates when they fail to properly connect themselves, the audience, 
and their ideas to the national order. Election debates become referenda 
on whether candidates can be elastic, powerful speakers able to articulate 
and defend both our local and national values in the face of varied and 
changing situations that demand response.
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DEVELOPING A USEFUL HEURISTIC
Recently the rise of political fact check sites and truth meters on cable 
news networks indicates a desire among debate viewers for objective 
rubrics for the evaluation of election debates. However, the function of 
campaign debates remains a function of what candidates want them to 
be — safe and secure. The joint press conference criticism assumes that 
there is no other way to examine election debates other than as full-on 
debates using objective standards for argument evaluation.
I suggest a shift away from fact checking and toward the epideictic. 
Election debates can be understood as complex rhetorical events meant to 
establish a convincing story of shared value, and then candidates use that 
story to prove their superiority. Through the debate, they attempt to hold on 
to a consistent story about themselves in this world as their opponent tries 
to prove inconsistency. This is a battle of narratives and consistency more 
than accuracy and good research. Candidates would be better positioned 
to treat debates as chances to celebrate themselves and their audience as 
lauders of a set of unquestionably good values and practices.
To this end, I have developed a four-part model for election debates 
based on the ancient rhetorical tool of the stasis — a set of questions that 
ancient rhetoricians would use to develop discourse on a question in order 
to find the most important disagreement. This model differs from other 
debate analyses as it is designed to seek out the portions of discourse that 
are most likely to engender audience identification with the speaker and 





Framework refers to any descriptors of what’s “out there,” what ex-
ists, and what things require our attention. These can be descriptions of 
either material or conceptual things that are known by the audience to 
be present in the world. Framework is essential because within candidate 
descriptions of reality, they indicate their consubstantiality with the val-
ues of the audience. The framework could spark a candidate to develop a 
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vision or be the site of action they took that communicates their identi-
fication with the values of the community.
Principle refers to any statements the candidate makes about what 
they stand for. Principles are commonly statements that are ideological 
or philosophical commitments — “I believe in an America where all have 
opportunity” would be considered principle. Often, candidates will ex-
press principles before they discuss a very specific past achievement or a 
future law or policy they would pursue.
Vision is any statement by a candidate about what he or she will do if 
elected. Any perspective about an action or a commitment they will make 
when elected, or anything they might plan for when going to Washington 
counts. Vision is important because it shows audiences that the candidate 
is an advocate for the beliefs and values of the community. They don’t just 
believe — they have a plan to defend and promote the good values of the 
people who put them in office.
Action statements are perhaps the most concrete of any in the de-
bates. This is where candidates discuss things they have done that prove 
their commitment to values. Something as general as serving in the mil-
itary, volunteering locally, or another action they did in their life or job 
can count. Most of the time candidates do not have a major successful 
piece of legislation to stand on to make their point — they are new to the 
job. They must rely on comparison to their past activities or metaphors 
as to put voters’ minds at ease and assure the audience that their work in 
Congress is going to make a difference.
These four elements are usually in concert, but often election debaters 
will combine them to generate more leverage on an issue. The better a can-
didate can speak to all four in a response, the better they are performing 
on that question and possibly in the entire debate. The presence of one or 
more of the elements in multiple iterations in a candidate speech might be 
an indicator that a very particular test of values is underway in that ques-
tion, and the candidate is responding by shoring up what they perceive 
is a weakness in their performance. Full presentation of all four elements 
would be necessary to clearly establish the local through the national, or 
vice versa, in the epideictic contest of election debating.
When candidates interact in election debates, they can be understood 
through two conceptions offered by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. The 
first is argument by dissociation, which “assumes the original unity of 
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elements comprised within a single conception and designated by a sin-
gle notion” (1969, p. 416). Dissociation is the rearticulating of a viewpoint 
to prevent perceived incompatibilities. The authors realize this theory in 
the idea of the argument pair, where a distinction between two different 
terms explains an incompatibility, as opposed to simply arguing that not 
enough evidence is apparent. Responses can reframe incompatible aspects 
of a position by renaming that position in a way that provides consistency 
and cogency. So a candidate might relabel the term of their opponent 
to situate them outside of the community of shared values: “He calls it 
leadership, but it’s simply selfish party politics” would be an example of 
a dissociative attack on a point of action or vision. Any statement under 
any of the four elements can be used to attempt to dissociate a candidate 
from the values in question during a debate. Dissociation is present when 
a candidate tries to indicate their opponent’s statements are out of line 
with audience belief or with the meaning of other statements made by the 
opponent during the debate.
ANALYSIS: NATIONAL REVELATIONS IN LOCAL DEBATING
It is a given that congressional district debating would only hold interest 
for those who live and work in the district in question. But contrast that 
very reasonable assumption with the national attention that the 2018 spe-
cial elections in Georgia and Pennsylvania garnered. The Pennsylvania 
special election has over 2,200 views in the C-SPAN Video Library, 
dwarfing all other congressional election debates for that year by at least 
a factor of 10. That debate in particular can be seen as a referendum on 
national values.
In each exchange, the candidates attempt to prove that they are the 
best representative of both local and national values and deserve the seat. 
Speakers who use carefully balanced ratios of the four elements are able 
to address this question most directly in a way that pushes the idea of 
choice to the side and foregrounds the idea of appropriateness. Since they 
already stand for those values, no choice needs to be made. Candidates 
then work toward making themselves consubstantial with both the local 
values and the national issues.
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Minnesota’s 3rd Congressional District Debate of 2016
The first debate between incumbent Erik Paulsen (R-MN) and candi-
date Terri Bonoff (D) is a good example of how election debates fuse the 
national and local together under an epistemic term or terms. Both can-
didates offered opening statements that are instructive for how election 
debates can be seen as epideictic contests.
The journalist-moderator called the debate “more of a conversation,” 
placing the candidates in very comfortable chairs sitting around a coffee 
table. These attempts to purge debate of its negative associations — par-
tisan cheering, talking over one another, and forceful arguing — actually 
might assist audience members in framing the debate as a contest of per-
spectives on values rather than a quest for factual accuracy.
Here is Terri Bonoff giving her opening statement in the first debate:
Bonoff: I am running for Congress because I believe in the prom-
ise of this country and its people [Principle]. It is more im-
portant now than ever before that we elect courageous lead-
ers who can bring people together on both sides of the aisle 
to tackle our real tough challenges [Principle/Framework]. 
In the Minnesota Senate I have earned a reputation for do-
ing just that. As a pro-business Democrat, I work with the 
Minnesota Chamber to create the Minnesota Pipeline project 
[Action]. That program was really about getting rid of stu-
dent debt and addressing the skills gap. It connected students 
with employers. They got on-the-job training, got paid wages 
while getting the degree. When they are done they actually 
have a job. That work has been written about twice in the last 
year by Forbes magazine [Action]. It is that kind of bold lead-
ership that I will bring to Congress where it is sorely lacking 
[Vision]. Congressman Paulsen, you have been there — you 
have been there eight years and I think you have contributed 
to that gridlock, to that obstructionist congress [Action dis-
sociation]. And I also believe you have voted too often on the 
wrong side of history, with the extreme part of the right-wing 
part of your party [Action dissociation]. So I believe I have 
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the values and the vision to represent this district [Principle]. 
(Minnesota House 3rd District Debate, 2016).
Bonoff’s use of dissociative argument attempts to place Paulsen outside 
the realm of appropriate principle (bipartisanship) and action (working 
across institutions) by indicating obstructionist behavior in party votes. 
She communicates her actions as consubstantial with Minnesotan’s val-
ues of hard work and the desire for good jobs, but never really connects 
these actions to a clear vision or to the principle of representation. To 
make it stronger, a step-by-step connection should be pursued: I am run-
ning for Congress because I see [Framework] and it’s similar to the time 
I [Action] because I believe in [Principle] and I can take that experience 
to Washington and fix things [Vision].
Looking to Paulsen’s opening statement, we see a bit of a differ-
ent approach:
Paulsen: I am running for Congress once again. Now is a time 
when Minnesota expects its elected leaders, now more 
than any other time, to work across the aisle bipartisanly 
[Framework]. Transcend partisan politics. And I’ve got a 
great track record of doing that, I’m gonna continue to do that 
[Vision], whether it’s repealing the medical device tax, which 
focuses on keeping high-paying jobs in the state, high-paying 
jobs that are so critical in all of Minnesota [Action]. I worked 
on that with Senator Klobuchar and I was persistent [Action]. 
It took five years to get that across the finish line, to suspend 
that tax, so sometimes it can take a while, or sometimes there 
may be an issue that moves quicker, such as stopping hu-
man trafficking or sex trafficking, also a very bipartisan issue 
[Action]. We were able to do that in less than a year and it’s 
literally saving lives. Recently I passed a missing children bill 
which will help find missing children and put sex offenders 
behind bars [Action]. And so we are in a time now with parti-
san gridlock, with partisan politics, and I want to continue to 
be a part of a constructive solution to move the ball forward 
[Vision]. (Minnesota House 3rd District Debate, 2016).
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Paulsen doesn’t discuss Principle, primarily because he is the incum-
bent. What is interesting here is how Paulsen makes the national issue, 
brought up by Bonoff, of the lack of leadership precisely the heart of a 
local issue as well. By blending those two issues into one response that 
can be addressed by drawing on Action, Paulsen can discuss Principle 
and Vision much less, since he’s convincingly indicating that he stands 
for the value of bipartisan leadership both nationally and in ways that 
Minnesotans can appreciate. Paulsen makes the connection that Bonhoff 
should have made — that of Washington Vision with local Action. Paulsen 
does it in reverse since he’s the incumbent: Washington Action supported 
local Principles, which is his Vision of representation.
Both opening speeches share the Framework of bipartisanship and are 
very strong on accomplishments. The candidates’ lack of development on 
Vision and Principle don’t take enough advantage of their accomplishments, 
placing them in better relations with other elements so that audiences can 
see the potential each candidate could offer. By contrast, an election under 
different circumstances, without an incumbent, accesses a different met-
ric for evaluation. Candidates express themselves quite a bit differently.
Pennsylvania’s 18th District Special Election Congressional Debate
Congressman Tim Murphy (R-PA), accused of ethics violations, resigned 
his seat in Pennsylvania’s 18th District, opening up a special election con-
test between Democrat Conor Lamb and Republican Rick Saccone. The 
difference in this debate is fascinating, as it simultaneously seems to be a 
contest between who best represents the district’s values and the values 
expressed by the presidency of Donald Trump. Both candidates must fig-
ure out a way to situate the values of the people in the district with their 
support of Trump or rejection of his policies.
The question of integrity — based on Tim Murphy’s resignation — starts 
the debate, and Conor Lamb is first to answer:
Moderator: If you win, what specific steps will you take to be a man 
of your word?
Lamb: I learned to be a man of my word from my father and my 
grandfather [Action]. I had the privilege of growing up in 
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a great family that has a lot of fun but is also very demand-
ing [Action]. And when I became a little older I also had 
the honor of a lifetime of becoming an officer in the United 
States Marine Corps [Action]. I didn’t become an officer in 
the Marines to change for anybody [Principle]. When I took 
the oath for the first time I thought about the phrase sem-
per fidelis. It means always. Some things are nonnegotiable 
[Principle]. Telling the truth, having integrity, and treat-
ing your people right are just basic things that we live by 
[Principle]. There is one thing we say in the Marines: Officers 
eat last. We take it literally. When the whole group gets to-
gether for Thanksgiving dinner or dinner out in the field, 
the highest ranking officer goes to the end of the line and the 
junior ranking Marine eats first [Principle]. And that’s how 
we treat each other — you always put your people first, and 
that’s what I’ll do [Vision]. (Pennsylvania 18th Congressional 
District Debate, 2018)
Through a series of listed Actions, Lamb encounters and embraces 
Principles that he clearly understands are important. He doesn’t posit 
them, but indicates how he came to understand and accept them. He then 
takes these Principles and uses them to support a Vision of his work in 
Washington. Lamb allows the audience to journey with him through these 
experiences. Lamb is able to take the values of the Marines and translate 
them as very clear, very common values of service and respect, claiming 
these are his daily practices and he will employ them in his congressio-
nal service.
Let’s examine Saccone’s response to the same question:
Saccone: I’ve always lived by my word [Principle]. I spent 18 years 
in the United States Air Force. I’ve been a military com-
mander — I commanded troops, they depended on me to be a 
man of my word. [Action] I’ve worked in the state legislature 
where every word you say is picked apart and put on camera 
every day. All my speeches and all my appearances are put up 
on my website and so forth [Action], and so I’m always — I’m 
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always very much aware that your word matters and people 
will look at that [Principle], and I think that the people in the 
18th district know that I’ve kept my word from the various 
campaign promises I made 8 years ago. I followed all of those 
campaign promises and I believe I kept them all [Action]. 
So I think I’m known as a man of integrity and a man of my 
word, and I will continue that in the U.S. Congress [Vision]. 
(Pennsylvania 18th Congressional District Debate, 2018)
Saccone falls victim to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s warning that 
discussing what matters to the speaker might be perceived as unreasonable. 
Lamb’s speech addressed the audience in a way that Saccone’s could not: 
Lamb offered the audience experiences that they might have shared — grow-
ing up, getting a job, and determining one’s values. Saccone looked at his 
own life and found examples of action that remain disconnected to au-
dience life experience. Lamb develops his identity within a community 
context of honesty, while Saccone treats it as an object. The difference is 
very stark. Saccone makes little attempt to connect to the national or lo-
cal values, believing his record as a state representative can stand on its 
own. He reaches for a position of expertise, when the best way to indicate 
expertise in values might be lived experiences.
Later in the debate, a journalist asks — in one of the potentially strang-
est debate questions of all time — how the candidates would rank a list of 
random priorities for government involvement:
Journalist: Rank them in order of your spending priority: infra-
structure, opioid epidemic, education, border wall.
Saccone: It’s not an either-or in government [Principle]. Budgets 
are large and there are many, many priorities in there 
[Framework]. Yes, walls are important, walls work [Principle]. 
I’ve been to Israel; I’ve seen the wall that they built and the 
results of what they’ve done there [Action]. Walls in other 
countries have worked [Framework]. We need to secure 
our border; we need to do that for national security reasons 
[Vision]. The opioid crisis — I want to spend a lot more time 
on that because it’s something I’ve spent a lot of time on and 
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it’s very important, and we need to work on that too [Action/
Vision]. It’s a different answer to a different question. So I 
would say we need to do both of those things [Vision].
Moderator: So it’s infrastructure, education, opioids, and the border 
wall — can you rank those please?
Saccone: Again, I say they are all important [Principle]. And we 
are going to get them all done [Vision]. (Pennsylvania 18th 
Congressional District Debate, 2018)
Saccone attempts a dissociative argument here using Framework. 
Governments can do several priorities at once — this is how they work. 
The dissociation of resource and priority isn’t accurate. The incompat-
ibility of a list with his own priorities is answered by movement to the 
second term of “government.” Without a priority list, Saccone feels safe to 
discuss his expertise via personal experience. Ultimately, the actions feel 
disconnected and don’t allow him space or time to communicate his be-
liefs. Saccone tries for the best of both worlds, but ends up speaking only 
about his experiences mostly, not connecting them to the values of the dis-
trict, or even the values that might be shared nationally with the district.
Lamb’s response accepts the list and uses it to craft a thread of value 
positions:
Lamb: To answer your question, I would vote for infrastructure 
first [Vision]. People in both parties are tellin’ us right now 
that we have three trillion dollars’ worth of infrastructure pro-
grams that we are behind on [Framework]. That’s our roads, 
that’s our bridges. Here in Pittsburgh that’s our locks and 
dams [Framework]. Unfortunately, my opponent is someone 
who has voted time and again against those very programs 
at the state level, even when they are backed by Republicans 
[Action dissociation]. So, highways and bridges — every-
body gets to ride on them, no matter what party they are 
[Principle]. I think they’re important [Vision]. Next for me 
would be the heroin epidemic. It’s life or death. In the next 
5 years we could lose 300,000 people to the heroin epidemic 
[Framework]. If we were losing that many in a war, we would 
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stop at nothing to stop it [Principle]. I think that’s the most 
important. Education to me would probably be next. We can’t 
continue cutting our public schools because class sizes go up, 
we lose programs [Vision]. The border wall is 25 billion, it’s 
expensive. I’ve seen that it’s our ports of entry that need the 
most investment [Vision]. The number one entry point for 
fentanyl in the United States is JFK airport — we need security 
there [Framework].
Moderator: That’s it for that question. (Pennsylvania 18th Con gres-
sional District Debate, 2018)
Lamb provides here a great example of how to accomplish a lot 
given a very difficult question and limited time. Notice the pairings 
here — Framework with Vision or Principle — something we don’t get 
from Saccone. This pairing works well to allow the choice to be pushed 
off onto “reality” rather than Lamb’s priority or preference. Lamb moves 
seamlessly between the local and the national as he discusses deteriorating 
Pittsburgh bridges and JFK airport as an unsecured drug trafficking site. 
He also manages to explain the inconsistencies in Saccone’s response by 
dissociating him from America and the 18th District’s roads and placing 
him with the state legislature Republicans, voting against their interests. 
Lamb’s speech immediately connects him to the larger community values, 
and then creates a springboard for articulating his vision. Most importantly, 
he gives us grist for the mill — we are able to evaluate his positions and 
feelings because he articulates them rather than depending on expertise.
Next the journalists turn to the issue of North Korea, and this response 
indicates the importance of establishing good dissociation in election de-
bates. The first question goes to Saccone, who expresses his position on 
North Korea, and his own values, quite clearly:
Moderator: You’re an expert, you’ve lived in North Korea — what’s 
the one thing you wanna tell President Trump about how to 
deal with that situation?
Saccone: My purpose if I were to get to Washington would be to 
advise the president on how to resolve this situation with 
North Korea from wherever we are at that time [Vision]. It 
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does no good to criticize from where we came or how we got 
there[Principle]. It would be how do we find our endpoint, 
resolving the situation from wherever we are at that time 
[Vision]. I’m the only one who has the skill set to do that 
[Principle]. My opponent doesn’t even know the difference 
between North and South Korea. I’ve been there, I’ve lived 
a year inside there, I’ve successfully negotiated with North 
Koreans, I’ve actually written two books about it [Action]. So 
that would be my purpose and that’s how I would approach 
that. There is a path in dealing with North Korea. It’s very 
narrow [Framework]. But I feel like I’m the only one who has 
the skill set to reach that path [Action].
Moderator: Mr. Lamb, you can respond to that — I’m pretty sure 
you know the difference between North and South Korea, 
but you can respond.
Lamb: You and everyone watching knows that, Shannon, so thank 
you. It’s amazing the lengths that they’ll go to on the other 
side to say things that aren’t true [Action dissociation]. But 
I think we do agree that negotiation is necessary, that we 
need experienced diplomats over there [Principle] — unfor-
tunately we’ve seen a lot of people leave the State Department 
in this administration. which makes it hard to get the basic 
work done [Framework], but look, we don’t need another 
vote against North Korea in Congress [Principle]. What we 
need in Congress are people who are willing to stand up to 
the leadership on both sides, oppose cuts in Medicaid, op-
pose all the other cuts that the Republican Party is known 
for right now and pass a budget that’s for our people, that 
gets infrastructure done, that protects Social Security and 
Medicare — that’s what we need in Congress [Principle]. 
(Penn sylvania 18th Congressional District Debate)
Instead of a direct response — something like proving he’s smart enough 
to address North Korean issues, Lamb dissociates again, explaining this 
attack by placing Saccone in the camp of “the other side.” He then asso-
ciates North Korea not as a case of individual expertise, but a sweeping 
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problem of leadership. He indicates his vision, that of strong, stand-up 
leadership, is what is needed, not just another vote. Compared to Saccone’s 
answer, we see Lamb is demonstrative not of knowledge of North Korea 
but of an embodiment of the values of the district and a clear path to how 
to translate that knowledge on a national stage. If North Korea is just an-
other issue that requires a particular kind of leadership, then Saccone’s 
specific experiences are no longer relevant. Again, Saccone relies on tradi-
tional ethos, while Lamb uses every opportunity to express differentiation 
across terms to indicate his relevance to voters and his stance nationally.
In the Pennsylvania debate we find Conor Lamb is better at connecting 
the local and the national through careful use of Framework in relation to 
Principle and Vision. Rick Saccone concentrates on Action without much 
Framework, and does not develop Vision and Principle. He’s left without 
a place to connect his accomplishments and provide a demonstration that 
he can embody the values of his district. Even comparing the points of 
Vision and Action between the speeches, we find that Saccone talks more 
about his qualifications and Lamb talks more about the state of the coun-
try and the people of Pennsylvania’s 18th District.
The most contemporary example is from the recent Texas Senate race 
between Representative Beto O’Rourke (D-TX) and incumbent Senator 
Ted Cruz (R-TX). These debates serve as a very good example of the 
evaluative criteria primarily because both candidates are very skilled at 
deploying both a wide range of examples across the elements and develop-
ing dissociative arguments. What’s interesting is the contrasting strategies 
in priority of element deployment.
The First Senate Debate in the Texas 2018 Election
The Texas Senate Debates of 2018 (Figure 1.2) can be considered a master 
class in dissociation. Both candidates are very good at not getting caught 
up in the idea that the debate is meant to prove something true or correct. 
Both candidates understand the debate is meant to be an opportunity to 
share reasons why they stand for the values that are best for the voters as 
well as in line with how they feel about national concerns.
Immigration was the first issue in this debate, and O’Rourke started 
the debate with this speech:
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O’Rourke: My wife Amy and I were in Booker, Texas. We traveled 
to every one of the 254 counties, one of the reddest com-
munities in the state [Action], and we were surprised as we 
were goin’ door to door to hear that the number one concern 
of the people of that community was the fate of Dreamers 
[Framework]. There are nearly 200,000 in the state of Texas 
and the salutatorian of Booker High School had just been de-
ported back to his country of origin — and to everyone there 
was concern about his welfare, but they were also concerned 
about the fact that he had been just sent back to a country 
whose language he didn’t speak, where he no longer had fam-
ily connections, where if he was successful against those long 
odds he’d be successful there, for that place, and not here for 
Texas [Framework]. There is no better people than those of us 
here in this state, Republicans and Democrats, independents 
alike [Principle]. The defining border experience, the defin-
ing immigrant experience and state to rewrite our immigra-
tion laws in our own image [Vision]. To ensure that we begin 
by freeing Dreamers from the fear of deportation by making 
them U.S. citizens so they can contribute to their full poten-
tial, to the success not just of themselves and their families 
FIGURE 1.2 2018 Texas U.S. Senate debate.
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but to this country [Vision]. The economists who’ve studied 
it have said that we will lose hundreds of billions of dollars 
to the negative if we deport them; we will gain hundreds of 
billions to the positive if we keep them here [Vision]. Senator 
Cruz has promised to deport each and every single Dreamer. 
That cannot be the way that Texas leads on this important 
issue [Action dissociation]. (Texas Senate Debate, 2018)
O’Rourke’s point here seems clear. He’s in direct contact with every-
thing that’s out there in connection to immigration. But the Vision falls a 
bit short — it is unclear what O’Rourke wishes to do to enact his Principle. 
It seems to be immigration reform, but a more direct response would be to 
save Booker from losing valuable community members. Placing Ted Cruz 
outside of the Principles of Texas is dissociation: Cruz claims to lead Texas 
and the nation here, but would deport good members of Texas commu-
nities. In the end, O’Rourke needs a clearer Vision-Principle connection 
and a return to Action near the end to make the strongest possible case. 
O’Rourke appears to be building his arguments in this sequence: Action 
→ Framework → Principle → Vision. Spelled out, it would be that the trip 
to the 254 Texas counties revealed the Dreamer situation as a bipartisan 
problem requiring a reconceptualization of national immigration law pro-
vided by adherence and articulation of Texas values on a national level. 
But he is not direct enough in his articulation. Plus, that’s a mouthful for 
less than a minute of provided time.
Let’s examine Ted Cruz’s response to the same question:
Cruz: You know, this issue presents a stark divide between 
Congressman O’Rourke and me. My views on immigration 
are simple, and I’ve summed them up many times in just 
four words: legal good, illegal bad [Principle]. I think the 
vast majority of Texans agree with that [Framework]. I think 
that when it comes to immigration, we need to do everything 
humanly possible to secure the border [Vision]. That means 
building a wall [Vision]. That means technology, that means 
infrastructure, that means boots on the ground [Vision], and 
we can do all of that at the same time that we are welcoming 
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and celebrating legal immigrants [Action]. There is a right 
way to come into this country [Principle]. You wait in line, 
you follow the rules like my father did in 1957 when he came 
from Cuba — he fled oppression and he came to Texas, he 
came seeking freedom [Principle]. We’re a state and we’re 
a nation built by immigrants [Framework]. But it’s striking 
that Congressman O’Rourke — over and over and over again 
his focus seems to be on fighting for illegal immigrants and 
forgetting the millions and millions of Americans, you know, 
Americans are dreamers also [Action dissociation]. And 
granting U.S. citizenship to 12 million people who are here 
illegally is a serious mistake. I think Congressman O’Rourke 
is out of step with Texas on that [Framework/Action dissoci-
ation]. (Texas Senate Debate, 2018)
Cruz’s dissociation is much clearer and more effective than O’Rourke’s. 
Cruz emphasizes national values as commensurate with Texas values with 
zero overlap. This makes Cruz appear to understand Texas values in a way 
that is actionable — he lists several points of vision based on the idea of 
legal immigration which he posits as a Texas central value. Cruz’s argu-
ment might not be in step or out of step with Texas, but it can be rendered: 
Principle → Vision → Framework → Action. Texans support a coherent 
approach to immigration for the United States that is clear and effective. 
This is a much more basic articulation of values than O’Rourke’s. Cruz’s 
vision is simplistic, but articulated every effectively. O’Rourke has a much 
more visionary perspective, which is fine, as long as it can be communi-
cated well through the dissociative challenges. His response shows how 
he tries to build consensus around Texas values:
O’Rourke: I’ll tell ya about being out of step with Texas. Senator 
Cruz has sponsored legislation that would have this country 
build a 2,000-mile wall 30 feet high at a cost of 30 billion dol-
lars [Vision dissociation] and that wall will not be built on the 
international border between the United States and Mexico, 
which is the center line of the Rio Grande [Framework disso-
ciation]. It will be built on someone’s farm, someone’s ranch, 
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someone’s property, someone’s homestead, using the power 
of imminent domain to take their property at a time of record 
security and safety on the border [Action/Vision dissocia-
tion]. Senator John Cornyn and I introduced legislation that 
would invest in our ports of entry, where the vast majority 
of everyone and everything that comes into this country first 
crosses [Action]. Knowing who or what come in here makes 
us safer, it allows us to lead on the issues of immigration re-
form [Principle/Vision]. (Texas Senate Debate, 2018)
O’Rourke has a powerful argument here, that Texas values are so 
strong they are not only in concert with where the nation is, they also lead 
national changes in values on major issues such as immigration. This ar-
gument is very difficult to construct in the light of Cruz’s simple good/
bad dichotomy, which resonates with nearly every American listening. 
O’Rourke attempts to dissociate Cruz from every major term of his ar-
gument, indicating that each claim he made is not “in step” with Texas 
values. O’Rourke believes he’s more at the center of Texas values by sug-
gesting leadership on the national immigration discussion. Cruz believes 
that enforcing extant American law will be enough.
This exchange shows how candidates should be to stay on track with 
the progression of Framework to Action. As Beto O’Rourke shifts from 
immigration reform toward border security, his arguments about Action 
and Principle on security are underdeveloped within his Framework ar-
guments and the dissociative challenge to his position on DACA. Cruz 
has a more coherent articulation of Vision within the Framework, plac-
ing O’Rourke as “out of step” — one of these debate phrases that the media 
loves to circulate. We move very quickly from the status of Dreamers to 
the question of border security. O’Rourke has a complex position that re-
quires a bit more careful attention.
As a final example, the issue of police violence on African Americans 
was introduced this way by the moderator, and posed it to Cruz:
Moderator: Senator Cruz, this question is to you. This month in 
Dallas, Officer Amber Guyger shot Botham Jean, a Black man, 
in his own apartment. Why did you caution Representative 
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O’Rourke and others not to jump to conclusions in this case 
when the Texas Rangers and the Dallas County District 
Attorney said she committed manslaughter?
Cruz: What happened to Mr. Jean was horrific [Principle]. Nobody 
should be in their own home and be shot and killed in their 
own home [Principle]. It was tragic [Principle]. Now, the 
officer as I understand it has contended that it was a tragic 
mistake [Framework]. It was a case where she thought she 
was in her own apartment. She thought he was an intruder 
[Framework]. Right now today, I don’t know what hap-
pened that evening. Congressman O’Rourke doesn’t know 
what happened that evening [Framework], but he imme-
diately called for firing the officer [Action]. I think that’s 
a mistake [Principle]. We have a criminal justice system, a 
criminal justice system that will determine what happened 
that night [Framework]. If she violated the law, if she did 
that intentionally, she’ll face the consequences, but without 
knowing the fact before a trial, before juries heard the evi-
dence, Congressman O’Rourke is ready to convict her, ready 
to fire her, and I’ll tell you it’s a troubling pattern [Principle 
dissociation]. Over and over again, Congressman O’Rourke 
when faced with an issue about police and law enforcement, 
he sides against the police [Principle dissociation]. In the 
United States Congress, he voted against allowing funds to 
go to body armor for sheriffs [Action dissociation]. When 
it comes to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, he has 
said he’s open to abolishing that law enforcement agency 
[Vision dissociation], and just this week, Congressman 
O’Rourke described law enforcement, described police offi-
cers as modern-day Jim Crow [Action dissociation]. Let me 
say something, I’ve gotten enough police officers all across 
this state that is offensive [Principle]. Just today, Fort Worth 
is burying Officer Garrett Hull with his wife Sabrina and two 
kids who was shot in the head risking his life. Here today, 
Officer Bryan Graham, an Arlington SWAT officer, was shot 
in the head [Framework].
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Moderator: Senator, I’m going to have to stop —
Cruz: He is here and every day police officers risk their lives for 
us [Framework]. Officer Graham is standing there, his two 
kids. He took a bullet in the head protecting us, and let me 
say right now I think it is offensive to call police officers mod-
ern-day Jim Crow [Principle]. That is not Texas.
Moderator: That’s your time, Senator. Please, please audience. 
Please, no applause. (Texas Senate Debate, 2018)
Ted Cruz starts with multiple Principles — it’s tragic, it’s not accept-
able to be killed in one’s home — and moves into dissociating O’Rourke 
from law and order. He claims that O’Rourke cannot support law and or-
der by stating that we are in a new “Jim Crow.” The Framework of police 
violence follows to prove that the police are sacrificing themselves for our 
protection. The vast number of Principle-statements outnumber all other 
elements, and there’s no mention of Vision or articulation of a plan for 
addressing the issue. Cruz feels comfortable standing in the middle of the 
value relation he’s constructed, that of the police. There’s no policy here 
except to reject the inconsistent and out-of-step O’Rourke.
O’Rourke always attempts to move to Vision in his speeches, and in 
his response, there’s little difference:
O’Rourke: What Senator Cruz said is simply untrue. I did not call 
police officers modern-day Jim Crow, and I as well as Senator 
Cruz and everyone here mourn the passing of Officer Hull 
in Fort Worth [Action]. My Uncle Raymond was a sheriff ’s 
deputy in El Paso. In fact, he was the captain of the El Paso 
County Jail [Framework]. He’s the one who taught me to 
shoot and the responsibility and accountability that comes 
with owning a gun, but he also taught me what it means to 
serve everyone, to be sworn to protect and serve everyone 
in a community, not just some people [Principle]. With the 
tragic shooting death of Botham Jean you have another un-
armed Black man killed in this country by law enforcement 
[Framework]. Now, no member of law enforcement wants 
that to happen [Principle]. No member of this community 
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wants that to happen, but we’ve got to do something bet-
ter than what we’ve been doing so far [Vision]. If African 
Americans represent 13% of the population in this coun-
try, and they represent one-third of those who are shot by 
law enforcement, we have something wrong [Principle/
Framework]. If we have the largest prison population on the 
face of the planet and it is disproportionately comprised of 
people of color, we have something wrong in this country 
[Framework/Principle]. Republicans and Democrats should 
be able to work together with law enforcement and members 
of the community for real, lasting, meaningful criminal jus-
tice reform [Vision]. (Texas Senate Debate, 2018)
O’Rourke establishes bipartisanship as the key part of his Vision. His 
Framework highlights events and facts that lead us to think that something 
is very wrong in law enforcement. Violence against the police exists and is 
not a Texas value; he’s against it. O’Rourke suggests that his Principles will 
lead him to push for criminal justice reform when in Washington, but this 
remains underdeveloped. Comparing O’Rourke to Cruz, we see a superior 
development of the move from Principle-Framework-Vision in O’Rourke 
to Cruz’s choice of Principle-Framework. This prompts the follow-up from 
the moderator, pushing on Cruz’s lack of rhetoric we could call Vision:
Moderator: Congressman, that’s your time. A quick follow-up to 
you, Senator Cruz, do you agree that police violence against 
unarmed African Americans is a problem, and if so, how 
would you fix it?
Cruz: I believe everyone’s right should be protected regardless of 
your race, regardless of your ethnicity, but I’ll tell you some-
thing [Principle]. I’ve been to too many police funerals. I was 
here in Dallas when five police officers were gunned down 
because of irresponsible and hateful rhetoric [Action]. I was 
at the funeral in Houston at Second Baptist Church where 
Deputy Goforth had been shot in the back of the head at a 
service station because of irresponsible and hateful rhetoric 
[Action]. Just now, Congressman O’Rourke repeated things 
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he knows aren’t true [Framework dissociation]. He stated 
for example White police officers are shooting unarmed 
African American children [Framework dissociation]. The 
Washington Post fact checked that claim and concluded 
Congressman O’Rourke was wrong, but I’ll tell you some-
thing — that rhetoric does damage [Principle].
Moderator: Senator —
Cruz: That rhetoric divides us on race [Principle]. It inflames ha-
tred [Principle]. We should be bringing people together in-
stead of suggesting the police are risking their lives to protect 
all of us, to protect African Americans, to protect Hispanics 
and turning people against the police people [Vision]. (Texas 
Senate Debate, 2018)
Candidates often violate time constraints in order to convince the 
audience that they are overcome with passion about an important is-
sue. Cruz dissociates O’Rourke from reality, or Framework, and tries to 
connect this to his indictment of irresponsible rhetoric. Cruz needs to es-
tablish a competing Vision of the world that he has to be able to match 
O’Rourke on Vision. Here, Cruz is lacking. But it might not matter due 
to the double- down on Principle that has governed Cruz’s total approach 
on this question. After Cruz’s heated speech, audience applause becomes 
the focus of the moderators’ ire, and the candidates share a moment of 
“illicit” direct engagement, which is also revealing:
Moderator: Senator, please.
Cruz: I think it’s profoundly —
O’Rourke: This is why people don’t like Washington, D.C [Frame-
work]. You just said something that I did not say —
Cruz: What did you not say?
O’Rourke: — and attributed it to me.
Cruz: What did you not say?
O’Rourke: I’m not going to repeat. I’m not going to repeat the slan-
der [Action].
Moderator: Audience, please —
Cruz: So what is it then?
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O’Rourke: I’m not going to repeat the slander [Action].
Cruz: You’re not going to say what you did say [Action dissocia-
tion]?
O’Rourke: This is your trick in the trade, to confuse and to incite 
based on fear and not to speak the truth [Vision dissocia-
tion]. This is a very serious issue and it warrants the truth and 
the facts [Principle]. (Texas Senate Debate, 2018)
Here O’Rourke attempts to use Principle in a meta-move to put Cruz 
as outside of the ideals of justice in his practices as a Senator as well as 
in the debate. Cruz misses the moment to construct his own position on 
Washington and on O’Rourke’s statements. He stays relatively quiet, hop-
ing O’Rourke will make a mistake. What’s interesting here is that O’Rourke 
demonstrates that no matter how short the time, establishment of the four 
elements of the debate can happen, and every little bit seems to assist. At 
the end of the exchange we have a sense that Cruz, in principle, supports 
the police while O’Rourke has a vision of criminal justice reform for all. 
O’Rourke might not be in full support of the police like Cruz, but Cruz is 
also identified as being consubstantial with Washington, as well as lack-
ing Vision to address the larger Framework of criminal justice reform. 
Cruz again has the advantage of simplicity, but lacks Vision. O’Rourke 
lacks grounding for his Vision, which winds up articulated very thinly in 
the face of Cruz’s dissociative argumentation.
CONCLUSION
Election debate events fail because we use the wrong metric to understand 
what they are. Seen as cultural, epideictic rhetorical performances, they 
become rich events worthy of scholarly attention beyond voting results. 
Instead, we see that congressional election debates can be evaluated as 
complex rhetorical performances involving four key categories of claims. 
Seeing election debates not as our antiseptic, Enlightenment conception 
of debating but as a deep rhetorical ritual of argumentation opens the 
door to both scholarly commentary and a rich resource of advisory ca-
pacity for candidates out there who wonder if they can get out of debating. 
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Seeing debating as a distraction from the work of politics is not good. 
Seeing it as counterproductive to politics is worse. Luckily we can take 
another view, and see election debates as potential sites of subversion of 
narratives that audiences bring to the table with them, if candidates are 
savvy enough to use that material to craft new perspectives. Thinking of 
these events as complex contests about representation of identity might 
not save them from the critique that they are not actual debates, but recov-
ers distinct and important values for these events in political discourse.
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POLITICAL GASLIGHTING IN THE 
CLIMATE CHANGE DISCOURSE 
SURROUNDING THE 2016 ELECTION
Farah Latif
This chapter introduces the concept of political gaslighting in the 
context of climate change political discourse. Political gaslighting is 
a form of deception that destabilizes and disorients public opinion 
on political issues. Thus, political gaslighting is a strategy used to 
garner support for or against an ideology, viewpoint, or policy. This 
chapter explores the etymology of the concept of gaslighting and its 
emergence as a political strategy through a content analysis of elected 
Republican politicians’ discourse and behaviors surrounding the 2016 
elections. This research suggests that political gaslighting is an observ-
able phenomenon in instances when some Republican politicians join 
the House Climate Solutions Caucus (CSC) to support pro-climate 
legislation, yet demonstrate behaviors that are contrary to the obli-
gations of CSC.
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Learning more about political gaslighting in the context of climate 
change may help illustrate the reasons why climate change policy remains a 
partisan issue (Marquart-Pyatt, McCright, Dietz, & Dunlap, 2014). A rep-
resentative sample of Americans shows that 71% of Americans believe 
that changing climate is real, 54% believe in its anthropogenic nature, 
and 63% are worried about climate and understand that the negative ef-
fects of climate change can be reversed (Leiserowitz et al., 2018); whereas, 
the partisan divide among American voters during elections grew by 23 
points from 2001 to 2017 (Newport & Dugan, 2017). Thus, growing con-
cern about climate change and deeply partisan voting behavior indicate 
dissonance between the beliefs of American voters and their adherence 
to party-line voting behavior.
The reason climate change is picked to uncover the evidence of politi-
cal gaslighting in politicians is that science is clear on climate change with 
a 97% consensus from climate scientists that man-made climate change 
exists (Cook et al., 2013; Powell, 2016). Further, dramatic weather changes 
manifested as heat waves and droughts have caused increased water and 
food insecurity (Woodward et al., 2012); heavy precipitation has caused 
higher sea levels and ocean acidification that harms marine and human 
life (Lawrence et al., 2014). Because these are scientists’ grave concerns 
about the overall health and well-being of human life due to declining en-
vironmental quality, any help to reduce the cognitive dissonance in the 
beliefs of the American voters and their voting behavior will be valuable 
in supporting pro-climate policy efforts.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether Republicans engaged 
in gaslighting the public about their commitment to climate change. To 
establish a correlation between gaslighting on climate change issues and 
public perception of climate change is outside the scope of the chapter; 
however, the research will look at whether there was political gaslighting 
regarding climate change issues. Thus, the research analyzes the politi-
cal discourse of nine elected Republican politicians who have joined the 
Climate Solution Caucus (CSC). In addition, the research elaborates that 
political gaslighting is harmful. The goal of this chapter is to conceptu-
alize the phenomenon of political gaslighting so the public can identify it 
and perhaps be vigilant against political gaslighting.
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DISCUSSION
The Internet provides a free exchange of information, but unfortunately, 
there is little that can be done to prevent the exchange of misinformation. 
Misinformation is easily sharable with others and can become perma-
nent on the Internet; thus, misinformation manifests itself as fake news. 
In the political vernacular, fake news refers to “ideological extremism, 
misinformation and the intention to persuade readers to respect or hate 
a candidate or policy based on emotional appeals,” (Howard, Kollyanyi, 
Bradshaw, & Meudart, 2017, p. 5). In addition, a negative outcome of “the 
post-truth era” is that the media serve as a playground for political play-
ers to advance political agendas in the public sphere with limited scrutiny 
from the media gatekeepers.
Confusion About Climate Change Science
Organized climate change opponents’ significant accomplishment has 
been instilling the notion of false controversy, the idea that the scientific 
community has uncertainty about climate change and that climate sci-
ence is inconclusive or “messy” (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & 
Leiserowitz, 2011; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2011). Van 
der Linden (2015) noted that casting doubt on the gateway belief that there 
is scientific consensus on human-caused climate change breeds confusion 
and mistrust in supporting scientific evidence and climate-related policies.
People often follow the beliefs of trusted elites such as politicians (Zaller, 
1992), and trust in conspiratorial information significantly increases with 
each time an individual is exposed to it (Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 
2018). It is also well documented that organized climate change denial is 
especially predominant among conservative Republicans (Davenport & 
Lipton, 2017; van der Linden, 2015). Thus, if Republican politicians trivial-
ize climate change, it is likely that the Republican voters will hold dismissive 
attitude toward climate change policies despite concern over climate change.
Such a surrender to the will of trusted others can be explained by gas-
lighting. Before discussing political gaslighting, reviewing the etymology of 
the term will clarify how gaslighting is different from ordinary deception; 
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a particularly noteworthy difference is that the emotional and psycholog-
ical toll of political gaslighting is on civil society.
“Gaslighting” Defined
The Oxford English Dictionary has defined gaslighting as an “action or 
process of manipulating a person by psychological means into ques-
tioning his or her own sanity” (2016). The term emerged in the United 
Kingdom in Hamilton’s (1939) play, Gas Light (known in the United States 
as Angel Street) in which Hamilton raised concern over a social phenom-
enon where people purged unwanted family members by claiming that 
they had gone insane and committing them to the insane asylums (Smith 
& Sinanan, 1972). A motion picture rendition of the play was later pro-
duced in the United States in 1944.
Barton and Whitehead (1969) noted the frequently unrecognized 
emotional and psychological abuse in their seminal work “The Gas-Light 
Phenomenon.” They recognized that sometimes family members’ constant 
manipulation can literally drive the victims to insanity.
With the etymology of the word in theatre, American cinema, and 
clinical psychology, gaslighting describes tactics by the gaslighter that cause 
confusion, indecisiveness, doubts of the gaslightee’s own perceptions, and 
surrender to the manipulations of the gaslighter (Barton & Whitehead, 
1969; Gass & Nichols, 1988; Kline, 2006; Smith & Sinanan, 1972).
Earlier Use of the Term “Gaslighting”
In the psychoanalysis of abusive domestic partners, gaslighting is de-
scribed as “the act of deliberately trying to drive someone [literally] crazy 
by psychologically manipulating their environment or the facts, and trick-
ing that person into doubting their own reality” (Stern, 2007, para. 14).
Anecdotal observation shows that gaslighting is a masculine behavior 
that occurs when the male partners label their female partners as jealous 
or insecure so that they can excuse their philandering ways or blame the 
women for pushing them into cheating (Gass & Nichols, 1988). “Gaslighting 
often evokes disturbing emotions, low self-esteem, and cognitive dyscontrol 
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by causing the individual [i.e., gaslightee] to question his own abilities for 
thinking, perceiving, and reality testing” (Dorpat, 1996, p. 34), leading a 
gaslightee to self-doubt, diminished self-esteem, confusion, anxiety, de-
pression, and even psychosis.
Recent Use of the Term “Gaslighting”
Slavs and Tartars1 (2018) reviewed the writings of Johann Georg Hamann, 
the 18th-century philosopher whose philosophical framework later 
spurred the Sturm und Drang 2 movement and who once referred to his 
work as deliberately “ ‘cryptic,’ ‘deranged’ and ‘unintelligible’ ” (Slavs and 
Tartars, 2018, p. 23). Slavs and Tartars wrote, “Never before in Western 
literature had an author written with the deliberate aim of not being 
understood” (p. 23). They further noted that Hamann gaslighted the ad-
mirers of the Enlightenment through the use of elusive religious logic (he 
was a staunch Lutheran) and his “highly sexualized, often vulgar lan-
guage” (p. 23).
Ahern (2018) used the term gaslighting to draw a link between the 
distress experienced by whistleblowers in the medical field and the insti-
tutional policies that fail to protect them when they report malfeasance. 
The whistleblowers received skepticism, harsh criticism, and scrutiny of 
the allegations, which often led to counteraccusations and personal attacks 
on them. The institutional red tape make the whistleblowers feel that their 
“reactions, perceptions, memories, and beliefs [were] not just mistaken 
but utterly without grounds” (p. 61) leading them to doubt their percep-
tions, competence, and mental state.
Davis and Ernst (2017) described the societal predispositions toward 
whiteness and nonwhiteness as racial gaslighting in America. They noted 
that the economic and cultural process that normalizes the whiteness, in 
turn, pathologizes those who resist or are different as deviant. An enduring 
effect of racial gaslighting takes place when unconnected and isolated in-
cidents, or spectacles, are used to support specific narratives about a group. 
Some broader patterns of racial gaslighting are seen in racism and xeno-
phobia toward Japanese Americans after the Pearl Harbor attack and the 
post-9/11 narratives around Muslim Americans (Davis & Ernst, 2017).
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Antecedents of Gaslighting
Gaslighting involves manipulation of information
Information may comprise truth, half-truths, denial, minimization, lies, 
concealment, falsification, exaggerations, and dismissiveness. The ma-
nipulation of information by the gaslighter may be expressed as scorn, 
for example, expressing anger or sadness about information, which may 
compel the gaslightee to avoid accessing or sharing information; margin-
alization, for example, the gaslighter may put down the opinions that the 
gaslightee expresses or ignores their opinions that they find undesirable; 
and isolation, for example, the gaslighter may create physical conditions 
where the gaslightee finds themselves isolated from others and unable to 
seek information from sources other than the gaslighters’ opinions.
Gaslighting is successful when the perpetrators are charismatic
Marcus (2016) noted that for gaslighting to be successful, the perpetrator 
must be charming to hold influence over their victims. While some stud-
ies described this power as charisma, others equated it with fear (Gavin, 
2011). Stern (2007) observed that the gaslighter maintains control, power, 
and a sense of moral high ground in a relationship because the gaslightee 
idealizes them and seeks their approval. In the political realm, party lead-
ers and other officeholders tend to hold such charismatic power.
Gaslighting is easy when the victim is isolated
Gaslighting tactics are easy to execute when the gaslightee’s sense of re-
ality is based on the information provided by the gaslighter. The altered 
sense of reality, in turn, may further isolate the gaslightee from others.
Political Gaslighting
Gaslighting is a political strategy that utilizes deceptive and manipula-
tive use of information, which destabilizes and disorients public opinion 
on political issues concerning the public. Several types of discourse and 
actions may constitute political gaslighting, such as lying, hypocrisy, mis-
leading by mischaracterizing or rejecting facts, use of logical fallacies, 
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and minimizing or deliberate silence on the seriousness of issues that are 
important to constituents of a politician. The following conceptualiza-
tion of political gaslighting is based on the review of the literature across 
a variety of fields.
Characteristics of gaslighting
Although gaslighting is a form of deception, specific characteristics 
separate it from ordinary deception. First, psychoanalysts find that for 
gaslighting to be successful, the victims display traits of vulnerability 
such as fear of uncertainty and the unknown (Hightower, 2017). Second, 
Abramson (2014) noted that gaslighters are sometimes nondeliberate or 
unaware of their actions as “they often seem not to have any clear end-
in-view; they’re not, that is, trying to drive their targets ‘crazy’ ” (p. 2). 
The assertion suggested that gaslighting could also be a subconscious 
disposition where the gaslighter may be unaware, uninterested, or even 
unbothered by the outcomes of their actions such as the psychological 
damage they inflict on their victims. Thus, the predispositions of both 
the gaslightees and the gaslighters play a role in allowing gaslighting to 
happen. Third, gaslighting is not an isolated incident of deception, lying, 
hypocrisy, or misleading; it is a perpetual abusive pattern, whether de-
liberate or nondeliberate, that causes the gaslightees to slowly slip into 
overreliance on the perpetrators’ opinions. Last, gaslighting is often in-
visible to outsiders and the tactics can go on without “concrete acts of 
abuse, no proofs to show, no solid means of obtaining corroboration that 
something is wrong” (Kahn & Kellner, 2004, p. 4).
Conceptualizing political gaslighting
Welch (2008) described political gaslighters as the “architects of false 
reality” (p. 107) and their actions as “an insidious set of psychological 
manipulations that undermines the mental stability of its victims” (p. 1). 
While mental instability in public might be a hyperbole, gaslighting in-
fluences the viewpoints of voters on political issues and diminishes their 
decisiveness on important issues.
Political gaslighting contextualizes the political discourse around so-
cial justice, freedom of the press, fake news, and other matters (Ahern, 
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2018; Davis & Ernst, 2017; Fox, 2017; Kovacs, 2017; Stosny, 2017). Duca 
(2016) wrote a provocative op-ed that suggested that the so-called po-
litical upset by Donald Trump was the result of “a terrifying strategy 
currently being used to weaken and blind the American electorate” 
(para. 4). Amanda Carpenter, a political strategist and a CNN commen-
tator, published Gaslighting America: Why We Love It When Trump Lies 
to Us to demonstrate political gaslighting by Donald Trump. Carpenter 
(2018) introduced Donald Trump’s gaslighting tactics as deliberate and 
deceptive and described him as a line crosser, bulldozer, and a political 
suicide bomber. Carpenter (2018) noted that Trump’s best defense tech-
nique, when criticized or asked a difficult question, has been to dodge 
the question by sowing the seed of doubt about the legitimacy or cred-
ibility of the question.
In political discourse, politicians have used the practice of gaslight-
ing to justify and legitimize objectives such as short-term political goals 
to long-term national agendas. For example, in postcolonial democracies, 
governments often manipulate public perceptions to cultivate nation build-
ing and patriotism by gaslighting them with recollections of a demonized 
former monarch. Pakistan is one such country where more than seven 
decades after decolonization, British rule is blamed for its bureaucratic 
problems. Similarly, when political upheaval erupts within the country, 
its military and political disputes with India are frequently used to unite 
the country. Similarly, in the post-9/11 United States, the Bush adminis-
tration fueled the “War on Terror” by racialization of American Muslims 
is the guise of the national security narratives (Chon & Arzt, 2005; Davis 
& Ernst, 2017; Green, 2011).
It is critical to note that gaslighting is a set of strategic behaviors 
intended to deceive the public, including discourse, actions, and other be-
haviors such as distancing tactics that often have little or no consequence 
individually. Because, as Zaller (1992) suggested, the public looks to their 
trusted leaders to form opinions on important issues, politicians’ attempt 
to distance themselves from important issues, ignoring issues, or white-
washing facts strategically undermines the importance of these issues 
in the public mind. Sometimes politicians strategically attempt to divert 
attention to unrelated issues by giving long-winded replies to questions 
that may raise more questions than provide answers (Marcus, 2016). For 
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example, the National Rifle Association’s (NRA) response to gun violence 
often incorporates unrelated narratives such as the Second Amendment 
freedom and stigmatizing mental illness. Similarly, running negative ads 
to demonize the opponents can also destabilize and disorient the pub-
lic opinion. Waldman (2016) used the naked-emperor story to sketch an 
image of political gaslighting. The story goes that an emperor announced 
that he would parade through the kingdom wearing a special outfit visible 
only to the wisest and of noble birth. The emperor paraded through the 
kingdom; neither his advisors nor the subjects admitted that they do not 
see the outfit that he claimed to be wearing due to the fear of being taken 
for unwise or ignoble. This is the case of political gaslighting where the 
public feels too confused, embarrassed, unqualified, or simply outnum-
bered to make sound judgments based on their observations and beliefs. 
Thus, gaslighting strategy alters public perceptions and destabilizes and 
disorients public opinion.
Political gaslighting and climate change science
Despite the rising awareness of the harms of increasing global warming, 
many American voters are not making climate change a priority issue on 
which they make voting decisions during elections. The Yale Program on 
Climate Change Communication (2018) found that all Republican voters 
considered climate change a low-priority issue, whereas it was on a spec-
trum of “very important issue” to “important issue” for all Democrats. 
Further, 69% of Republicans are still skeptical about the extent of climate 
change (Brenan & Saad, 2018). Cognitive science research has established 
that the way people organize and discuss an issue’s central idea with others 
will influence the way they understand the nature of the issue (Maibach, 
Nisbet, Baldwin, Akerlof, & Diao, 2010). Since the decrease in support 
for pro-climate behavior is linked to exposure to even a small amount of 
climate-related conspiratorial information (van der Linden, 2015), it is 
plausible that when politicians partake in behavior that gaslights voters 
about global warming, this inevitably hurts voters’ support for making 
climate change a priority. 
To establish a correlation between gaslighting on climate change is-
sues and public perception of climate change is outside the scope of this 
chapter; however, the research will look at whether political gaslighting 
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about climate change issues took place in the Republican party candidates 
surrounding the 2016 elections. 
The House Climate Solutions Caucus
Representatives Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) and Ted Deutch (D-FL) initi-
ated the first ever bipartisan House caucus on climate change called the 
Climate Solutions Caucus (CSC) to address policy options regarding the 
impacts, causes, and challenges from climate change (Citizen’s Climate 
Lobby, 2018). Therefore, we expect that politicians in the group will act 
and behave in a manner that acknowledges that climate change is real, 
human caused, serious, and solvable. Indicators of this support would in-
clude support for pro-climate policies such as reducing greenhouse gases, 
reducing human involvement in the greenhouse gases, and supporting 
the Paris Agreement, which is a comprehensive greenhouse-gas-emission 
mitigation initiative taken by the United Nations.
The study collected data about whether Republican politicians gas-
light voters on climate change issues. By joining the CSC, we assume the 
Republican politicians established a commitment to pro-climate action; 
therefore, any discourse that may sow doubts about climate science, hold-
ing contrarian beliefs, or obscuring position on climate change science 
will constitute political gaslighting. Because negative discourse, distanc-
ing, and not refuting denialist discourse minimizes the seriousness of 
climate change, politicians’ silence also indicates gaslighting. With that, 
the following research question was forwarded:
RQ 1: Do Republicans who are part of the Climate Solutions 
Caucus (CSC) engage in gaslighting the public on climate 
science?
Another dimension of the inquiry is approached with the following 
hypothesis:
H1: Republicans with poor scores in environmental voting re-
cords will be more likely to engage in political gaslighting 
about climate change than Republicans with good environ-
mental voting record.
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METHOD
Overview
This research comprised content analysis of the behaviors that the 
Republican Party members of Congress who joined the CSC exhibited 
concerning climate change during the campaign and after the 2016 elec-
tion. Content analysis was deemed as the appropriate method to analyze 
the data, as it helps to identify message characteristics such as ideas, 
thoughts, and feelings embedded in the discourse (Neuendorf, 2002). 
Content analysis is also a pragmatic approach to examining how partici-
pants reflect these themes in their discussions (Pew Research Center, n.d.). 
This approach allows the researcher to discern the invisible strategies em-
ployed in the discourse such as the deliberate exclusion of information in 
public discourse and stonewalling climate-related issues.
The sample consisted of Republicans who claim pro-climate attitudes 
via membership in the Climate Solutions Caucus (CSC). The CSC informs 
and educates these Congress members on viable ways to reduce climate 
risks and the associated national interests such as the economy, health, 
and national security. As of September 2018, the caucus is represented 
by 90 members, 45 from each party. In order to collect a representative 
sample, every fifth member was selected from the list of Republican mem-
bers of CSC for a total of nine members. Each name was searched on the 
C-SPAN Video Library website, with an additional query “climate change” 
or “global warming.” 
Procedure
The researcher considered the two years between November 8, 2014, 
and November 8, 2016, as a manageable time period for research be-
cause many candidates start their campaigns two years before an election. 
However, this limitation was later dropped so sufficient data could be col-
lected. Further, the candidates’ successful election to office was considered 
an indication that they are persuasive and trusted by their constituents 
and thus their opinions and behaviors hold credibility in the minds of 
most of their constituents. The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) 
is a respected American environmental advocacy group that generates 
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an annual environmental voting record, the LCV scorecard, for every 
member of Congress. The LCV scorecard is compiled by a consensus 
of 20 bipartisan organizations that tally the Congress member’s votes 
on key bills related to environment and conservation. The LCV score-
card was selected as a reliable measure of the members’ commitment to 
environmental policies because it is widely recognized as an unbiased 
record keeper.
The LCV scorecard provides two types of scores: the percentage of a 
member’s voting record on key issues in the prior year and their voting 
record during the lifetime of holding the congressional position. The de-
termination of what might constitute a good or a poor voting score was 
made by a comparison with scorecards of the Democratic members of 
CSC. Scorecards of a representative sample of nine Democrats on the CSC 
membership page were averaged to determine “good” as 97% for the 2017 
voting score and 92% over the lifetime voting score. Therefore, a score 
below 50% was determined as a reasonable threshold to be considered 
as a poor score. Next, the scorecard for every member in the sample was 
compiled. Since members of Congress communicate with their constit-
uents and inform them of their activities via their official congressional 
websites, the members’ official congressional websites were reviewed for 
climate-related discourse by searching for key words “climate change” or 
“global warming.” In addition, the websites were reviewed for a mention 
of any pro-climate bills sponsored or cosponsored by the member, press 
releases concerning climate-related issues, or mention of other pro-climate 
activities. Additionally, members’ names and “climate change” or “global 
warming” were searched in the C-SPAN Video Library. A similar review 
of the sample’s official Twitter accounts was also done by searching for 
#climatechange on their Twitter handle. The last step was searching the 
members’ names with the phrases “climate change” or “global warming” 
in the Google search engine to look for quotes or interviews that have 
appeared in credible news sources on climate-related issues, such as na-
tionally recognized and local newspapers from within their state.
It is particularly noteworthy that the findings of this research do 
not represent the sample’s entire contribution to pro- or anti-climate 
discourse. Instead, the findings cover the image that Republican mem-
bers have projected through the strategic and deliberate media that they 
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control. These outlets include the official congressional websites, their 
official Twitter accounts, congressional floor speeches, and published 
interviews. Since online media stores all information permanently (Latif, 
2017), the public can potentially be exposed to any deceptive behaviors 
of the politicians repeatedly; so negative behavior on climate change will 
constitute political gaslighting.
Since little or no far-reaching outcomes emerge from small-scale, 
localized pro-climate efforts (Maibach et al., 2010), pro-climate attitude 
rests on two significant determinants: the acknowledgement that climate 
change is a global problem and that meaningful climate change mitiga-
tion will come from reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Because the CSC 
educates and informs its members on the latest scientific research on cli-
mate science, it is reasonable to expect that the politicians’ views should 
also reflect science-driven solutions backed by facts, such as that climate 
change is real, it is happening, it is caused by man-made greenhouse gases, 
and it can be reversed.
The researcher developed a grounded coding schema to analyze the 
content from various sources. These codes were compiled from a prior 
review of the climate change communication literature and were then 
further refined throughout the coding process.
RESULTS
The research question posed in the study was whether Republicans who 
belong to the CSC engage in political gaslighting on climate science. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show evidence of different ways in which gaslighting 
was observed. Table 2.1 demonstrates discourse that is contradictory to 
the cause and purpose of the CSC. Table 2.2 demonstrates actions and 
distancing behaviors, which also constitutes gaslighting. For example, no 
Republican member except one in the sample mentioned sponsoring a 
pro-climate bill on their official congressional website. Therefore, either 
not participating in pro-climate activities or strategically withholding 
information of their involvement in pro-climate initiatives indicates a 
gaslighting attempt. Similarly, only two members mention their member-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 2 Political Gaslighting in the Climate Change Discourse Surrounding the 2016 Election 55
silent about it while they may have flaunted their membership in other 
caucuses and groups that are typically expected of a Republican Congress 
member, such as veteran affairs and the NRA.
The hypothesis advanced in the study that suggested that Republicans 
with poor scores in environmental voting records will be more likely to 
engage in political gaslighting about climate change than Republicans 
with a good environmental voting record was inconclusive. Because the 
average LCV score of a similarly gathered sample of Democrats was 92% 
over the lifetime and 97% for 2017, below 50% was determined to be a 
poor score. No Republican politician in the sample had earned a good 
LCV score. Among the sample, the highest LCV score was earned by Dave 
Reichert with 29% for 2017 and 36% over the lifetime, which still did not 
rise to the preselected 50% LCV score threshold.
DISCUSSION
David Leonhardt of The New York Times noted in a 2018 op-ed that 
Senator Marco Rubio’s harsh opposition to recounting Florida votes in 
the 2018 midterm election was “to change the results of election” (para. 4). 
Leonhardt (2018) found Rubio’s inflammatory Tweets dangerous and 
called his deceptive language “Trumpified.” He explained:
I want to walk you through those falsehoods this morning. They’re 
important to debunk, because Rubio is doing something danger-
ous: Deliberately undermining people’s confidence in our electoral 
systems for partisan gain. . . . Rubio has chosen to employ a classic 
tool of autocrats. He is using the language of democracy to subvert 
democracy. (para. 3 & 11)
Deliberate deception and manipulation of information is neither a 
novel idea nor restricted to politicians alone. Countries to corporations 
leverage big data, artificial intelligence, and black box algorithms to con-
trol information by strategically restricting or supplying it to the public 
(Howard et al., 2017). But, I use Leonhardt’s article to demonstrate two 
facts. First, as human communication has become more complicated, 
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more cognitively complex concepts are needed to understand it. To that 
end, this type of deception can be succinctly captured using the term 
political gaslighting. Second, political gaslighting can and should be ex-
posed once identified, as it exacts a considerable toll on society and 
democracy due to these manipulations. Therefore, this chapter concep-
tualized and defined political gaslighting to draw a link to its possible 
harmful consequences.
So, a question now arises: What is the difference between political 
gaslighting and ordinary deception? Deception is the deliberate attempt 
to alter the target’s belief system via ambiguous or vague messages (Buller 
& Burgoon, 1994), whereas political gaslighting is a strategy that utilizes 
deceptive and manipulative use of information with the motivation to 
destabilize and disorient public opinion on political issues. Thus, po-
litical gaslighting is a strategy used to garner support for or against an 
ideology, viewpoint, or policy. However, political gaslighting threatens 
democracy when it targets groups, communities, and large populations 
to prevent them from forming sound judgments on important policies. 
Political gaslighting potentially harms the public’s ability to influence poli-
cies that affect their short-term and long-term well-being. In this manner, 
political gaslighting harms the democratic process. In the case of climate 
change policy, political gaslighting can have serious consequences as 
the entrusted politicians’ gaslighting strategy undermines the urgency 
with which climate change interventions are needed to prevent the im-
minent climate decline.
It is also unwise to dismiss the tense political context in which climate 
change communication takes place. Much of climate change discourse uti-
lizes populist discourse. For example, Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK; 2012), a 
well-known climate change skeptic, sketches an image of the frightened 
“mothers in the grocery store” who divulge to him their worry over chil-
dren being indoctrinated in schools about climate change, asserting that 
climate change is a political issue of the elites and that ordinary citizens 
are neither concerned nor affected by it.
To identify the characteristics of political gaslighting, a research 
question was put forward about whether the Republicans in the CSC 
showed commitment to the mission of the caucus by exploring policy 
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options that address the impacts, causes, and challenges of climate 
change. Many Republican members of the caucus continued to earn 
poor LCV scores even after joining the caucus. One must then ques-
tion whether being part of the caucus is merely for positive optics, or 
are there favorable attitude changes toward proposing policies for solv-
ing climate change? The results suggested that the sample Republicans 
in the CSC frequently gaslighted constituents about climate science by 
mischaracterizing or rejecting facts, using logical fallacies, minimizing, 
or deliberately keeping their silence. It is then not surprising that the 
legitimacy of the CSC is often questioned. Critics further object that 
some Republicans with low scores such as Ed Royce (R-CA), who has 
called for the dismantling of the EPA, are “unlikely inclusions” to the 
CSC and that Republicans are “joining the caucus in an attempt to gre-
enwash their resumes and appeal to moderate voters” (Becktold, 2017). 
In fact, prominent climate policy proponent R. L. Miller of the Climate 
Hawks Vote PAC considers the caucus dangerous because Democrats 
allow a political cover for Republicans who are not committed to pro-
tecting the climate (Colman, 2018).
Moreover, critics question the intentions of Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) 
as one of the founders of the CSC, who only scored 23% on LCV’s 
2017 scorecard (33% overall score). Further, it was evident in the dis-
course that members in the sample supported climate change policies 
to the extent that the policies affected their constituents. For example, 
Francis Rooney (R-FL) stated, “I joined the Climate Solutions Caucus 
because environmental issues are critical for our Southwest Florida com-
munity” whose record reflected voting on policy changes that affected 
Florida (Berardi, 2018).
Since the average score of a sample of Democrats was 92% over the 
lifetime and 97% for 2017, below a 50% score was determined to be a poor 
score. Thus, the hypothesis that Republicans with poor LCV scores will 
engage in more gaslighting than those with good LCV score turned out 
inconclusive because no Republican in the sample had a good LCV score. 
Note that a score of 50% translates to only supporting half of the pro-cli-
mate legislation. The highest score was earned by Dave Reichert with a 
29% LCV score for 2017 and a 36% lifetime LCV score.
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Interestingly, it is evident that there is little if any difference in the views 
of the Republican members of the CSC since they joined the caucus. For 
example, examining two interviews with Bill Posey, one from before he 
joined the CSC and one afterward, both interviews are laden with simi-
lar anti-climate-change discourse. Therefore, continued use of contrarian 
discourse indicated that there has not been much change in the views of 
some members of Congress about climate change.
Although the sample did not attempt to provide evidence of a correla-
tion between a member of Congress’s LCV score and gaslighting attempts, 
the data showed that there is a more pro-climate discourse on the part 
of Dave Reichert, who has the highest LCV score, than other Republican 
Congress members in the sample.
The discussion of political gaslighting attempts should not in any 
way suggest that the audience is passive in the communicative pro-
cess. In fact, during the research, I came across several instances when 
Twitter followers called out the politicians on their taciturn dispositions 
on climate- related issues. Twitter followers, many of them private citi-
zens, asked the Republican politicians to make public statements and to 
be clear about their response to climate-related issues. Some followers 
even shared provocative photos such as of them rowing in flooded streets 
to get a reaction from the politicians.
It is noteworthy that in political gaslighting attempts there may be 
two distinct victims: the public who is being gaslighted and those holding 
opposing views. For example, to deceive the public on climate science, 
politicians may undermine the credibility of those who hold opposing 
views such as climate change scientists by damaging their reputations 
(Nelson, Gwiasda, & Lyons, 2011). Political gaslighters may also use other 
tactics, such as silencing researchers to undermine their research — for 
example, when the EPA was forced to urge staff to downplay climate 
change (Milman, 2018). It is thus reasonable to believe that political gas-
lighting is a tactic used in the character assassination of opponents. In 
fact, in the 2016 election, Republicans and Democrats both surpassed 
expenditures on negative campaigns than positive campaigns (Blake, 
2016). In this way, political gaslighting may be an undesired side effect 
of character attacks.
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CONCLUSION
Gaslighting in political discourse is not a new strategy, but this type of 
communication is dangerous and needs further examination. Because 
the conceptualization of gaslighting is adopted from case studies in clin-
ical psychology, the literature provides idiosyncratic descriptions of the 
gaslighter, gaslightee, and the context in which it takes place. Future re-
search should include quantitative and qualitative approaches to elaborate 
political gaslighting and draw correlations between the public’s decision- 
making ability and exposure to gaslighting.
Communication scientists often consider ignorance of climate change 
science in the public as the main culprit contributing to climate change 
communication difficulties. However, more emphasis should be placed 
on the public’s ability to consume and engage with information, because 
this vulnerability in the public allows politicians to construct populist nar-
ratives and stringent attitudes toward climate issues. Thus, future studies 
should also focus on best response strategies that the public can adopt, 
such as narrative repair strategies. For example, inoculation theory is a 
practical narrative repair strategy that uses deceptive information in small 
doses to elaborate the unlikelihood of such narratives being true. Similarly, 
Rowan (1991) suggests the use of transformative explanations to remove 
misconceptions in difficult-to-understand concepts.
A technical shortfall of the research is that the queries on C-SPAN, 
Twitter, and the Internet were run using keywords “climate change” and 
“global warming,” which is a limited search as climate change may be 
discussed as an issue-based discussion such as ocean acidification, fam-
ine, drought, and so on. However, doing so might have diluted the initial 
query about whether the policy makers who are part of the CSC are mak-
ing a meaningful impact on climate by supporting policies that are good 
for the climate and not just focusing on issues that are impacting their 
constituents. Moreover, the research was developed with an assumption 
that significant data will be available on the C-SPAN Video Library and 
in other places. That assumption was premature, especially considering 
that gaslighting includes the tactic of distancing and deliberate silence 
on important issues.
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EXPLORING THE ORAL HISTORIES OF AFRICAN 
AMERICANS WHO SUPPORT DONALD TRUMP
Ray Block Jr. and Christina S. Haynes
INTRODUCTION
I have a great relationship with the Blacks. I’ve always had a good 
relationship with the Blacks.
— Donald Trump, speaking on the Talk1300 radio show in 
New York, NY, April 14, 2011 (emphasis added)
Donald J. Trump says controversial things. It is part of his brassy, brag-
gadocious,1 and belligerent rhetorical style, and he made that style a 
mainstay of his unprecedented and unexpectedly successful campaign 
(Ahmadian, Azarshahi, & Paulhus, 2017; Block & Negrine, 2017; Hall, 
Goldstein, & Ingram, 2016; Healy & Haberman, 2015; Hochschild, 2016; 
Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Ott, 2017; Rundle, 2016; Savoy, 2017; Sclafani, 2017). 
While his June 3, 2016, comments during a campaign rally in Redding, 
California, were not the worst things he has ever said about people of 
color (see Huber, 2016; Kivel, 2017; Park, 2017),2 they were particularly 
telling. When reminiscing about an incident at a previous rally in Arizona 
involving a Black Trump supporter striking a White anti-Trump protester, 
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then-candidate Trump compliments the man who threw the punch. 
While doing so, Trump stops midsentence as his train of thought shifts, 
scans the audience, points enthusiastically at Gregory Cheadle, one of 
the few African Americans in attendance, and yells: “Look at my African 
American over here! Look at him! Are you the greatest?!” The presump-
tive GOP nominee received a round of applause, and Cheadle described 
his experience at the rally — a snapshot of which appears in Figure 3.1 — as 
being “surreal” (Corasaniti, 2016).
We take issue with much of the goings-on at Trump rallies, but there 
are four things about what happened in Redding that we find especially 
problematic. The first of which is the specter of violence that seems to fol-
low these campaign events. Recall that the Black man in Arizona Trump 
speaks so fondly of was in the act of hurting someone. By calling that 
man a “great guy,” Trump tacitly condones the attacks performed in his 
honor by his “passionate” followers (Boyette, 2016; Moyer, 2015). Booker 
(2016) points out that Trump also boasted of his benevolence to the Black 
man, acknowledging that this assaulter would have been waylaid by other 
White rallygoers (who might have mistaken the Black man for a protes-
tor and not a supporter) had Trump not intervened. The insinuation is 
that there would have been more violence, and perhaps more cheering, 
if Trump wanted the fighting to continue, for the future president earned 
FIGURE 3.1 Candidate Donald Trump campaigning in Redding, CA.
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a reputation for encouraging audience members to retaliate against his 
critics (Jacobson & Tobias, 2017; Sommers-Dawes, 2016).
Second, the use the of the possessive determiner “my” in front of the 
term “African American” is ill chosen, if not racially insensitive (Simon, 
2018). As shown in the epigraph, Trump makes other questionable word-
ing choices when talking about race, and people had similar misgivings 
about his habit of calling African Americans “the Blacks,” (e.g., Parker, 
2018). The linguistic practice of adding a definite article when referring 
to racial or ethnic minorities betrays Trump’s unfamiliarity (and perhaps 
discomfort) with members of those demographic groups and, in some 
cases, his desire to create distance between himself and the minorities 
being mentioned. Worse yet, this group-labeling practice essentializes as 
it otherizes: implying that Trump believes minorities occupy monolithic 
sociocultural spaces that are fundamentally unlike his own (Abadi, 2016; 
King & Stewart, 2016).
On a third and related note, we wonder if Trump understood that the 
person he was talking to in California was not the “great guy” who decked 
an anti-Trump protestor in Arizona. To be fair, this was not completely 
Trump’s fault. Cheadle admits that he was holding a large “Veterans for 
Trump” sign that simultaneously shielded him from the sun and made him 
easier to locate. The sign-toting attendee also egged the candidate on by 
shouting “I’m here!” while Trump searched the audience for the African 
American in question — a joke that won Cheadle an autograph after the 
rally (Barabak, 2017). Even so, it is odd that Trump would expect people 
from Arizona to be in the crowd in California, and by likening Cheadle 
to someone else, Trump either thinks these two men (and possibly all 
African Americans) resemble one another, or he knows the men are dif-
ferent and simply does not care because it would be “good optics” for his 
campaign if he is seen with a supportive Black person, regardless of who 
that person is.
Finally, the irony is not lost upon us that Cheadle — who describes him-
self as a racially progressive “Lincoln Republican” (Philpot, 2007) — does 
not consider himself to be one of Trump’s African Americans. In fact, 
Cheadle’s decision to attend the rally in his hometown was less about backing 
Trump and more about seizing an opportunity while satisfying a curios-
ity: he was himself running for political office (losing to incumbent Doug 
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LaMalfa in the June 2018 election for the chance to represent California’s 
first congressional district) and went to the rally to pass out fliers and 
meet constituents while watching a major candidate in action (Barabak, 
2017). For similar reasons, Cheadle also went to Bernie Sanders’s rally 
in the nearby city of Chico weeks before (Booker, 2016). Cheadle did 
not cast a ballot for Trump during the primaries, and he regrets voting 
party-line during the general election. His objection was not with the 
president’s rhetoric but with his broken promises to help communities 
of color: “Why can’t he go to a Black city? Why can’t he trumpet Black 
business? Why can’t he have more Black people in his administration?” 
(Haltiwanger, 2017). Cheadle is outspoken about both his race-centered 
policy agenda3 and his disappointment in Trump, and that disappoint-
ment stems from the fact that the Californian running for Congress has 
a highly developed sense of racial identity. In this sense, Cheadle helps 
us to understand the racial dynamics at work among African American 
voters who are (or were) Trump supporters. Specifically, these dynamics 
beg the following questions: Who are these Black Trump voters, and why 
did they cast their ballots for him?
We address these questions below. By merging the framework of Darity, 
Mason, and Stewart (2006) with insights from Dawson (1994) — and, more 
recently, White, Laird, and Allen (2014), Laird (2017, 2018) and Laird, 
McConnaughty, Wamble, and White (n.d.) — we develop a theory regard-
ing the impact of racial norms on Black political behavior. Specifically, to 
borrow the terminology of Darity, Mason, and Steward (2006) and Mason 
(2017), we conceive of voting decisions as taking place within a “racial-
ized economy” in which Trump support is widely and strongly viewed as 
a deviation from established norms, and the likelihood of a Black person 
casting a Trump ballot represents that individual’s willingness to “defect” 
from intragroup cooperation. To evaluate the empirical implications of 
this theoretical model, we evidence from a handful of oral histories of 
Black Trump supporters that were archived in the C-SPAN Video Library.
In this chapter, we explore the interconnections between race, gender, 
political orientation, and Trump support. We begin by developing a theory 
in which we characterize “Blacks for Trump” as African Americans who 
are defecting from racial/political norms. Next, we provide details about 
the research design in general, and our qualitative analyses of C-SPAN 
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video footage in particular. We then discuss our findings, for our research 
on Black Trump support reveals interplay between in-group racial identity 
and right-wing political orientation. We conclude the chapter by acknowl-
edging implications of our project. For example, while recent scholarship 
shows that the heightened salience of racial in-group identity contributed 
to Trump support among White voters (see Inglehart & Norris, 2016; 
Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2018; Newman, Shah, & Collingwood, 
2018; Pettigrew, 2017), our research contributes to the literature on race 
and turnout by demonstrating that decreased racial identity is associated 
with Trump voting among African Americans.
RACIAL IDENTITY, POLITICAL ORIENTATION, AND BLACKS’ TRUMP SUPPORT
The State of the Literature on the “Trump Vote”
There are many reasons why voters support Trump (Pettigrew, 2017). 
Here, we focus on those reasons that pertain, even if indirectly, to racial 
identity. For example, the conventional wisdom about the 2016 presi-
dential election is that “racial considerations” (to borrow a phrase from 
Hutchings and Valentino [2004]) were major factors motivating Whites’ 
Trump support. These considerations take many forms, ranging from 
outright expressions of bigotry and white supremacy to the fear wrought 
by demographic shifts that witness to the “browning” of the nation. For 
example, Fitzduff (2017) has an edited volume linking votes for Trump 
to the degree to which Whites are attached to their racial in-group (see 
also Myers 2017). Others attribute the Trump vote to the extent to which 
Whites are antagonistic toward members of out-groups (Huber, 2016; 
Lopez, 2017; Newman et al., 2018; Swain, 2018). In their studies of the 
rise of far-right extremist groups in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, Bhambra (2017), Gusterson (2017) and Inglehart and Norris 
(2016) credit Trump’s success to his ability to exploit a growing wave 
of race-based populism fueled by the increased adherence to the ideol-
ogy of White Nationalism. Recent work discusses Trump voting in terms 
of racialized zero-sum perceptions in which Whites feel economically 
and culturally threatened by the gains being made by persons of color 
(Collingwood, Reny, & Valenzuela, 2017; Major et al., 2018). In short, the 
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literature suggests that race governs Whites’ support for Trump: Whites 
who value the racial status quo were inclined to cast Trump votes, and 
the presidents’ rhetoric reinforced these sentiments among White voters.
We know from past research that racial considerations tend also to 
influence African Americans’ voting decisions. This finding persists re-
gardless of whether scholars are focusing on voter turnout (see Chong 
& Rogers, 2005; Dawson, Brown, & Allen, 1990; McKee, Hood, & Hill, 
2012; Philpot, Shaw, & McGowen, 2009; Tate, 1991) or candidate prefer-
ence (e.g., Block, 2011; Block & Onwunli, 2010; Philpot & Walton, 2007; 
Tate, 1994). Most relevant to our purposes is the fact that racial consider-
ations, broadly defined, mattered greatly to Black voters during the 2016 
presidential election (Collins & Block, 2018; Griffin, Teixiera, & Halpin, 
2017). Despite the richness of our understanding of race and voting be-
havior, conversations about the impact of racial considerations on Blacks’ 
Trump support are conspicuously absent from this literature. It is tempt-
ing to dismiss this paucity of “Blacks for Trump”4 research on numeric 
terms, saying, for example, that few people study this because few African 
Americans voted for Trump. However, according to exit polls, Trump re-
ceived between 8% and 12% of the Black vote, which is consistent with 
previous Republican candidates for presidential elections. As Figure 3.2 
shows, Mitt Romney (who got 7% of his support from African Americans) 
and John McCain (for whom 4% of Blacks voted), did worse among Black 
voters, arguably because they both ran against Barack H. Obama, the na-
tion’s first self-identified5 African American to make it out of the primaries, 
let alone win serve in the White House. Obama’s historic candidacy and 
two-term presidency corresponds with two of the highest Black vote shares 
ever earned by a Democratic nominee (95% in 2008 and 93% in 2012).
The uniqueness of Obama’s presidency is further highlighted by the 
fact that, from 1980 to 2004, GOP candidates tended to earn 8% to 12% of 
the Black vote — the same vote share range that Trump won (Kiely, 2016). 
It is surprising that Trump’s vote-share among African Americans looks 
so “typical”6 considering the racially divisive campaign he ran. Also sur-
prising is the gender gap within this racial group. Exit Poll results in Table 
3.1 show that, for Black women, the vote breakdown across candidates 
was 94% to 4% in favor of Hillary Clinton (2% of these voters were unde-
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FIGURE 3.2 Trends in the Black vote shares earned by presidential candidates. (Compiled for 1992 through 2016 from the 
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies using a variety of sources.)
Note: Estimates are the percentage of African American voters who supported the Democratic (solid line) or Republican 
(dashed line) presidential candidates.
TABLE 3.1 Exit Poll Results (Within-Race Gender Gap)
2016 presidential election
Clinton Trump Other Total
Black women (%) 94 4 2 100
Black men (%) 82 13 5 100
2012 presidential election
Obama Romney Other Total
Black women (%) 96 3 1 100
Black men (%) 87 11 2 100
Data sources: http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/race/president/ and https://www.cnn 
.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls
74 PART 1 C-SPAN and Historical Research
is less lopsided at 82% versus 13% (with 5% “other” or “undecided”). While 
recent survey evidence confirms that Black men were the second most 
committed voting bloc for Democrats in 2016,7 these within-race gender 
differences are important. In his electoral college victory over Hillary 
Clinton, the president won over a nontrivial number of African American 
voters, particularly African American men.
This absence of research on “Blacks for Trump” is particularly troubling 
if we consider that we should expect racial differences in the motivations 
for casting Trump ballots. After all, several scholars confirmed that that 
the theories and statistical models used to understand Black voter turn-
out are not the same as the ones used to explore Whites’ political behavior 
(Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Dawson, 1994, 2001, 2011; Walters, 1988; Walton, 
1985). Moreover, research by Avery (2006, 2007, 2009) and Leighley and 
Vedlitz (1999) demonstrates that the impact of common determinants of 
political participation (such as interest in politics, trust in government, 
political efficacy, etc.) also vary by race. We therefore expect to observe 
racial differences in the ways that racial considerations influence Trump 
support. Specifically, while they are presumably positively related to Trump 
voting among White people, we anticipate that racial considerations are 
inversely associated to Trump support among African Americans: rather 
than signaling an adherence to racial norms (as is the case with White 
voters), Trump votes by Black people represent a desire to defect away 
from in-group norms. Below, we explain why we expect racial differences 
in the impact of racial norms on Trump voting.
Political Orientation and In-Group Identification as Proxy Variables for Racial Norms
To make sense of Blacks’ support of Trump, we start by exploring a per-
son’s preexisting political beliefs. For example, consider partisanship, a 
common indicator of these predisposition (which we refer to here as fac-
toring into a person’s “orientation” to politics). African Americans lend 
nearly unanimous support to the Democratic Party, and they have done 
so for decades. There are numerous studies confirming this pattern, but 
Haynie and Watts (2010) say it best when they note that “Blacks are not 
only overwhelmingly Democratic in their partisan identification, they also 
consistently vote for Democratic candidates by overwhelming margins in 
CHAPTER 3 Exploring the Oral Histories of African Americans Who Support Donald Trump 75
elections at all levels” (p. 93). In addition to their ideology and policy pref-
erences, Black people’s “overwhelming” support for the Democratic Party 
reflects their suspicion of the Republican Party. After all, Republicans have 
been comparatively less responsive to African American issues since the 
realignment of the mid-1960s (see Tate, 1994; Dawson, 1994; Philpot, 
2007, 2017). Tesler and Sears (2010) argue that anti-Black attitudes, stoked 
by Obama’s victory in 2008, produced a second realignment in which ra-
cial tensions push Black voters further away from the Republican Party 
while enticing some racially conservative Whites to join the GOP and 
support its candidates and platforms (see also Powers, 2014).8 Readers 
can disagree over how many realignments have taken place in America, 
but it is clear that there are enduring racial divisions in party identifi-
cation (Carmines & Stimson, 1990; Fauntroy, 2007; Layman, Carsey, & 
Horowitz, 2006; Philpot, 2007; Walton, Smith, & Wallace, 2017).
By displaying data from the 1952 through 2016 American National 
Election Studies (ANES), Figure 3.3 provides further evidence of the connec-
tion between race and political orientation in the United States. Specifically, 
we compare the correlations between African Americans’ party affiliation 
and their affinity toward members of their racial group, using feeling ther-
mometer scores as a standard measure of the latter concept (Axt, 2018; 
Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Wong & Cho, 2005) and dummy 
variables for Democrat (blue dots and lines) and Republican (red-colored 
estimates) self-identification to gauge the former. While the trends fluc-
tuate over time, a consistent pattern emerges between 1976 and 1980 and 
becomes consolidated after 2008: being a Democrat is positively associated 
with the degree to which Black people feel a sense of “closeness” toward 
other African Americans, while identifying with the Republican Party is 
negatively related to racial in-group affinity. The 95% confidence intervals 
around the coefficients for Black Democrats and Republicans are above 
and below zero (marked by a horizontal line that splits the figure at the 
vertical axis), respectively, and, because the error bands do not overlap, 
the polarization in the post-2008 correlations is statistically significant.
These patterns comport with Laird’s (2018) observation that “Democratic 
partisanship has become significantly tied to Black identity in the United 
States.” In our case, the link between measures of racial identification and 
political orientation among Black voters may have started with the election 
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of Reagan in 1980, but they certainly crystalized after Barack Obama’s 
historic presidential election. The finding that political orientation is sig-
nificantly correlated with racial identity is also consistent with the idea 
that Democratic Party identification has become particularly relevant as 
an indicator of African Americans’ commitment to racial norms.
For the purposes of our chapter, norms are widely held expectations 
among African Americans’ regarding politics, policies, and politicians. 
Research in economics confirms the importance of political orientation 
as a normalized form of African American political behavior (see Darity, 
Mason, & Stewart, 2006) and political scientists advancing similar argu-
ments include Abrajano and Hajnal (2015), Dawson (1994, 2001) and 
Mangum (2013). Research by White and his colleagues provide direct 
tests of the policing power of racial norms. Specifically, White, Laird, and 
Correlation between racial ID
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FIGURE 3.3 Democratic partisanship has become significantly linked to Black identity. (Data source: 1964 through 2016 
American National Election Studies (ANES) Time Series surveys.)
Note: Estimates are bivariate correlation coefficients (dots) with 95% confidence intervals (vertical lines). We used 
connector lines to illustrate changes over time in the correlation between feeling thermometer ratings of African Americans 
(our measure of Blacks’ “racial identification”) and (our variable tapping into “party identification”).
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Allen (2014) use campaign donation experiments to demonstrate that 
race-specific social pressure shapes Black people’s decision to seek political 
outcomes that favor group solidarity over self-interests. Laird et al. (n.d.) 
further demonstrate the importance of racial-group social interactions by 
showing that African American respondents in face-to-face surveys tend 
to express stronger allegiance to the Democratic Party when they are in 
the presence of Black interviewers.
Of relevance to us, Table 3.2 demonstrates that the “norm” among 
African Americans is to be skeptical of Trump and his politics. The data 
for this table come from a public opinion survey conducted in the sum-
mer of 2016 by the African American Research Collaborative (AARC) and 
sponsored by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP). This poll targeted registered voters in highly competi-
tive midterm election races, across 61 congressional districts in the United 
States (N = 2,045), and the survey is unique because it contains over-
samples of African Americans (n = 400) and Whites (n = 400). The top 
portion of Table 3.2 lists the percentage of Black and White respondents 
who said “yes” to the following statement: “Donald Trump (because of 
the kind of person he is or because of something he has said or done) has 
made me feel this way: disrespected.” The second portion of the table re-
cords whether respondents agree with the following statement: “Some 
people have said Donald Trump’s racist statements and policies will cause 
a major setback to the progress made in recent years by [Black] commu-
nities.” The final portion shows the percent of respondents who select the 
following statement as matching their opinion: “Trump is a racist whose 
policies are intended to hurt African Americans.” We sort responses by 
both race and gender, and the evidence is clear: Black people (especially 
Black women) tend to view much of Trump’s rhetoric, most of his gov-
erning agenda, and several of his surrogates as constituting racial threats 
(Barreto & Parker, n.d.; Coats, 2017; Parker & Barreto, 2013).
Taken together, the work on racial norms lends further credence to 
the idea that African Americans consider it to be a form of “racial defec-
tion” to vote Republican (and, presumably, against the collective interests 
of their in-group). This logic of racialized defection applies well to the cur-
rent political context, for there is clear evidence that many (if not most) 
African Americans view President Trump and his administration as being 
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antagonistic toward racial progress. Given Black America’s strong reaction 
against Trump, it stands to reason that Black people who support the 45th 
president are choosing to operate outside the boundaries of established 
racial norms.9 Below, we develop a racial-norm theory about the impact of 
our key predictors (political orientation and racial in-group identification) 
on our outcome of interest (Trump voting) among African Americans.
RACIAL NORMS AS MOTIVATORS OF TRUMP SUPPORT
If the norm is for African Americans to not support the GOP in general 
and Trump in particular, then “defection” in this context would be for 
Black people to knowingly transgress this racial/political norm. In this 
section, we argue that African Americans’ Trump support stems, at least 
in part, from their decreased commitment to racial/political norms and 
their increased willingness to defect from those norms. Recall that the 
TABLE 3.2 African Americans’ Tendency to View Donald Trump in Racially Antagonistic Terms
Has Donald Trump—because of the kind of person he is or because of something he 
has done or said—ever made you feel: Disrespected? (% “Yes”)
Black respondents (%) White respondents (%)
Full sample (%) Female Male Female Male
59 89 74 57 44
Some people have said Donald Trump’s racist statements and policies will cause a 
major setback to the progress made in recent years by [Black] communities. Do you 
agree or disagree? (% “Somewhat agree” + % “Strongly agree”)
Black respondents (%) White respondents (%)
Full sample (%) Female Male Female Male
59 83 71 58 44
People have different opinions about Donald Trump’s impact on [Blacks]. Which is 
closest to your opinion: Trump is a racist whose policies are intended to hurt African 
Americans. (% who believe this statement matches their opinion)
Black respondents (%) White respondents (%)
Full sample (%) Female Male Female Male
38 63 42 38 26
Source: NAACP/AARC July 2018 Midterm Survey (N = 2,045 total; n = 400 per racial/eth-
nic group).
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concepts of political orientation and in-group racial identification can 
function as proxies for a person’s adherence to racial norms. In Table 3.3, 
we organize Black Trump supporters according to these proxy concepts.10 
For simplicity’s sake, the categories of this 2-by-2 table characterize sup-
porters as exhibiting either “low” or “high” levels of both pro-Black racial 
identification and right-wing political orientation.11 For example, the up-
per left-hand quadrant of this table represents those African Americans 
who support Trump because they are to borrow Harriot’s (2018) phrasing, 
“opportunistic.” These are people who, in addition to being unbeholden 
to any political party or ideology, are also not guided primarily by racial 
considerations. For the Entrepreneur, backing Trump is profitable: these 
supporters are typically persons in the business or entertainment indus-
try, and some are even close friends and past acquaintances. Regardless 
of affiliation, they see in Trump an opportunity to raise their professional 
profiles while padding their bank accounts (Williams, 2018).
Compare these entrepreneurial supporters to those in the upper right 
quadrant of Table 3.3. Among Doctrinaires, politics, rather than prof-
its, matters is most important. These are the staunch conservatives and 
Republican Party loyalists who, because their unyielding beliefs prevent 
them from following anyone but a right-wing leader, are willing to over-
look the fact that Donald Trump repeatedly violates cherished Republican 
and conservative principles. These violations take many forms: for ex-
ample, with the current president flouting his lavish tastes and bourgeois 
upbringing (Rubino, 2016), behaving in less-than-moral if not irreligious 
ways (Hauerwas, 2017; Riess, 2018), cultivating tense relationships with war 
veterans and “top brass” military authorities (Gaouette, 2018; McKelvey, 
2018; Vanden & Tritze, 2018; Walcott 2018), ignoring the recommenda-
tions of his White House advisers to practice more decorum on social 
media (Gaouette, 2018; Ott, 2017) and maintaining his questionable rep-
utation with the law (Ball, 2017; Buchanan & Yourish, 2018).
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By rejecting the conventional tenets of party and ideology, the Iconoclasts 
(see the bottom left-hand quadrant of Table 3.3) interpret Trump’s political 
ascent as emblematic of the antiestablishment shift the world is currently 
undergoing. Authors like Black (2018), Inglehart and Norris (2016), Moffitt 
(2016), and Oliver and Rahn (2016) talk at length about the global trend 
toward populism, and this topic became the inspiration for the March 2017 
issue of Real World Economics Review.12 Because they rail against the estab-
lishment, iconoclastic African Americans have historically been lionized 
by the Republican Party as champions of conservative values (Asante & 
Hall, 2015; Faryna, Stetson, & Conti, 1997; Rigueur, 2015; Thomas, 1991). 
However, the reason why we argue that these supporters score higher on 
racial identity while getting lower marks on political orientation is be-
cause many iconoclasts, regardless of their race, see Trump as part of a 
larger movement and therefore seek to ride the president’s momentum 
while pushing a populist — and at times, ethnocentric — agenda (Kalkan, 
2016; Newman, et al. 2018).
We reserve the bottom right-hand quadrant of Table 3.3 for the 
Complicated Trump backers. These are the “true believers” that Harriot 
(2018) refers to in his essay, for these African Americans can reconcile 
their rightward-leaning politics with their strong sense of racial pride. 
Moreover, they encourage other Black people to escape the “Democratic 
plantation.” By acknowledging that the Left often takes communities of color 
for granted, the Complicated seek to undermine the Democratic Party’s 
monopoly over Black politics. According to these supporters, subverting 
this political monopoly requires, among other things, casting ballots for 
GOP candidates and advocating for conservative policies and causes. This 
sentiment is voiced strongly by the #walkaway social media movement, 
and an African-American-specific version of this movement is known 
as #blexit — a combining of the racial designation “Black” and the word 
“exit,” which mimics the UK-based portmanteau adopted by those who 
defend the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (Clark, 
Goodwin, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017; Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 
2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2016).
To summarize, we organize African American Trump supporters into 
four broad categories: the profit-driven entrepreneurs, the ideologically rigid 
doctrinaires, the opportunistic and racially mobilized iconoclasts, and the 
anti-Left provocateurs comprising the group known as the complicated. In 
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the section below, we discuss a sample of oral histories collected from the 
C-SPAN Video Library. Each oral history contains audio or video footage 
of outspoken African Americans whose viewpoints are consistent with 
each of the supporter types.
EVIDENCE FROM THE C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY
Based on an approach used in past research (see Block & Haynes, 2015), 
we analyze oral histories footage using Dedoose, our preferred software 
for mixed-methods research. The typology mentioned above — of the 
entrepreneurial, doctrinaire, iconoclastic, and complicated Trump sup-
porters — will serve as our “deductive” (i.e., predetermined) themes, and 
present video footage from African Americans to whom these themes 
apply. Preliminary searches in the C-SPAN Video Library helped us to 
identify several oral histories that are relevant to our research. We discuss 
some of the most exemplary excerpts here.
Entrepreneurial Black Trump Supporters
Two of the more outspoken entrepreneurs are Lynnette Hardaway 
and Rochelle Richardson (a duo that goes by the nickname “Diamond 
and Silk”). In a C-SPAN clip from July 18, 2016, titled “Donald Trump 
Campaign and Female Voters,”13 the duo spoke at length during the 2016 
Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio. After whipping the 
crowd into a frenzy with stock comments about Hillary Clinton’s short-
comings, Donald Trump’s bona fides, and the truth-challenged liberal 
media, Diamond and Silk go on to make the case for why they will sup-
port the presumptive GOP nominee:
And when we looked at Donald J. Trump, we see a man that never 
wavers, nor does he back down. That’s what we love. That’s right. I 
love everything about Donald J. Trump. I love everything. He can 
do no wrong in my eyes.
The excerpt above suggests that Diamond and Silk prefer Trump be-
cause they like his style — a sentiment voiced by several Black Trump 
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supporters who are taken with the candidate’s charisma. This prefer-
ence, when combined with the fact that the duo’s website (https://www 
.diamond andsilkinc.com/) contains very little in the way of political 
content and instead includes opportunities for visitors to purchase mer-
chandise, schedule speaking engagements, and make contributions, adds 
further credence to our suspicion that Diamond and Silk’s allegiance to 
the Trump administration is grounded more in profits than in ideology 
and partisanship.
Doctrinaire Black Trump Supporters
Carol Swain, a conservative television analyst and former political science 
and law professor at Vanderbilt University, provides us with an example of 
a doctrinaire supporter. Swain has reputation for holding and defending 
conservative viewpoints (see McClerking & Block, 2005), and her status as 
a scholar-activist affords her a unique platform to advocate for these ideo-
logical ideals. Her commitment to doing so was on full display in a July 
12, 2016, clip titled “Conservatism and Progressivism,” which was based 
on a panel discussion between Swain, conservative writer and television 
personality Ann Coulter, liberal critic Sally Kohn, and journalist/author/
talk show host Janus Adams that took place as part of the Comedy Cellars’ 
underground debate series.14 When asked to discuss politics, Professor 
Swain reminded the audience that it was the Republican Party that abol-
ished slavery and elected the first woman into Congress in 1915. Swain 
also explains why her Trump support went beyond the candidates “cult 
of personality” and instead reflected her long-standing religious and po-
litical convictions:
I don’t think we should vote for any candidate because they are 
black or a woman or because they are going to make a historical 
first, we should be thinking of the best qualified candidate. And in 
the case of where our nation stands today, with so much chaos and 
the breakdown of rule of law that we have seen with the Obama 
Administration, and we have [with] Hillary Clinton, . . . with a 
history of lies, lies, more lies. . . . She should be indicted. . . . Why 
should we elect a president who shows no respect for the rule of 
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law and will apparently say anything to get the votes of various 
groups? I think that she and the Democrats manipulate Blacks, 
she uses Blacks, and when she gets power, they refuse to advance 
the cause of Blacks. When it comes to Donald Trump, I intend to 
support him because I like his stance against political correctness; 
I think he speaks to the issues that a lot of Americans care about, 
and, right now, there are very few people who are willing to stand 
up and push back against the destruction of America. America is 
being destroyed. It is heading in the wrong direction. And there are 
very few people on the horizon that that will stand up and speak 
truth. And I think Trump speaks truth and I am confident that 
he will appoint people that are qualified to lead. So, I am going to 
support Donald Trump, and I will never under any circumstances 
support a Democrat. I don’t see how any Christian could. I’m a 
Christian, and I would never ever vote for that party.
For Swain, it is not about demographic identity. Rather, Professor Swain 
bases her political decisions purely on her adherence to rightward-leaning 
political doctrine: As can be seen in the first sentence in the excerpt above, 
Swain would not cast a ballot for a female or an African American presi-
dential nominee simply because they represent “historical firsts,” and Swain 
is emphatic in her assertion that she could never bring herself to vote for 
a Democrat, regardless of that candidate’s race or gender.
Iconoclastic Black Trump Supporters
The iconoclasts are a particularly vocal group celebrities, aspiring celeb-
rities, and sociopolitical contrarians and, if the activity on social media is 
any indication, these African American Trump supporters are growing in 
both number and influence. Of interest to us is Candace Owens, the icon-
oclast that has seen her celebrity status increase since she was endorsed 
by Kanye West, the mega-rapper, singer, songwriter, record producer, and 
fashion designer who started out as a Democrat before converting over 
the political Right. While discussing the Kanye endorsement to the audi-
ence at the Steamboat Institute Freedom conference (August 11, 2018),15 
Owens tells the audience that, while she is thrilled that West “likes the way 
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she thinks” (see Golding, 2018; Rossman, 2018), she also refutes the idea 
that the Red Wave (the predicted mass shift of African Americans to the 
Republican Party that she later termed “Blexit”) is riding West’s coattails:
If there are celebrities who are willing to open the conversation, 
to get people to think differently, and to think critically . . . that 
is not hitching to a wagon; that wagon is going nowhere. Kanye 
didn’t say: “Hey, everyone has to vote for Trump.” [He rather says]: 
“I like Trump.” Okay, he’s allowed to like Trump. You don’t need 
permission to like Trump if you like him. [Kanye] also did not then 
say: “I hate Hillary,” right? He just said who he liked. The idea that 
we are hitching to his wagon is false. We are embracing the fact 
that there are people who have hitched their wagon to the celebrity 
culture, and we are trying to do away with that. We are trying to let 
people know that it is okay to be an individual. It is okay to think 
differently. Yes, I embrace that completely.
Readers should know that Kanye West has recently began to distance 
himself Owens, partly because he did not want to be (mis)represented as 
being the person who designed the logo for Owen’s “Blexit” clothing line 
and merchandise company, but also because he worried that, after the 
controversies stirred by his increasingly polarizing Twitter messages and 
the his recent visit to the White House, he believed it best to take a break 
from politics to focus on “being creative” (Montgomery, 2018). Owens 
has since apologized to West for the misunderstanding, and, as expected, 
she has continued her quest to encourage African Americans to shift their 
allegiance from the Democratic Party to the GOP (Giaritelli, 2018).
Complicated Black Trump Supporters
The Complicated are arguably the most intriguing of the African American 
Trump backers. They are the ones for whom both political orientation 
and racial identity matter deeply and as such, have forged an uneasy alli-
ance with the Trump campaign and eventual presidency. To discuss these 
Trump supporters, it is useful to return to Gregory Cheadle, the person be-
hind the “my African Americans” incident described in the introduction. 
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Recall that Cheadle describes himself as a Lincoln Republican: a moniker 
meant to convey that he holds socially and politically conservative view-
points while still caring about racial equality. Recall also that Cheadle 
took issue with Trump’s governing agenda and that he voiced his misgiv-
ings publicly. While it is not a C-SPAN video, the biopic16 about Cheadle 
that was published on YouTube by the Los Angeles Times on September 1, 
2017, does a great job of articulating Cheadle’s concerns. As mentioned 
in the biopic: “He believes prejudice has limited the number of [B]lacks 
in Trump’s Cabinet. Cheadle claims Trump’s promise to help the African 
American community was nothing more than empty rhetoric.”
It is clear that, despite voting for Trump because of his conservative 
ideology, Cheadle is far from pleased with Donald’s racial politics, and 
he prefers not to be mentioned in the same sentence of those African 
Americans who Trump in particular (and the GOP more generally) uses 
as, what Harriot describes as, “MAGA-scots (or token mascots for the 
“Make American Great Again campaign).
CONCLUSION
A question we often get is “Who cares”? Since Blacks for Trump are still 
a small number of the African American electorate, then why bother 
studying them systematically? If the arguments in our introduction (that 
studying this group of Trump supporters exposes important race and gen-
der gaps) do not fully persuade you, the perhaps exploring the implications 
of these voters will. For example, understanding political orientation and 
racial identity as potential motivators of Trump support is important be-
cause Blacks for Trump might represent the “miner’s canary” in the sense 
that they show the fragility of the presumably strong bond between Black 
America and the Democratic Party. If the number of African American 
Trump supporters increases, then this should tell the Democrats that they 
cannot continue to rely on Black votes. The fact that Black support for 
GOP candidates is so stable (see Figure 3.3) means that both political par-
ties should do a better job of recruiting this important voting bloc.
This chapter is part of a larger project in which we study the impact 
of racial identification and political orientation on Blacks’ Trump support. 
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Future research will complement the findings from the C-SPAN oral his-
tories with examinations of survey evidence. In particular, we plan to use 
evidence from the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey 
(Barreto, Frasure-Yokley, Vargas, & Wong, 2018) because of its focus on 
racial attitudes and its large oversample of Black respondents (n = 3,154). 
By triangulating qualitative analyses of video footage with statistical analy-
ses of polling data, we seek to paint a fuller picture of the who the African 
Americans who support Trump are, and, more importantly, why they de-
cided to cast ballots the way they did.
NOTES
1. Trump received heavy scrutiny for describing himself as “non-braggado-
cious” during the September 2016 debate against Hillary Clinton. Comedians and 
social media users chided Trump, not only for using an unconventional term, 
but also because he did so while he was, in fact, crowing about his accomplish-
ments (McAffee, 2018).
2. In an effort to chronicle his words and deeds, Desjardins (2017), Leonhardt 
and Philbrick (2018), and Simon (2018) created lists that include, for exam-
ple, Trump’s multiple housing discrimination lawsuits; his use of the N-word 
and other racially denigrating terms; the “birther” conspiracy regarding Barack 
Obama’s nationality; his refusal to condemn the White Supremacists who endorse 
him; his recommendation that the United States no longer accept immigrants 
from Haiti, El Salvador, and African nations (places he calls “shitholes”); and the 
recent decision to criminally prosecute all immigrants who enter the country il-
legally, a strategy that uses the separation of parents from their young children 
as a deterrent against illegal border crossings.
3. One need only to visit Cheadle’s website to learn that the candidate pri-
oritizes issues of racial equality and social justice: http://cheadleforcongress.com 
/Cheadle4Congress1856.html.
4. While initially coined by Michael the Black Man, the right-wing fringe 
activist who is often seen on stage at Trump rallies wearing T-shirts or carry-
ing signs with the “Blacks for Trump” message (Crockett 2017; Mettler & Bever, 
2017), the phrase has since evolved to represent all pro-Trump (and anti-Clinton) 
voters who happen to be African American (for example, search #Blacks4Trump 
on Twitter, or visit http://blackamericansfortrump.net/).
CHAPTER 3 Exploring the Oral Histories of African Americans Who Support Donald Trump 87
5. Two things are worth noting here: First, Barack Obama is the son of 
a Kenyan father and White American mother but views himself as culturally 
“Black” rather than biracial. Second, his status as the first African American US 
president is a distinction that neither Bill Clinton (for whom the nickname “Black 
President” was meant as a backhanded compliment) nor Warren G. Harding 
(whose political legacy was dogged by rumors of his alleged African ancestry) 
can claim.
6. Mitt Romney (who got 7% of his support from African Americans) and 
John McCain (for whom 4% of Blacks voted), did worse among Black voters, 
arguably because they both ran against Barack H. Obama, the nation’s first 
self-identified African American to make it out of the primaries, let alone win 
serve in the White House. Obama’s historic candidacy and two-term presi-
dency corresponds with two of the highest Black vote shares ever earned by a 
Democratic nominee (95% in 2008 and 93% in 2012). The uniqueness of the 
Obama candidacy is further highlighted by the fact that, from 1980 to 2004, GOP 
candidates tended to earn between 8% to 12% of the Black vote—the same vote 
share range that Trump won (Kiely, 2016).
7. This finding appears in many places, but we are familiar with it from the 
polls conducted by the African American Research Collaborative (https://www 
.africanamericanresearch.us/). We are referring specifically to the results from 
the 2018 Midterm Election Survey (fielded June 27 through July 2, 2018) and the 
American Election Eve Poll (October 31–November 6, 2018).
8. We acknowledge the racial history underlying these current patterns, for 
Blacks’ party loyalty results just as much from a suspicion of the GOP as it does 
from Blacks being “captured”—to use Frymer’s (2010) term—by a Democratic 
Party that sometimes takes them for granted.
9. The following image illustrates this dynamic, where entertainer Kanye 
West and then candidate Trump share a “bro-hug” in the lobby of Trump Tower 
while West’s colleague looks on and is visibly uncomfortable with the interaction: 
https://media.giphy.com/media/rZznwvqzTu8bm/giphy.gif.
10. See Harriot (2018) for an alternative typology.
11. We acknowledge that the concepts of racial identification and political 
orientation are inherently continuous rather than categorical, and, as such, the 
“low” versus “high” cut-points we use in Table 3.3 are arbitrary. However, we de-
cided to present the concepts this way for ease of presentation, and we hope that 
the readers agree that the 2-by-2 table us useful for distinguishing different types 
of African American Trump supporters.
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12. An online version of this journal issue is available here: http://www 
.paecon.net /PAEReview/issue78/whole78.pdf#page=54.
13. Here is a web link to the video footage from which we obtained the 
except: https://www.c-span.org/video/?412888–1/panel-support-donald -trump 
-women-voters.
14. The URL for the video footage is https://www.c-span.org/video/?412034–1 
/conservatism-progressivism.
15. See https://www.c-span.org/video/?448631–1/steamboat-institute 
-freedom-conference for footage of this conference.
16. Readers can find the video here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=GtqU8Eya8KQ.
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Using the C-SPAN Video Library 
to Study Congressional Rhetoric
Edited by Logan Strother
The three studies in Part 2 highlight the exciting opportunities afforded 
to scholars of political communication by the C-SPAN Video Library. 
The studies show three particular ways to use data gathered from the 
Video Library: Hoewe and Ziny content-analyze the rhetoric of members 
of Congress to study the use of moral language in immigration rheto-
ric; Schmitt and Bergbower examine congressional support for three of 
President Donald Trump’s more controversial policy proposals — build-
ing a wall on the southern border of the United States, banning the entry of 
immigrants and refugees from majority-Muslim nations, and penalizing 
sanctuary cities; and Sery focuses on discussion of the federal judiciary 
in Congress to understand how the rhetoric of politicians simultaneously 
performs partisan identity and seeks to build their constituencies. A clear 
focus on legislator rhetoric ties these chapters together. They concern 
members of Congress’s choice or decision to speak, and how those mem-
bers speak — what they say, what language they employ, and why.
Beyond this common thread, these chapters suggest a wide variety of 
potential applications for the data that can be gleaned from the C-SPAN 
Video Library. In doing so, the foregoing studies point to the wide variety 
of social science questions that data from the Video Library could help to 
address. These studies also suggest the wide range of methodologies that 
can be applied in studies using the C-SPAN data.
The chapter by Carly Schmitt and Matthew L. Bergbower, “Building 
the Border Wall: Congressional Efforts to Support Trump’s Immigration 
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Legacy,” presents an examination of the correlation between legislators’ 
rhetoric and their support for executive policy priorities in the area of 
immigration. Schmitt and Bergbower code rhetoric during the “Morning 
Hour” when legislators are afforded an opportunity to signal their pol-
icy priorities, so as to assess this rhetoric vis-à-vis support for three of 
President Trump’s legislative priorities: the Muslim travel ban, the border 
wall, and penalties for sanctuary cities. In this way, this chapter is fun-
damentally concerned with legislators’ decisions to speak — specifically, 
it asks when and why legislators take advantage of opportunities to sig-
nal their political and policy preferences to their constituents and also to 
other elites, including co-partisans who may have less-entrenched pref-
erences on the relevant policy. Thus the chapter points to the potential 
utility of the C-SPAN Video Library to address key questions in the study 
of legislative behavior.
In “Congress and Immigration Policy: Use of Moral Language 
Surrounding the Trump Presidency,” Jennifer Hoewe and Mohammed 
Ziny also examine legislative rhetoric on the topic of immigration, but they 
go beyond the question of rhetorical support for or opposition to some 
specified policy. Instead, Hoewe and Ziny take advantage of the C-SPAN 
Video Library collection of closed captioning transcripts, and code the 
language used by members of Congress for the moral foundations implicit 
in their rhetoric. This analysis suggests a wide array of potential uses the 
C-SPAN Video Library could be put to: much current research in polit-
ical science, psychology, sociology, communication, and related fields is 
working to understand the role of psychological traits in shaping elite 
political behavior — and much of this work uses elite rhetoric to measure 
latent psychological traits. As such, the C-SPAN Video Library has tre-
mendous potential to contribute to our understanding of the effects of elite 
psychology on a huge array of politically and socially relevant outcomes.
Finally, in “Using the Judiciary: C-SPAN, Judicial Activism, and the 
Constitutive Function of Law in the Trump Era,” Joseph Sery qualitatively 
analyzes the rhetoric of members of Congress about the judiciary. This ex-
amination of “rights talk” by elites points to the use of the C-SPAN Video 
Library for understanding when, why, and how members of Congress 
might seek to persuade or lead their publics rather than engage vacu-
ous signaling. In exploring this dynamic, the Sery chapter shows that the 
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C-SPAN Video Library is potentially valuable, not only for the study of 
legislators, but also of other institutions. That is, oversight of the execu-
tive and judicial branches is a key activity that Congress engages in — and 
when it does oversight, not only do legislators talk in depth about the ac-
tivities, outputs, and actors in other units of government, but they often 
bring in people from these other institutions to provide testimony. In 
short, Sery’s study is a good reminder that extensive information about 
executive agencies, the judiciary, independent commissions, and so on 
is on file in the C-SPAN Video Library, alongside the legislative rhetoric 
that C-SPAN is known for.
The chapters by Schmitt and Bergbower, Hoewe and Ziny, and Sery 
discussed above use the materials available in the C-SPAN Video Library 
in three distinct ways, and do so to answer three very distinct types of 
question. The uses to which the C-SPAN data were put in these studies 
point to both the substantive breadth of topics that can be broached us-
ing the C-SPAN Video Library and to the wide variety of methodological 
tools that could be brought to bear on these topics. Despite their diversity, 
one key theme of the three chapters discussed here is that what legislators 
say — this elite rhetoric — is tremendously important to students of American 
politics. And the importance of this rhetoric highlights the importance of 
the C-SPAN Video Library, as it offers unparalleled opportunity to rigor-
ously study elite rhetoric in the U.S. Congress. Importantly, though, the 
C-SPAN Video Library utility is not limited to studies of Congress. Because 
Congress provides oversight over the executive and judicial branches, votes 
to confirm or reject elites who have been nominated to staff these other 
institutions, and votes on appropriations and structural bills that directly 
affect these other institutions, the C-SPAN Video Library can provide tre-
mendous insight into all of our federal institutions.
Building on this, there are two further points made clear by these 
chapters. First, the C-SPAN Video Library can be used to study rhetoric 
that is aimed at the public, at other elites, or both. The chapters discussed 
here show that elites sometimes aim their rhetoric at the mass public in 
an effort to signal that they take positions on, or claim credit for, legisla-
tion preferred by their constituents. At other times, though, legislators’ 
rhetoric is aimed squarely at other political elites — perhaps to signal pref-
erences to members of other institutions, to draw attention toward (or 
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away from) intraparty disagreements, or to stake out positions on pend-
ing legislation within the chamber. And sometimes rhetoric is aimed at 
both mass and elite audiences at the same time. Second, these studies 
show that there is much more to be gleaned from legislative rhetoric than 
simple support for or opposition toward a bill, nominee, or policy posi-
tion. The legislative rhetoric collected in the C-SPAN Video Library can 
be tapped to measure and explore the effects of legislator psychology in a 
huge number of contexts. By extension, the Video Library could also be 
put to great use in studying the role of emotion in legislative behavior. Just 
as language can be used to measure latent psychological traits, language 
used is an excellent way to study the emotions being felt when a person 
is speaking. As such, the Video Library could be fruitfully used to ex-
plore numerous questions about how emotions shape legislative behavior. 
The C-SPAN Video Library’s nearly 250,000 hours of content offer a wealth 
of opportunities to contribute to key debates in political science, history, 
communication, and related fields. The data available in the Video Library 
can be used in a tremendous variety of ways, ranging from small-N and 
interpretative approaches to large-N quantitative approaches, and even to 
advanced machine-learning techniques, and everything in between. The 
three chapters discussed here highlight some of this breadth, and suggest 
an even wider array of opportunities to available to researches who would 
take advantage of the C-SPAN Video Library.
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CHAPTER 4
CONGRESS AND IMMIGRATION 
POLICY: USE OF MORAL LANGUAGE 
SURROUNDING THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY
Jennifer Hoewe and Mohammed Ziny
Recent events have illustrated the tumultuous nature of Americans’ 
consideration of individuals not born in the United States. The cur-
rent political climate seems to have emboldened the opinions of those 
Americans who are less comfortable with the inclusion of individuals 
born outside the United States. One of the major events that appears to 
have triggered more intense rhetoric surrounding immigrants and immi-
gration policy was the election of President Donald Trump. His campaign 
featured strong stances regarding immigrants and refugees, from building 
a wall between the United States and Mexico to the “Muslim ban” that re-
stricted travel to the United States from seven Muslim-majority countries. 
It is possible that Trump’s enflamed language regarding immigrants and 
immigration policy, in particular, has encouraged a similar increase in the 
use of morally laden language among members of Congress.
This language used by political figures is then translated, often through 
the media, to the general public, helping constituents form their opinions 
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of policy issues (e.g., Baum & Potter, 2008; Soroka, 2003). The language 
used to describe individuals can reflect the larger social context surround-
ing those discussions. Prior research has used varying strategies to study 
changes in language related to political issues more broadly (e.g., Clifford 
& Jerit, 2013) as well as immigrants more specifically (Hadarics & Kende, 
2017; Hoewe, 2018). As such, it is important to study the language used 
to describe policy issues and the individuals affected by those policies to 
better understand the context of current public opinion.
This study extends the existing literature by determining how mem-
bers of the U.S. Congress use language to contextualize their arguments 
and statements regarding immigration in the current political era. Given 
the implementation of several contentious policies since Trump’s election 
(e.g., DACA renewal, the separation of immigrant families), it is possible that 
politically driven language has similarly shifted into sharper stances. This 
possibility will be examined through the context of moral foundations the-
ory (Haidt, 2008). This study examines how members of the U.S. Congress 
discuss policy related to immigration, focusing on how senators and rep-
resentatives discussed immigration both before Donald Trump took office 
and during the first portion of his presidency. It will determine if Trump’s 
controversial stances related to immigration have emboldened members of 
Congress in their discussions of immigrants relocating to the United States.
The results of this study benefit the study of political communication 
in several ways. First, this study considers how changes in the overall po-
litical environment (in this case, Trump’s presidency) can alter Congress’s 
discussions of political issues. Second, it applies moral foundations theory 
to the understanding of politically motivated discussions of immigration. 
This will help in understanding how moral language is used to persuade 
the American public into agreeing with a particular side of a political de-
bate. Third, this study shows how these uses of moral language are tied 
to emotion-based persuasion by considering the relationships between 
a member of Congress’ political party, their use of moral language, and 
the degree of positive or negative language they used to describe immi-
grants or immigration. Each of these goals works toward providing a 
better understanding of Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants and im-
migration-related policies.
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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS
Theories of social identity (Tajfel, 1981, 1982) and group threat (Blumer, 
1958) have long predicted that people may find other individuals who 
they perceive as distinct from themselves as out-group members capable 
of disrupting the status quo. Such perceived threats to social or economic 
order tend to be increased when the number of out-group members 
rises (Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010). Furthermore, as social distance be-
tween the individual and the perceived out-group members increases, so 
does the likelihood of stereotyping (e.g., Magee & Smith, 2013; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010).
It can be argued and largely supported that many — if not all — new 
immigrant groups in the United States have become part of an out-group 
for at least some Americans. A recent Pew survey (2018a) found an overall 
shift in attitudes toward support of increasing legal immigration; however, 
the issue was sharply divided along political lines, where twice as many 
Republicans (33%) supported cutting legal immigration when compared to 
Democrats (16%). The same report showed that nearly 70% of Americans 
were sympathetic toward immigrants who entered the United States il-
legally. But again, there was a partisan distinction: far more Democrats 
indicated these feelings of sympathy (86%) than Republicans (48%). Pew 
also asked about support for expansion of the wall separating the United 
States from Mexico, an issue specific to one of the policies touted in Trump’s 
campaign and early presidency. In this June 2018 survey, respondents 
were again starkly divided by partisanship. Republicans were largely in 
support of expanding the wall (74%), while the majority of Democrats 
were opposed to it (83%). These results begin to illustrate a discrepancy 
in the understanding of attitudes toward immigration and related policy 
in the United States.
Since these views are held so strongly by the electorate, it is likely 
that these partisan views are shared and voiced by members of the U.S. 
Congress. The question this study seeks to ask is whether those views 
were exacerbated — or emboldened — by Trump’s election. This question 
will be addressed by analyzing the underlying moral foundations used in 
these elected officials’ discussions about immigrants and immigration.
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MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND POLITICS
Moral foundations theory was developed to study the underlying struc-
tures that form individuals’ morality. Haidt (2008) defined the moral 
systems that drive everyday life as “interlocking sets of values, practices, 
institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together 
to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (p. 70). 
Based on extensive research demonstrating these moral foundations’ 
application across numerous cultures and contexts, moral foundations 
theory advances five moral foundations: care/harm, fairness/cheating, 
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation (Graham 
et al., 2013).
These moral foundations have been categorized into individualizing 
and binding foundations (Hadarics & Kende, 2017; Weber & Federico, 
2013). Individualizing foundations, including care/harm and fairness/
cheating, are based in considerations of individual rights. Binding foun-
dations, including loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/
degradation, are based in the efforts made to support group cohesion. 
Research on these moral foundations has revealed that liberal individuals 
are more likely to focus on individualizing foundations. Conservatives, 
on the other hand, are more likely to form judgments based on binding 
foundations (Weber & Federico, 2013).
Prior research has illustrated that these moral foundations can be 
linked to partisan-based policy arguments. Focusing on attitudes toward 
immigrants and refugees, Hadarics and Kende (2017) found that peo-
ple rely on particular moral foundations in order to form these attitudes. 
Use of binding foundations in describing immigrants and refugees was 
associated with perceptions of threat to group cohesion and social order, 
whereas use of individualizing foundations was related to perceptions of 
these individuals as needing help and support. Hoewe and Bowe (2016) 
also used moral foundations language to examine political discourse. They 
analyzed letters to the editor and found that partisan stances and policy 
preferences were strongly connected to the emphasis of particular moral 
foundations. Clifford and Jerit (2013) found that when discussing stem 
cell research, liberals were more likely to use words related to the moral 
foundation of care/harm. Conservatives relied on language associated 
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with the moral foundation of sanctity/degradation. Particularly of note 
for the present study, Clifford and Jerit (2013) concluded that elite indi-
viduals’ usage of moral language helps citizens in connecting their own 
moral foundations with political attitudes.
These politically distinct interpretations of moral issues may — and 
most likely will — factor into discussions of current political issues. As 
such, this study will determine how moral language used by members of 
Congress may indicate their understanding and suggested treatment of 
immigrants. It is predicted that this language will become more morally 
driven following Trump’s inauguration. As a divisive political figure, Trump 
does little to encourage cooperation or compromise among other poli-
ticians. For example, the brazen statements he made on Latin American 
immigrants when he announced his candidacy in 2016 were immediately 
met by extensive backlash from Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, the 
leading candidates for the Democratic nomination, as well as powerful 
Senate Democrats such as Elizabeth Warren and Chuck Schumer and House 
Democrats like Nancy Pelosi. Effectively, Trump offered one extreme in 
the nation’s immigration policy, and the protracted and unambiguous re-
sponse from the most influential Democratic Party figures emphasized to 
voters the lack of a middle ground between the two positions.
Given that Democratic election strategies often rely heavily on mi-
nority voters, and with Hispanic and Latino individuals being the largest 
minority group in the United States, congressional Democrats may feel 
a greater need to highlight the moral foundations of care/harm and fair-
ness/cheating. As a retort to Trump’s seeming lack of regard for the unsafe 
and unstable conditions immigrants and refugees are often attempting to 
leave, Democrats would point to the harm these individuals would face if 
they did not migrate, pushing for an increased consideration of the care 
they may need extended to them. And in response to calls for a “Muslim 
ban” and initiatives on the Mexican border that would drastically reduce 
immigration, Democrats may argue that Americans are cheating immi-
grants out of a future, when the United States has traditionally been more 
open to the settling of immigrants (pursuit of fairness).
Republicans, on the other hand, would paint alleged “illegal immi-
grants” as guilty of betrayal because they enter the country unlawfully, 
expressing solidarity with the immigrants who are characterized as loyal 
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because they enter the country legally. Trump united Americans in rec-
ognizing the authority of their government and its immigration laws by 
underscoring the depiction of unauthorized immigrants as subversive. This 
ties into an argument on preserving the sanctity of law and order against 
degradation. While these are not new lines of rhetoric, the intensity of 
Trump’s platform was unprecedented when many political analysts pre-
dicted the Republican Party would use the 2016 election to court new voters 
in minority groups. This intensity solidified the conservative bloc against 
such expectations, leading Democrats to seize the opportunity to secure 
their voter coalition and present themselves as a foil to Trump. On both 
sides, it made political sense to further contrasts between the immigration 
policies of the two parties. This divisiveness should lead to increasingly 
divergent moral language used to describe individuals attempting to enter 
the United States. Therefore, the following predictions are made.
Based on their political party, the language used by members of 
Congress to describe immigration policy will become more morally driven 
after Trump’s inauguration, where:
H1a: Democrats will increase their emphasis on the moral foun-
dations of care/harm and fairness/cheating (i.e., individual-
izing foundations).
H1b: Republicans will increase their emphasis on the moral foun-
dations of loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanc-
tity/degradation (i.e., binding foundations).
To better understand how this use of language is related to general pos-
itivity or negativity toward immigrants and immigration policy, additional 
analyses will be performed. The valence of these comments, combined 
with their moral emphases, may better illuminate the contents of the ar-
guments made by members of Congress. They may also begin to suggest 
the potential impact — intentional or unintentional — of this use of lan-
guage in describing immigrants and immigration policy in the pre- and 
post-Trump eras. Therefore, the first research question focuses on rela-
tionships between the language used by U.S. senators and representatives 
in terms of its positive or negative valence.
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RQ1: Are discussions of immigration policy among members of 
Congress connected to emotional language that leans posi-
tively or negatively?
METHOD
To test these predictions, a sample of video evidence of members of 
Congress’s use of language surrounding the issue of immigration was 
collected. Using the C-SPAN Video Library, discussion of policies re-
lated to immigration among senators and representatives was gathered. 
Using two different time periods, this study compares the use of moral 
language before and after Trump’s inauguration. More specifically, it in-
cluded a search for Senate and House floor debates that included the 
terms “immigrant(s)” and “immigration” for equal periods before and 
after January 20, 2017. The period of analysis before Trump’s inauguration 
lasted from January 20, 2015, until June 30, 2016. The period of analysis 
after Trump’s inauguration lasted from January 20, 2017, until June 30, 
2018. These time periods were selected to be as equivalent as possible (e.g., 
time of year) and to avoid including the period between Trump’s election 
and his inauguration. The time between election and inauguration is a 
transitional period, where the outgoing administration coordinates with 
the incoming one. Results from this period are not included because the 
transition is primarily occupied with the logistics of the transfer of office 
(staff and personnel vetting, resource allocation, etc.) and familiarizing of 
the incoming administration with the operations of the executive branch. 
The outgoing administration is known as the “lame-duck” administra-
tion because it often does not effectively pursue policy objectives due to 
time constraints. At the same time, the incoming administration is still 
occupied with putting together a cohesive, comprehensive program. With 
a lack of action or direction from the executive branch, the legislative 
branch operates without the type of influence that this study is trying to 
highlight — a difference between the Obama and Trump administrations.
This sample was drawn by searching for the aforementioned terms in 
the congressional records hosted in the C-SPAN Video Library, including 
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only those instances with the classifications “Senate Proceeding” and “House 
Proceeding.” This selection ensured that the information collected was 
related specifically to discussions held in relation to official House and 
Senate floor proceedings. To better understand the particular arguments 
made among these elected officials, transcripts of these videos were col-
lected. The portions of the transcripts used for analysis were limited to 
those that related specifically to immigrants or immigration policy. For 
example, if a House floor debate concerned issues of cybersecurity first 
followed by a discussion of immigration policy, only those statements 
about immigration would be included in this analysis. In this way, the 
data in this study relates specifically to statements and arguments made by 
members of Congress who were engaged in discussions of immigration- 
 related issues.
The unit of analysis was an individual statement made by a mem-
ber of Congress about immigration. As such, each floor debate resulted 
in multiple data points. This coding process resulted in a total of 457 
units of open-ended data,1 which were the exact statements drawn from 
the C-SPAN Video Library closed captioning transcripts. Among these, 
there were 130 statements from the first time period and 327 statements 
from the second time period. Clearly, there was a marked increase in the 
amount of discussion about immigration after Trump was inaugurated. 
The average number of words per statement was 689. However, the primary 
interest of this study is the particular language used in these discussions.
The language was then coded for several features. First, the party of the 
speaker was considered. Since moral foundations theory predicts different 
uses of moral language as it relates to political affiliation (e.g., Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Weber & Federico, 2013), this study analyzed how 
each moral foundation was used before and after Trump’s inauguration 
based on the party affiliation of the member of Congress. The analysis for 
this study included 216 statements from Republicans, 239 from Democrats, 
and 2 from Independents. Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of these state-
ments by party and time period.
Second, this study used the Moral Foundations Dictionary to analyze 
the language that was used in discussions of immigration in Congress 
(Graham et al., 2009). Powered by a computer-assisted content analysis 
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software, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, 
Boyd, & Francis, 2015), this dictionary permitted an analysis of the use of 
language related to each moral foundation. Each of the variables exam-
ined through LIWC is reported as a percentage of overall unit of analysis. 
That is, the value given each statement is the percentage of words related 
to care/harm, for example, in comparison to the entirety of that mes-
sage. The Moral Foundations Dictionary has been used in prior research 
to examine similar usage of moral foundations language but in different 
contexts (e.g., Bowe & Hoewe, 2016; Graham et al., 2009). This dictionary 
includes two dimensions for each moral foundation: “foundation support-
ing” (e.g., care) and “foundation violating” (e.g., harm). The analysis then 
produces 10 moral foundation components. The foundation-supporting 
and foundation-violating components were summed to form each of the 
five moral foundations. (see Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics).
TABLE 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Number of Statements
Overall Republicans Democrats
N % N % N %
Time 1 130 28.4 68 31.5 62 25.9
Time 2 327 71.6 148 68.5 177 74.1
Note: Percentages are of each column considered across time periods.
TABLE 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Use of Moral Language and Valence of Statements
Overall Republicans Democrats
M SD M SD M SD
Care/Harm 0.69 0.72 0.61 0.65 0.77 0.77
Fairness/Cheating 0.09 0.21 0.10 0.25 0.08 0.17
Loyalty/Betrayal 1.88 1.23 1.61 1.02 2.13 1.35
Authority/Subversion 1.25 1.04 1.54 1.17 1.00 0.84
Sanctity/Degradation 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.19
Positive language 2.89 1.35 3.09 1.44 2.71 1.26
Negative language 1.77 1.19 1.58 1.14 1.94 1.21
112 PART 2 Using the C-SPAN Video Library to Study Congressional Rhetoric
Third, several other constructs have been developed for analysis in 
LIWC (e.g., Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 2004; Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, 
& Richards, 2003). Among these, two categories may provide some addi-
tional context to the analyses suggested here. Both positive and negative 
emotion-based language may be related to the descriptions of immigration 
and related policy in the periods before and after Trump’s inauguration. 
This possibility is considered by examining the use of these categories, 
which are part of the LIWC dictionary and have been validated in prior 
research (Kahn, Tobin, Massey, & Anderson, 2007). Overall, the language 
used in these congressional debates was more positive (M = 2.89, SD = 
1.35) than negative (M = 1.77, SD = 1.19). Table 4.2 also shows the de-
scriptive statistics for the use of moral language and positive or negative 
valence based on the party of the member of Congress. The descriptive 
statistics for use of moral language and valence of that language based 
on both time period and party of the speaker are presented in Table 4.3.
RESULTS
To begin addressing this study’s hypotheses, a hierarchical ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model was run. The first block of the model in-
cluded the time period (first time period = 0, second time period = 1) and 
party of the speaker (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican). The second block 
included the interaction term created by multiplying these two indepen-
dent variables. This basic model structure was used in all of the analyses 
conducted; only the dependent variable was changed. Table 4.4 shows the 
results of each of the regression models testing the use of moral language 
based on each of Haidt and Graham’s moral foundations.
The first dependent variable, use of moral language related to care/
harm, did not result in a significant interaction between the time period 
and the party of the speaker. This illustrates that the use of this type of 
language did not change over time based on party. The only significant 
result in the model was the main effect of party, where Democrats were 
more likely to use language related to the care/harm moral foundation.
The second model tested the use of moral language related to fairness/
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by taking the square root before analysis. Again, the interaction term was 
not significant. The main effect of time period reached statistical signif-
icance, where members of both parties were using more moral language 
related to fairness/cheating after Trump’s inauguration. This model, in 
combination with the first model, does not provide support for H1a, which 
proposed that Democrats would increase their emphasis on the moral 
foundations of care/harm and fairness/cheating.
The third model examined the moral foundation of loyalty/betrayal as 
the dependent variable. No significant interaction emerged. The main effect 
of the speaker’s party was significant, but not in the direction that would 
be anticipated based on moral foundations theory. Instead, Democrats 
were more likely to use language related to loyalty/betrayal across both 
time periods.
The fourth model, looking at use of moral language related to authority/
subversion, did not produce a significant interaction. However, both main 
effects were significant. During the second time period, senators and rep-
resentatives were less likely to discuss legislation in terms of authority and 
subversion. As would be expected based on theory, Republicans, when 
compared to Democrats, were more likely to rely on this moral founda-
tion in making their arguments.
The fifth moral foundations model with sanctity/degradation as the 
dependent variable showed that the interaction was not statistically sig-
nificant. (This dependent variable also was not normally distributed, so it 
was transformed before analysis.) None of the relationships in this model 
reached statistical significance. The results of the previous three mod-
els do not provide support for H1b, which proposed that Republicans 
would increase their emphasis on the moral foundations of loyalty/be-
trayal, authority/ subversion, and sanctity/degradation.2
The research question inquired about changes in language based on 
positivity or negativity in Congress’s discussion of immigration pre- and 
post-Trump’s inauguration. These two regression models tested the use 
of positive and negative emotional language as the dependent variables. 
The use of negative language (as shown in Table 4.5) was not related to 
the interaction term, but the main effect of the speaker’s party was sig-
nificant. Democrats were more likely to use negative language than were 
Republicans.
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The positive language model, however, did produce a significant in-
teraction effect. Using Andrew Hayes’s PROCESS macro to probe this 
interaction, Republican members of Congress used more positive emo-
tional language during Time 2 than did Democrats, β = .74, p < .001. On 
the other hand, Democratic members of Congress did not change their use 
of positive emotional language over time, β = .06, p = .78. Figure 4.1 illus-
trates this interaction effect. This result most likely indicates a shift toward 
positive perceptions of Trump’s immigration policies among Republican 
members of Congress.










TABLE 4.5 Hierarchical Regression Models for Emotional Language
Positive emotional language Negative emotional language
β t R2 change β t R2 change
Step 1 .04*** .03**
Time period .13 2.89** -.06 -1.21
Party of speaker .15 3.16** -.16 -3.34**
Step 2 .01* .00
Time × Party .24 2.48* -.05 -0.52
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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DISCUSSION
Given the recent heightened interest in policy related to immigration, this 
study sought to understand how members of Congress discuss these is-
sues. Highlighting the importance of such research, a recent Pew Research 
Center (2018b) survey found that immigration had passed healthcare 
as the most important issue for voters in the months leading up to the 
2018 U.S. midterm elections. Moreover, following Trump’s inauguration, 
several controversial policies received a great deal of media coverage 
(e.g., DACA renewal, the separation of immigrant families, the so-called 
Muslim ban). In light of these public views and Trump-era policy ini-
tiatives, this research addressed if and how Trump’s election spurred 
members of Congress to rely more heavily on morally laden language to 
persuade voters and other members of Congress about how the United 
States should proceed in regard to immigration policies.
This study’s predictions relied on an over-time effect, where members 
of Congress were expected to more strongly utilize moral language re-
lated to immigration policy after Trump was inaugurated. An analysis of 
36 months of House and Senate proceedings revealed that there were no 
significant over-time changes in moral language regarding immigration. 
The results presented in Table 4.3 show that there was very little overall 
change in the use of moral language before and after Trump was inaugu-
rated. These mean values suggest that there were no major shifts in the 
use of morally bound language, contradicting this study’s hypotheses. This 
finding is most easily explained by the overall reliance of the two parties 
on specific moral foundations. While Trump made waves with statements 
on immigrants and immigration that were not perceived as politically 
correct by members of both parties, immigration as an issue is not new 
to American politics. It has shaped the party preferences of voters, par-
ticularly in the last 10 years, where Democrats have taken stronger steps 
in support of both immigrants and refugees.
As moral foundations theory would predict (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 
2008), Republicans were more likely than Democrats to use language re-
lated to the moral foundation of authority and subversion. Illustrating 
a reliance on a binding foundation (Weber & Federico, 2013), congres-
sional Republicans’ use of language related to authority/subversion in 
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their discussions of immigration is related to a general support of group 
cohesion. That is, they emphasize the legitimacy of the American govern-
ment in making decisions about immigrants’ rights in order to maintain 
a position of authority and rule in the country. This also emphasizes to 
Republican voters the weight they should place on protecting established 
citizens as a group from perceived encroachment on the wealth and so-
cial services of their nation by “aliens” actively engaged in subversion. To 
better show the reliance on this authoritative language, several portions 
of Congress members’ statements that had high levels of the authority/
subversion moral foundation are provided:
On June 29, 2017, Republican Representative Bob Goodlatte (VA) 
discussed the importance of law enforcement in maintaining 
order and offering protection, particularly from people who 
he referred to as “alien.” He said: “Respect for the rule of law 
is to keep communities safe and make sure that people like 
Kate Steinle are not murdered in the city of San Francisco 
as we heard of murders by people who are unlawfully in the 
United States.”
Republican Representative Robert Pittenger (NC) spoke on that 
same day, emphasizing similar sentiments: “Mr. Speaker, 
the previous administration’s failure was the lack of pros-
ecution and enforcement for crimes committed by illegal 
immigrants.”
During the first time period (on July 23, 2015) Republican 
Representative Lamar Smith (TX) spoke about the need for 
Congress to ensure that immigration laws are followed: “When 
does it end? I don’t understand how anyone could oppose 
enforcing immigration laws. The victims are not Democrats 
or Republicans. The victims are innocent Americans. Many 
of the crimes committed by illegal immigrants could have 
been prevented if the Obama administration had enforced 
immigration laws. Instead, it has chosen to ignore them, and 
innocent Americans continue to pay a steep price.”
From the Senate floor on February 25, 2015, Republican Roy 
Blunt (AR) also spoke out in opposition to the Obama ad-
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ministration: “Who will stand with the president’s clear 
power grab on immigration, and who will stand by the rule 
of law?”
On the other hand, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to 
use the moral foundation of care/harm. Again, this coincides with prior 
research (Weber & Federico, 2013). It also further solidifies Democrats’ 
reliance on individualizing foundations that focus on maintaining and sup-
porting individual rights. In this case, Democratic members of Congress 
were more likely to emphasize the amount of consideration that should be 
given to the plight of immigrants. Focusing on the circumstances of indi-
viduals and the difficulty immigrants find in every step of their move to 
the United States, congressional Democrats are able to inspire sympathy 
from their traditional voter base, as well as score points with the affected 
minority communities that constitute a major part of their voter coalition. 
To illustrate these points, several statements made by members of Congress 
that were high in the moral foundation of care/harm are provided:
During the second time period (on June 21, 2018), Democratic 
Representative Kathleen Rice (NY) discussed immigration- 
related legislation: “The bills being considered today are not 
what most Americans want. They deny DREAMers a path 
to citizenship. They deny our ability to protect those fleeing 
poverty and violence. And they do nothing to reunite fami-
lies already torn apart by the Trump administration.”
On that same day, Democratic Representative Eliot Engel (NY) 
also spoke against the same legislation: “This legislation does 
not provide a path to citizenship. It eliminates asylum pro-
tections, drastically cuts legal immigration, removes basic 
requirements for safe and humane detention, fails to end 
family separation, and does nothing to reunite the children 
who are being held 2,000 miles away from their parents, in-
cluding in my district in New York, without any idea where 
their parents are or if they’ll ever see them again. This is cruel. 
What we need is a compassionate solution with a path to 
citizenship and reunification of these families. Instead, this 
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bill is an attack on family values and an insult to our country’s 
beacon of freedom and opportunity to all.”
Democratic Senator Edward Markey (MA) spoke about immi-
grants during the first time period (on February 25, 2015): 
“Immigrants are a vital part of the fabric of Massachusetts 
and of our country. They start businesses, they create jobs, 
and they contribute to our communities. The president’s 
executive order recognizes the value of immigrants to our 
country. . . . The immigration system we have now doesn’t 
reflect our time-honored values as a melting pot of diverse 
and cultural innovation. It hurts our economy, and it hurts 
our national security. In short, our immigration system is 
broken. But for millions of immigrants who are living in 
the shadows, who are working every day to support their 
families, who have been brought up here from a young age, 
who are serving our country in the military, are pursuing the 
dream of higher education, these people deserve a path that 
allows them to earn citizenship.”
Contrary to prior research on moral foundations, this study’s analyses 
showed that Democrats relied more heavily on the moral foundation of 
loyalty/betrayal than did Republicans. Previous studies have found that 
Republicans tend to emphasize loyalty/betrayal as one of the binding foun-
dations (e.g., Weber & Federico, 2013). However, in this study of members 
of Congress’s use of language related to immigration policy, Democrats 
were more likely to discuss these issues in terms of loyalty and betrayal. 
To better explain this finding, examples taken from this study’s sample are 
provided. Each example includes a Democratic speaker whose statement 
relied strongly on the moral foundation of loyalty/betrayal:
Democratic Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (NV) spoke on 
February 14, 2018, about the importance of family and its 
relationship with immigration policy (see Figure 4.2): “Our 
immigration system is important for the family unit. Families 
are support systems. They pull each other up when someone 
is in need and pull together their resources. Strong families 
FIGURE 4.2 Sen. Cortez-Masto speaking about immigration reform.
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bill is an attack on family values and an insult to our country’s 
beacon of freedom and opportunity to all.”
Democratic Senator Edward Markey (MA) spoke about immi-
grants during the first time period (on February 25, 2015): 
“Immigrants are a vital part of the fabric of Massachusetts 
and of our country. They start businesses, they create jobs, 
and they contribute to our communities. The president’s 
executive order recognizes the value of immigrants to our 
country. . . . The immigration system we have now doesn’t 
reflect our time-honored values as a melting pot of diverse 
and cultural innovation. It hurts our economy, and it hurts 
our national security. In short, our immigration system is 
broken. But for millions of immigrants who are living in 
the shadows, who are working every day to support their 
families, who have been brought up here from a young age, 
who are serving our country in the military, are pursuing the 
dream of higher education, these people deserve a path that 
allows them to earn citizenship.”
Contrary to prior research on moral foundations, this study’s analyses 
showed that Democrats relied more heavily on the moral foundation of 
loyalty/betrayal than did Republicans. Previous studies have found that 
Republicans tend to emphasize loyalty/betrayal as one of the binding foun-
dations (e.g., Weber & Federico, 2013). However, in this study of members 
of Congress’s use of language related to immigration policy, Democrats 
were more likely to discuss these issues in terms of loyalty and betrayal. 
To better explain this finding, examples taken from this study’s sample are 
provided. Each example includes a Democratic speaker whose statement 
relied strongly on the moral foundation of loyalty/betrayal:
Democratic Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (NV) spoke on 
February 14, 2018, about the importance of family and its 
relationship with immigration policy (see Figure 4.2): “Our 
immigration system is important for the family unit. Families 
are support systems. They pull each other up when someone 
is in need and pull together their resources. Strong families 
FIGURE 4.2 Sen. Cortez-Masto speaking about immigration reform.
build strong communities. . . . So, Mr. President, our immi-
gration system should reflect our national commitment to 
the strength and the importance of that family unit and those 
family values. It makes no sense to me that we are fighting 
today to protect these kids and keep them in this country and 
then take their parents and rip them out of their homes and 
send them back to a country that they do not want to go to, 
that they do not call home, and where their safety is called 
into question. I do not understand that as a family value or 
as an American value.”
On June 21, 2018, Democratic Representative Judy Chu (CA) 
spoke about prior changes in immigration policy and a sense 
of betrayal from current legislation: “Finally in 1965, during 
the Civil Rights era, Senator Ted Kennedy (MA) ushered in 
a fairer immigration system based on family reunification. 
Because this system brings families together, immigrant 
households are less likely to rely on public benefits, and im-
migrants are often buying homes and starting businesses at 
a faster rate. Now with this bill, Republicans are trying to 
undo that process and make American White again. Worse, 
they are tearing families apart to do this while Trump and 
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Republicans are ripping parents from children at the border. 
They’re trying to do the same through our immigration laws. 
This war on families must stop.”
During that same House session, Democratic Representative 
Jerry Nadler (NY) discussed a loyalty both to families and 
to immigrants themselves: “Mr. Speaker, this bill is a harsh 
anti-immigrant package that fails to provide a pathway to 
citizenship for DREAMers while slashing legal immigration, 
crippling our agriculture industry, criminalizing undocu-
mented immigrants, undermining public safety, and remov-
ing critical protection for families and children. All in one 
monstrous bill. There is no justification for anyone voting 
for this bill.”
In an earlier House session during the second time period (June 
27, 2017), Democratic Representative John Conyers (MI) 
said: “H.R. 3003 will trample the rights of states and locali-
ties to determine what is in the best interest of their public 
safety and will conscript law enforcement to enforce federal 
immigration law. The ultimate experts on community safety 
are communities themselves, and hundreds of them have de-
termined that as community trust increases, crime decreases. 
This is because immigrants will come out of the shadows and 
report crimes to the local law enforcement when they are not 
threatened with deportation.”
During the first time period, a similar sentiment emerged. For ex-
ample, Democratic Representative David Cicilline (RI) spoke 
on March 17, 2016: “These executive actions will strengthen 
our communities, keep families together, and grow our econ-
omy. . . . [Conversely, the current resolution] is about a fun-
damental change in immigration policy that will rip families 
apart, that will undermine our values as a country.”
As can be noticed from these selections from the transcripts, the loyalty 
emphasis appears to be on a commitment to families and to trust between 
individuals and institutions (e.g., immigrants and law enforcement). While 
Republicans’ discussions of loyalty tend to rotate around an allegiance to 
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the American status quo and established political paradigms, Democrats 
seem to highlight loyalty among the individuals of immigrating families 
as well as a betrayal of American values (e.g., inclusion). This is a different 
perspective of the loyalty/betrayal moral foundation that appears under-
represented in prior research. It is possible that congressional Democrats 
are willing to emphasize this moral foundation, but in ways distinct from 
their Republican counterparts.
This study also considered the use of positively and negatively valenced 
emotional language in members of Congress’ discussions of immigration. 
Democrats, across both time periods, were more likely to use negative 
language. In terms of positive language, an interaction effect emerged, 
where Republican members of Congress used more positive emotional 
language during Time 2 than did Democrats. This finding appears to high-
light Republicans’ general acceptance of the policy positions espoused by 
Trump (during the second time period). That is, after Trump took office, 
House and Senate Republicans became more positive about immigration 
policy. These two examples provide a small representation of Republican 
members of Congress’s recent sentiments on immigration that were high 
in use of positive language:
On February 7, 2018, Republican Representative John Curtis 
(UT) spoke about legislation in the House that addressed 
immigration: “I believe before us now is a unique window of 
opportunity that will allow us to solve some of these complex 
problems. We can make this an historic time for our coun-
try. . . . My hope is that Congress will pass a bill that provides 
certainty for DREAMers while also bringing meaningful 
improvements to our VISA programs for seasonal workers 
and our highly skilled immigrants, along with providing re-
sources for an enhanced border security.”
A longer statement given by Republican Senator Joni Ernst (IA) a 
week later (on February 15, 2018) shows similar sentiments: 
“Mr. President, I want to take a moment to emphasize why 
the Secure and Succeed Act is the right bill for the Senate to 
pass this week. You see, I chose to join my colleagues who 
have worked hard on this bill for months for a few important 
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reasons. First, this bill provides a way forward for our DACA 
recipients. I have said time and again that I appreciate the 
contributions our DACA recipients are making in our 
communities. They are our friends, our neighbors, and our 
churchgoers. I support finding them a way forward. Our bill 
does this. It does it in a fair and humane way. But impor-
tantly, it also adds strong eligibility requirements to ensure 
the safety and security of the program and stop future illegal 
immigration. For instance, it does not reward the parents 
that came here illegally by giving them any type of lawful 
status. And it sets reasonable time limits and restrictions on 
who can apply. Second, it provides immediate and significant 
investments in our border. We cannot allow this problem 
to happen again. We have a duty and an obligation to keep 
our borders secure and our citizens safe. Our bill recognizes 
that spending money on the border without giving law en-
forcement strong authorities is like buying a boat without an 
engine. We need both to keep our borders and our commu-
nities secure. Third, our bill recognizes that you cannot view 
immigration in a silo. It is a bulky issue that represents many 
legal, economic, and security concerns. Many of these issues 
are deeply interesting — deeply interconnected. Addressing 
DACA and addressing the border without addressing some 
of the other issues plaguing our system is a half solution. We 
must have the president’s four principles to make this work. 
Finally, this is the president’s plan. The White House has en-
dorsed this proposal. The president’s pen is ready to sign it.”
Congressional Republicans’ use of more positive language in the 
second time period appears to serve two purposes. First, it indicates a 
mainstream conservative endorsement of Trump’s policy objectives, with 
many Republican politicians “falling in line” with the administration’s 
push for a renewed hardline position (in the sense that it did not shift in 
an attempt to attract minority voters) regarding immigration and border 
security. Second, it allows Republican politicians to respond to the often 
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highly publicized verbal attacks by Democratic members of Congress 
on conservative immigration policies and the conservative figures intro-
ducing them, showing their support for such policies. Democrats’ use of 
more negative language can be seen as a reaction to immigration poli-
cies they construe as draconian. Furthermore, Democrats contrast their 
sentiments and positions from Republicans by using negative language 
to describe legislation introduced and executive orders. These findings 
can be attributed to a general Democratic strategy of highlighting the 
drawbacks of strict immigration and border policies, as opposed to the 
Republican strategy that focuses on what would be lost if less stringent 
policy were implemented.
CONCLUSIONS
The statements from members of Congress provided in this section offer 
a more in-depth perspective of their use of moral, positive, and negative 
language in discussions about immigration policy. They further illustrate 
that although moral language use has not changed significantly based 
on party distinctions in the times before and after Trump’s inaugura-
tion, some moral lines were entrenched across time periods. As moral 
foundations theory would predict, Democrats focused on care/harm and 
Republicans emphasized authority/subversion. Surprisingly, Democrats 
also utilized the moral foundation of loyalty/betrayal. They stressed a 
commitment to family structures within immigrant communities and 
the United States more generally. Finally, Republicans were more likely to 
use positive language in the second time period, most likely showing their 
support for the Trump administration’s policies related to immigration.
NOTES
1. A portion of one unit of analysis was removed because of its anomalous 
nature in comparison to the rest of the sample. Democrat Nancy Pelosi filibus-
tered for eight hours during one House session (on February 7, 2018). Much of 
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BUILDING THE BORDER WALL: 
CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO SUPPORT 
TRUMP’S IMMIGRATION LEGACY
Carly Schmitt and Matthew L. Bergbower
Immigration has been a divisive issue within the Republican Party over 
the past decade. As the country elected an African-American president 
in 2008 with an agenda that included more inclusive immigration pol-
icies, growing discontent among Republicans across the country began 
to stir. The emergence of the Tea Party Movement in 2010, whose grass-
roots efforts advanced both conservative economic and cultural positions 
(Skocpol & Williamson, 2011), enhanced divisions within the Republican 
Party. Following the 2010 election, the Tea Party Movement continued to 
pick up steam with dozens of self-proclaimed Tea Party Republicans serv-
ing in Congress.1 With a philosophy of limiting government and tightly 
regulating immigration, this group was able to obstruct compromises on 
immigration that were struck between mainstream Republican leaders in 
Congress and President Barack Obama.2 This reflected a growing call by 
Tea Party grassroots activists across the country, 63% of whom viewed 
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immigrants as a growing threat to America’s customs and values (Jones, 
Cox, Navarro-Rivera, Dionne, & Galston, 2014).
Then candidate Donald Trump’s arrival onto the political scene in 2015 
was perfect timing. In his June 2015 presidential announcement, Trump 
decried that under the leadership of Obama the United States had fallen 
to the level of “a third world county” (Trump, 2015). He focused much of 
his attention on Mexico and immigration, adding: “When Mexico sends its 
people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re bringing drugs, They’re 
bringing crime, They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” 
This struck the right chord among those in the Republican Party whom 
were already concerned about immigration and weary about immigrants. 
Throughout the campaign, candidate Trump strongly advocated for a bor-
der wall along the United States-Mexico border, increased arrests from 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, and a massive de-
portation plan akin to “Operation Wetback” implemented by President 
Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s.3
Following his election, Trump has kept his campaign promises and 
prioritized immigration reform in his agenda. With support among the 
base, Trump continues to push Congress for, among many things, a bor-
der wall and enhanced deportations. If they did not recognize it before the 
election, then after Trump’s Electoral College victory Republican members 
of Congress (MCs) saw how important these anti-immigration tenets were, 
not only to the president, but also to their party base. How is a Republican-
led Congress to respond to this more extreme approach of immigration 
policy reform, especially given that both congressional leaders and much 
of the rank and file were not advocating for such hardline approaches to 
immigration reform prior to Trump’s arrival into the White House?
Our research seeks to better understand congressional support for 
Trump’s immigration agenda, such as building a border wall, implementing 
a travel ban for those from select Middle Eastern majority-Muslim coun-
tries,4 and penalizing sanctuary cities. Given Trump’s relative popularity 
among the Republican Party faithful — consistently holding over 80% ap-
proval ratings — Republican MCs may too advocate for strict immigration 
policies in the 115th Congress following the 2016 election. However, the 
White House did not achieve comprehensive immigration reform in the 
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115th Congress. Thus, we should not assume that Republicans are unified 
in their approach to immigration reform.
We conduct a content analysis of floor statements in the U.S. House 
on immigration in the 115th Congress (2017–2018). Our empirical results 
suggest that vocal advocates for Trump’s immigration agenda come from a 
select few Republicans with culturally conservative views on immigration, 
while Democrats seek to capitalize on Trump’s controversial proposals 
with an abundant amount of floor activity to voice their opposition. Our 
research contributes to both the presidential and legislative studies litera-
tures. Contemporary research on presidential legislative success suggests 
that in today’s heightened state of partisan polarization, presidents can be 
very successful in getting their agendas through Congress in periods of 
unified government (see, for example, Franklin & Fix, 2016). Our research 
is situated in this discussion by empirically assessing the extent to which 
the president’s agenda is stunted or supported during the “honeymoon” 
period of the president’s term under the condition of unified government.
In addition, our findings point to meaningful implications about rep-
resentation in Congress and how MCs might position themselves in the 
2018 midterm election. For example, with immigration as a central issue 
in the 2018 midterm elections, our research delves into the ways in which 
Republican MCs might be engaging in position taking (Mayhew, 1974) 
ahead of the election, especially those that were “primaried” (challenged, 
but not defeated) in the previous election cycle. We also explore whether 
MCs are responsive to those in their districts who might feel threatened 
in the wake of an increased presence of Latinos in their communities.
THE CONTEXT OF THE 115TH CONGRESS AND SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT’S AGENDA
In January 2012, Republican National Committee (RNC) chair Reince 
Priebus announced a plan to court Latino voters ahead of the 2012 gen-
eral election. With the economy as a central concern for Latinos at the 
time (Madison, 2012), Priebus said that the Republican Party was eager 
to engage this group in the wake of high Latino unemployment rates. At 
the same time, immigration was also an unparalleled concern for many 
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members of the Republican Party base, particularly those aligned with 
the Tea Party. Although mainline conservatives were concerned with im-
migration from a law-and-order standpoint, there were also those whose 
immigration concerns rested on fears of the changing “face” of the coun-
try (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011; Parker & Barreto, 2013). This anti-other 
perspective undoubtedly tied to then candidate Trump’s “Make American 
Great Again” campaign theme. Trump was able to resonate with many 
voters who thought that certain minority groups in America were getting 
ahead at the expense of others with the help of socialist-based government 
programs (Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck, 2018). Further, these voters were par-
ticularity drawn to the racially charged messages prioritized by Trump, 
like the strict immigration stances.
Thus, entering into his first term with a Republican-controlled Congress, 
the president was presented with a seemingly perfect opportunity to push 
through his agenda, including its centerpiece: immigration. A Republican-
controlled Congress provides the best institutional context for the president 
to pursue his immigration agenda, as research suggests that even during 
periods of high polarization, presidents can achieve legislative success with 
a unified government (Franklin & Fix, 2016). Further, presidents tend to be 
more successful immediately following their arrival into office (Beckmann 
& Godfrey, 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2005; Lockerbie, Borrelli, & Hedger, 
1998; Piffner, 1988; but see also Light, 1999 and Barrett & Eshbaugh-Soha, 
2007). Together, this provides the opportunity for the president to achieve 
legislative success on agenda items, including immigration.
However, the political context has not necessarily lent itself to con-
gressional support for the president’s more extreme views on immigration. 
Although the party base has largely fallen in line with the president’s hard-
line view on immigrants and immigration, the general public has not. 
Specifically, polling in 2018 finds that 65% of Americans do not agree that 
immigrants are more likely to commit violent crimes and 69% feel sympa-
thy towards undocumented immigrants living in the United States (Pew 
Research Center, 2018). Further, 60% of Americans oppose the president’s 
border wall proposal, while the country is evenly split on what to do about 
sanctuary cities (CBS News, 2018). Given that the public mood was gen-
erally unsupportive of the president’s hardline approach to immigration, 
congressional support and action on these agenda items may be stunted.
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Adding to this, embracing stricter immigration policies undoubt-
edly has consequences for the Republican Party in its quest for power in 
Congress. Demographically, Latinos are the largest racial minority group 
in the nation and continue to grow as part of the electoral body. Stricter 
approaches to immigration reform affect the treatment and experiences of 
Latinos in the United States. Latinos may be more reluctant to seek out ba-
sic government benefits like public education for their children, increased 
voting rights, reduced college tuition costs, and greater freedom from law 
enforcement oppression when the national dialogue on Latino immigra-
tion is highly negative. If MCs embrace the president’s framing of Latino 
immigrants as criminals, for example, greater Latino mobilization for the 
Democratic Party should be expected. This is the exact opposite approach 
that was prioritized by the RNC just six years ago. In short, Trump’s nom-
ination put a stop to much of the progress the Republicans were making, 
or seeking to make, with Latinos.5
There are also reasons to believe that Trump may have less leverage in 
Congress given his unique background, personality traits, and campaign 
style. Voters were well aware of his nonexistent experience in elected office, 
his irreverent behavior on Twitter (and elsewhere), and a good number of 
scandalous actions in his past that would cripple most presidential cam-
paigns. Trump regularly insulted other Republicans running against him 
in the 2016 primaries and generally lacked specific details on his ideas to 
“Make America Great Again.” Together, this made him unpopular among 
many in the elite circles of the Republican Party.6 Since becoming pres-
ident his approval ratings have been low, often hovering just above the 
40% approval mark. An FBI investigation, which began in May 2017, 
into his campaign’s actions and associations with Russia has cast a cloud 
over the legitimacy of his presidency. For these reasons it is not necessar-
ily inherent that Republican MCs will fall in line with Trump’s hardline 
immigration agenda.
In sum, the institutional and political context in the 115th Congress 
provides a setting that complicates the president’s ability to push through his 
uncompromising immigration agenda. On the one hand, unified govern-
ment and the honeymoon phase of the presidency should lead to legislative 
success on his key agenda items. On the other hand, the president’s hardline 
approach to immigration, in addition to his aggressive characterizations 
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of immigrants, does not have mass public support, and the president did 
not engender allies within the Republican establishment over the course 
of the 2016 election. It is thus unsurprising that immigration reform — in-
cluding funding for the border wall and penalties for sanctuary cities — did 
not make it through the 115th Congress, and that the president has instead 
relied on executive actions to carry out his agenda items.
IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IN THE 115TH CONGRESS
Although congressional action on the president’s immigration agenda has 
largely been stunted, there have been a handful of conservative immigra-
tion-related bills introduced in the House but that never made it to the 
floor. For example, Representative Mike Rogers (R-AL) sponsored H.R. 
1813 (Border Wall Funding Act of 2017), but it never received consid-
eration in committee. Representative Steve King (R-IA) sponsored H.R. 
140 (Birthright Citizenship Act of 2017), which also failed to be consid-
ered in committee. The DACA elimination threats and travel ban actions 
were initiated by executive decrees, and federal court legal battles ensued 
shortly thereafter. Congressional attempts to legislate on these matters, 
such as with H.R. 4873 (DACA Compromise Act of 2018) sponsored by 
Darrell Issa (R-CA) and H.R. 730 (Equal Protection in Travel Act of 2017) 
sponsored by Justin Amash (R-MI) similarly failed to receive U.S. House 
consideration.
Despite this inaction for much of the 115th Congress, two compre-
hensive reform bills sponsored by Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) made it to the 
House floor on June 21, 2018. These bills were H.R. 6136 (Border Security 
and Immigration Reform Act of 2018) and H.R. 4760 (Securing America’s 
Future Act of 2018). H.R. 6136 included $24.8 billion to fund a border 
wall, elimination of the diversity immigration visa program, creation of 
a point system for citizenship, and a new application process for current 
DACA recipients. On the day this bill received a floor debate, Trump took 
to Twitter and proclaimed his support for the bill, but also warned that 
Democrats in the Senate would not allow it to pass in its chamber. H.R. 
6136 is perhaps the clearest opportunity for Republican House members 
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to support a Trump-based immigration plan. The bill failed with a vote 
of 121–301. All 189 voting House Democrats opposed the bill along with 
112 House Republicans.7 The lack of comprehensive immigration reform, 
a leading campaign promise by the president, was a big loss for the party 
and the White House.
Three additional immigration bills that received legislative debate in 
the U.S. House were on sanctuary cities, immigrant reentry attempts, and 
gang-affiliated immigrants. First, H.R. 3003 (No Sanctuary for Criminals 
Act) was sponsored by Goodlatte and sought to block federal grants to cit-
ies that shelter illegal immigrants and put forward no attempts to enforce 
federal immigration laws. Second, H.R. 3004 (Kate’s Law), also sponsored 
by Goodlatte, increased the penalty for those illegal immigrants who re-
entered, or sought reentry into, the country. Finally, H.R. 3697 (Criminal 
Alien Gang Member Removal Act) sponsored by Barbara Comstock (R-VA) 
sought to make it illegal for foreign criminal gang members to enter the 
United States. All three of these bills passed the House, but failed to re-
ceive consideration in the Senate.
This overview of congressional action — or inaction — suggests that 
the Republican Party is still torn on how to tackle immigration reform. 
With immigration as a key policy item in the 2018 midterm (Shoichet, 
2018), the lack of comprehensive reform on immigration in Congress 
coupled with the president’s unilateral executive actions on immigra-
tion issues indicates that there is not uniform support for the president’s 
policies among Republicans in Congress. Indeed, economically conser-
vative Republicans, for example, may be opposed to the border wall in 
particular because of the estimated $25 billion cost to pay for it. Although 
public opinion polling indicates that 77% of Republicans support the plan 
(CBS News, 2018), fiscally conservative Republicans in Congress might 
be reluctant to embrace the price tag. Nonetheless, with Trump’s high 
approval ratings with Republicans and as the leader of the party, Trump 
has the power to set the Republican agenda for many issues of concern to 
voters during the 2018 midterm elections, and strategic incumbents are 
well aware of this. Our next step is to examine individual-level support 
for the president’s immigration agenda in Congress with these consid-
erations in mind.
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REPRESENTATIVES AS ADVOCATES: SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT’S IMMIGRATION AGENDA
Although few bills have made it to the floor of Congress and no immi-
gration related legislation has passed both houses, the president does not 
lack support for his policies from the Republican caucus. Indeed, there 
have been a handful of bills that have been introduced and debated in 
Congress, particularly in the House. Even if Republicans on the whole 
are not falling in line with the president’s immigration agenda, the presi-
dent has like-minded allies and those who are supportive of his hardline 
immigration approach.
The literature suggests a number of factors may lead MCs to support the 
president’s agenda. Richard Neustadt’s (1960) seminal study contends that 
presidential approval should drive support for his policies in Congress. As 
Edwards (2009) argues, constituent support for the president can serve as a 
proxy for the preferences of voters in the district. MCs from districts with 
high levels of support for the president should be prompted to represent 
and respond to the preferences of the district by advancing the president’s 
agenda. In doing so, MCs aid their reelection efforts as they are driven 
by reelection concerns (Mayhew, 1974). With an eye toward their next 
election, MCs are responsive to their districts by engaging in constituent 
casework, keeping in touch with the districts’ various communities, par-
taking in fundraising, and pursuing a legislative agenda that is consistent 
with the values and beliefs of their districts’ voters. If voters are supportive 
of the president and the administration’s agenda, the election-legislative 
behavior linkage should lead MCs to be supportive as well, perhaps even 
prioritizing the president’s agenda in their own legislative activity. Thus, 
our first hypothesis is that MCs from districts with higher levels of support 
for the president will be stronger advocates for Trump’s immigration agenda.
Adding to this, MCs’ own election experiences undoubtedly shape 
their legislative activity. Research shows a consistent linkage between 
electoral vulnerability and legislative behavior (Herrick & Moore, 1993; 
Rothenberg & Sanders, 2000; Sulkin, 2005; Victor, 2011). Exit polls show 
that Trump received around 90% of the vote share from self-identified 
Republicans. As the de facto leader of the Republican Party, Trump has 
primed immigration as a top priority for the party. And many within the 
party base have followed Trump’s lead on immigration issue positions — he 
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is the opinion leader on this issue, and the party faithful have followed 
suit. This means Republican MCs are faced with a partisan constituency 
that is largely allegiant to the president’s agenda. MCs who are vulner-
able to intraparty competition, then, might be more responsive to the 
president’s hardline immigration agenda in order to keep the support of 
the party base ahead of the 2018 elections to preempt getting “primaried” 
(Boatright, 2013) from a challenger that aligns more with the president. 
We expect that MCs who had primary challenges in the 2016 election will 
be stronger advocates for Trump’s immigration agenda.
The president is also likely to find support for his immigration agenda 
from one particular group in the House: the House Freedom Caucus. This 
caucus, known for its conservative hard line on immigration, is led by 
Mark Meadows (R-NC) and was responsible in the 115th Congress for 
the failing of the June 2018 immigration reform package — it was not 
tough enough.8 An outgrowth of the Tea Party Movement, the Freedom 
Caucus’s roots are with the Tea Party Caucus (TPC)9 that was first formed 
in 2010. The Freedom Caucus pursues an agenda of “limited government, 
the Constitution and the rule of law, and policies that promote liberty, 
safety, and prosperity of all Americans.”10 Over time, this caucus has 
taken an inflexible view on immigration reform by thwarting efforts to 
reach a compromise since 2012. Though this group has its roots firmly 
in the fiscally conservative side of the Republican caucus, it also consists 
of culturally conservative members that represent those within the party 
who are particularly concerned about the changing “face” of the coun-
try in light of a Black president and changing racial demographics of the 
country (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011; Parker & Barreto, 2013). Given 
this, our third hypothesis is that members of the House Freedom Caucus 
will be stronger advocates for Trump’s immigration agenda.
It is important to note that the Freedom Caucus’s hard-line immi-
gration preferences may no longer be a fringe position in the Republican 
Party. Trump was clear in his support for deportations and building a bor-
der wall during the 2016 presidential campaign, and this has been a top 
priority during the president’s first two years in office (and beyond). Some 
Americans may be convinced that strict immigration reform is necessary 
based on their overestimation of the number of immigrants living in the 
United States along with concerns about their burden on social services 
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and perceived criminal activity (Citrin & Sides, 2008; Parker & Barreto, 
2013). These perceptions may lead Republican MCs to adopt and vocalize 
restrictive immigration stances, even those not in the culturally conser-
vative Freedom Caucus.
In sum, we expect both electoral considerations and MCs’ own policy 
preferences to drive Republican support for the president’s immigration 
agenda in Congress. The election-legislative behavior linkage should man-
ifest in two ways. First, with an eye towards their culturally conservative 
base, Republican MCs from districts with high support for the president 
are expected to advocate for the president’s immigration plans in the 115th 
Congress in order to demonstrate responsiveness to their districts. Second, 
legislators’ own experiences with primary challenges in the 2016 election 
is expected to prompt them to be vocal proponents of the president’s hard-
line immigration approach in their efforts demonstrate responsiveness to 
the party base and thus avoid getting “primaried” from a more Trump-
esque candidate. Finally, members of the House Freedom Caucus, with 
legacies of uncompromising and extreme views on immigration, should be 
more likely to echo the president’s views on immigration and immigrants.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We utilize floor statements on immigration in the U.S. House of 
Representatives in order to gauge individual-level support in Congress 
for the president’s immigration agenda items. Floor statements provide 
a rich opportunity to examine vocalized support for these policies — in-
cluding the position, reasoning, and overall tone on the issue. With a 
membership of 435, the House has tight rules over floor debate on legisla-
tion. Debate is typically constrained to a small window of time, sometimes 
as little as an hour, with very few MCs able to participate (Maltzman & 
Sigelman, 1996). However, the House provides time for members to make 
5-minute “Morning Hour” floor speeches and, at other times, 1-minute 
floor speeches outside of legislative debates. This floor time is used by 
MCs to communicate their policy priorities and engage in position tak-
ing (Mayhew, 1974) to a national audience, as the speeches are taped by 
C-SPAN. Research indicates that use of this floor time is often a tool for 
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the minority party and ideologically extreme MCs to advocate for their 
political goals (Maltzman & Sigelman, 1996, but also see Rocca, 2007), but 
also used by party leaders to orchestrate a party message (Harris, 2005). 
Nevertheless, MCs can decide whether they are going to give a speech 
and what the content of that speech is, especially in the context of 1- and 
5-minute open speech times. Thus, those who want to advocate for or 
against the president’s immigration policy items are sending signals about 
their own policy priories in addition to their positions on these issues.
The C-SPAN Video Library provides us with an opportunity to develop 
a unique dataset of House floor statements in the 115th Congress. Here, 
we code support and opposition along with the reasoning for this support 
and opposition on the issues of the border wall, travel ban, and penal-
ties for sanctuary cities in MCs’ floor statements from January 3, 2017, to 
July 31, 2018. This sampled time period includes floor statements during 
debate on bills directly focused on immigration (such as those discussed 
above), floor statements during debates on bills not directly focused on 
immigration, and floor statements made during the Morning Hour and 
during other general speeches times. The codesheet for this study can be 
found in Appendix 5.1. Searches in C-SPAN for floor speeches on our 
three immigration issues were done by the authors.11 Two trained under-
graduate students separately coded the content. For intercoder reliability 
purposes, agreement percentages between coders and Cohen’s Kappa co-
efficients are provided in Appendix 5.2. Overall, our searches yielded a 
total of 233 immigration mentions12 across the three topics considered. 
Of these 233 mentions, 20 (8.5%) are overlapping comments made by 
the same legislator at the same time and thus coded two or more times as 
mentions. For example, a MC saying “I support the border wall and the 
travel ban” would be a statement coded twice, once for the border wall 
dataset and again for the travel ban dataset.
Our collection of floor speech data consider a variety of issue positions 
that may be stated by MCs, and the rationale behind their positions. For 
proponents of the border wall or the travel ban, for example, a rationale 
could be that immigrants engage in criminal activity in the United States, 
are an economic burden, or present a national security risk. For the op-
ponents of Trump’s restrictive immigration plans, they may defend their 
opposition by recognizing the benefits immigrants bring to America’s 
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economy, the historic legacy of accepting immigrants in the United States, 
or that a ban on Muslims traveling to the United States is racist.
SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT TRUMP’S IMMIGRATION POLICIES
Table 5.1 shows the number of mentions on policy issues (support and 
oppose) and the number of Republican and Democratic MCs who stated 
their positions. At the outset, it is clear that support and opposition 
for the Trump immigration agenda items is motivated by partisanship. 
Looking first at the border wall mentions, our search yielded 66 mentions 
of support for the border wall spanning 16 Republican MCs, with one 
Republican MC supporting the border wall with some reservations and 
no support from Democratic MCs. Republicans’ support for the border 
wall centered on arguments about crime prevention. In only one instance 
did a Republican argue that Mexico will or should pay for the wall, a 
prominent argument made by Trump. Here, Steve King (R-IA), a lead-
ing voice on immigration reform, said that he’s “pretty confident” the 












Support border wall 16 0 66
Support border wall (with reservations) 1 0 1
Against border wall 0 33 74
Support sanctuary cities penalties 29 0 112
Oppose sanctuary cities penalties 0 9 25
Support travel ban 9 0 36
Oppose travel ban 0 32 133
Negative Latino immigrant mention 29 0 174
Negative Muslim immigrant mention 9 0 60
Positive immigrant mention 6 36 128
Note: Mentions equal position stated per sentence in U.S. House floor speech.
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president is going to carry out his promise to get the border wall built 
and paid for by Mexico. Conversely, there were 74 instances of opposi-
tion towards the border wall from 33 Democrats. Arguments against the 
border wall centered on the costs, that it would not work, and support for 
the contributions immigrants make to the country.
Based on the number of floor statements in the House during our 
sampled time period, support among Republican MCs for Trump’s travel 
ban was considerably lower than that of the border wall (which is low al-
ready). No Republican argued to ban all Muslim immigrants, but some 
were rather supportive of banning some segments of the immigrant pool 
and/or enhanced screenings of immigrants. Nine Republican MCs made 
floor statements in support of this measure with these caveats, with a to-
tal of 36 mentions. Republicans supportive of the president’s executive 
order generally contended that it is not a “Muslim Ban” and that it was 
consistently misrepresented as such by the news media. In their support 
for the executive order, though, the reasoning rested on homeland secu-
rity. Democrats attacked Trump for issuing the order. Their arguments 
centered on the ban being unconstitutional and racist. Democrats also dis-
agreed with Republicans over the meaning of the executive order. Brenda 
Lawrence (D-MI), for example, argued: “A Muslim ban is a Muslim ban. It 
remains hateful, discriminatory, and goes against our American values. . . . 
This Muslim and refugee ban continues to be part of a dangerous and im-
moral agenda against a religion, people of color, and immigrants.” In total, 
there were 133 mentions against the travel ban across 32 Democratic MCs.
Although Republicans were collectively not apt to take on the issues 
of the border wall and the travel ban, they did take a hardline stance on 
sanctuary cities. There were 112 mentions by 29 Republicans in opposi-
tion to sanctuary cities for undocumented immigrants. During the debate 
on the No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, Doug Collins (R-GA) focused his 
comments on the rule of law, whereby states and cities are not adhering 
to federal laws, and that sanctuary cities “endanger lives as well as setting 
dangerous precedent” that local law enforcement does not need to cooper-
ate with federal law enforcement. Collins also argued that sanctuary cities 
pose a problem “with the [public’s] confidence that laws apply equally to 
everyone in American communities.” Republicans included in their state-
ments stories of how sanctuary cities harbor criminals that are not in the 
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United States legally and the tragic outcomes that have arisen as a result. 
Democrats were comparatively more silent on this issue. There are only 
25 mentions of support for sanctuary cities among eight Democratic MCs. 
During the debate on the No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, Jim McGovern 
(D-MA) stated that the bill “reeks of prejudice” and is not meant to solve 
problems, but rather to “demonize all immigrants as criminals” and “pun-
ish cities that don’t embrace the radical views of the anti-immigrant right 
wing of the Republican Party.” Democrats also contended that sanctuary 
cities are safer for immigrants and nonimmigrants alike.
Three trends emerge in our content analysis of support for the Trump’s 
immigration policies. First, the Republicans and Democrats who discussed 
these issues in floor statements are diametrically opposed on these issues. 
Republicans are not speaking out against the president’s immigration pol-
icies and Democrats are not supporting the president’s policies. Second, 
both Republicans and Democrats are supportive of the policies that ad-
vantage their party, particularly for the border wall and sanctuary cities. 
A June 2018 Gallup poll suggests that 41% of the public supports build-
ing a border wall (Newport, 2018). Alternatively, a Harvard-Harris poll 
from February 2017 indicates that upwards of 80% of the public are op-
posed to the efforts of sanctuary cities (Easley, 2017). Thus, it is politically 
beneficial for Democrats to attack the former issue and Republicans to 
attack the latter. Third, both Democrats and Republicans use emotional 
appeals. For the Democrats, these are stories of immigrants as a positive 
cultural influence in the country. For the Republicans, these are stories 
of undocumented immigrants who have committed violent crimes in the 
United States.
Our next step is to take a closer look at congressional Republican 
support for the president’s immigration agenda. We develop models that 
predict support for the border wall, the travel ban, and sanctuary cit-
ies penalties. Our unit of analysis in these models is the individual MC. 
Included are members that served from the start of the 115th Congress 
through July 31, 2018. Members who resigned, died, or began their terms 
in the House of Representatives after the January 3, 2017, start date are 
omitted. This allows for a comparison across legislators. In total, there are 
229 Republican MCs in the dataset.13
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We created dichotomous variables as dependent variables that in-
dicate a legislator’s support for each of the three immigration policies 
(border wall, travel ban, and penalties for sanctuary cities). For exam-
ple, our search yielded 66 mentions of support for the border wall by 16 
Republican MCs (a somewhat surprisingly low number of vocal support-
ers). We aggregate mentions across each policy area to create a variable 
that indicates whether an MC mentioned support for the policy at least 
one time in a floor statement (coded 1 for yes and 0 for no). Our focus is 
not on the volume of MCs’ support for policies, but rather whether MCs 
vocalize support during the sampled time frame. A dichotomous variable 
captures this conceptualization. We follow this same approach for mea-
suring support on the president’s executive travel ban order and support 
for penalizing sanctuary cities.
The independent variables in these models encompass a variety of 
district and MC characteristics. We assess the impact of district-level fac-
tors on support for Trump’s immigration policies. First, we expect that 
MCs from districts with high levels of electoral support for the president 
(District Vote % for Trump) to be more supportive of his immigration pol-
icies. The mean level of support for Trump in the 2016 election was 57% 
in Republican congressional districts, in contrast to a mean of 31.8% in 
Democratic congressional districts. Similarly, we expect that MCs whose 
own electoral fortunes have been in question via intraparty competition 
in the previous election cycle (Primary Vote %) might be pushed to the 
ideological right as they seek to be responsive to their party base. The av-
erage Republican MC in the 115th Congress had a vote share of 78% in 
the 2016 primaries, with 12% of these Republicans obtaining less than 
50% of the vote share in their primary elections. Data on both of these 
variables are collected from The Almanac of American Politics (Cohen, 
Barnes, Cook, & Barone, 2017).
In addition, we expect that members of the House Freedom Caucus 
will align more with the president’s policies on immigration. Its list of 
members is not published, so we classify members through an online 
news media search of those who have been identified as Freedom Caucus 
members in the 114th and 115th Congresses. The sources include Politico, 
Newsweek, and The Hill. There are 39 Republican MCs coded as a House 
144 PART 2 Using the C-SPAN Video Library to Study Congressional Rhetoric
Freedom Caucus Member in the dataset. This variable allows us to capture 
not simply whether conservative members are more likely to advocate for 
the president’s immigration agenda, but whether the MCs’ ideological 
positions on immigration in particular fall in line with Trump’s stances.
Models of representation also stipulate that MCs are responsive to 
their constituents in the district. With just over a quarter of Latino vot-
ers supporting Trump in the 2016 election (Krogstad & Lopez, 2016), 
and Trump’s immigration policies largely rebuked by this segment of the 
population, we expect that pressures from the district’s Latino population 
decreases MCs’ support for the president’s hardline immigration policies. 
We incorporate the variable District Latino Population % to capture the 
district’s Latino population (from 2015) as recorded by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. At the same time, however, evidence suggests that support for 
the president’s immigration policies has been most fervent in areas for 
which there has been a growing Latino population (Newman, Sha, & 
Collingwood, 2018). Thus, it may be that Republican MCs are responsive 
to this group of constituents, those feeling threatened by demographic 
changes in their community. As such, we create a variable to capture this 
change in district-level Latino population, % Change in Latino Population 
(from 2010 to 2015). The mean change in Latino population during this 
time frame is 0.56%.14
Another independent variable considers those Republican MCs re-
tiring or running for another office (i.e., the Senate or governor), but still 
finishing their term to the end of 2018. There are 33 Republican MCs 
coded as Retiring. Finally, the model includes a structural control vari-
able for Seniority. This variable is measured as a count for the number of 
years the MC has been in the House of Representatives.
Figure 5.1 graphically shows logit regression coefficient estimates along 
with their 95% confidence intervals (Jann, 2014). The results of the models 
predict support for Trump’s immigration policies among Republicans in 
the 115th Congress. The dependent variables are dichotomous, indicating 
whether the MC mentioned support for the policy in a floor speech.15 At 
the outset it is clear that Freedom Caucus members are more supportive of 
these policies. These legislators are 7% more likely than their Republican 
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of the travel ban, and nearly 9% more likely to express opposition to the 
efforts of sanctuary cities.16
However, the results are mixed on the election and district-level vari-
ables. MCs from districts with higher levels of support for Trump in the 
2016 election are no more likely to be supportive of his immigration pol-
icies in floor speeches. And, the percentage of Latinos in the district has 
no effect on legislators’ floor statements on immigration policy. However, 
there is a clear connection between an MC’s own vote share in the 2016 
primary election and support for the strict immigration proposals. MCs 
that are electorally vulnerable within their parties tend to be more sup-
portive of the border wall and penalties for sanctuary cities compared 
to their partisan colleagues that are more electorally secure. Predicted 
probabilities estimate that, in the 115th Congress, the most electorally 
threatened legislators in the 2016 primaries were 17% more likely to vo-
calize their opposition to sanctuary cities and 11% more supportive of the 
border wall than their Republican colleagues who ran in more uncom-
petitive races in this election.
GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT IMMIGRANTS
Our analysis up to this point indicates that Trump has an ally in the 
Freedom Caucus, at least in terms of immigration policy.17 The consis-
tent support in floor speeches for the president’s immigration agenda 
by those in the Freedom Caucus coupled with the significant effects for 
those whom are electorally vulnerable in their primaries indicates that 
a select few members of the Republican Party are prioritizing immigra-
tion in their floor activity. Our next step is to assess the ways in which 
House members talk about immigration and immigrants. Here, we are 
particularly interested in the tone of floor speeches. For each immigra-
tion mention, we code whether the statement included negative language 
directed towards immigrants, Latinos, and Muslims.
One of Trump’s typical phrases on the campaign trail was to include 
portrayals of Latino immigrants as criminals (e.g., “rapists” and “murder-
ers”). Similarly, he expressed concerns about chain migration, immigrants 
“taking our jobs,” and immigrants taking advantage of the U.S. taxpayer. 
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We code any such characterizations of Latino immigrants in such a hos-
tile manner as negative. As seen in Table 5.1, there are 174 such mentions 
in the dataset from 29 Republican MCs.18 Several of these mentions are 
during the legislative debate on sanctuary cities with narratives about 
undocumented immigrants that broke the law, as well as generalizations 
about Latino immigrants as a whole. For example, in a floor speech on 
December 7, 2017, Representative Ted Poe (R-TX) provides examples of 
undocumented immigrants murdering U.S. citizens. He uses examples to 
make generalizations about Latinos and why Congress needs to support 
the president’s policies so that we do not let people enter the country who 
“can hurt us.” He then argues that the United States should not be admit-
ting people that do not speak or write English. There are some instances 
of Democrats acknowledging illegal acts of undocumented immigrants, 
but these examples were immediately qualified as an exception to the 
norm. Given this, we did not code this as a negative characterization of 
Latinos. There are 128 instances of positive remarks on immigrants from 
6 Republican MCs and 26 Democratic MCs.
Our second focus is on characterizations of Muslims. President Trump’s 
Executive Order 13769 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry) created travel restrictions for those from seven Muslim-majority 
countries. Given that the order was often framed as a ban on Muslims, 
we seek to investigate whether MCs are connecting terrorism to Islam. 
Specifically, we code whether MCs linked Muslims (visitors or immigrants) 
to national security and terrorism, or if statements about the nation’s threat 
of adhering to sharia law are made. There are 60 such mentions by nine 
Republican House members. Louie Gohmert (R-TX) was a leading voice 
in support for the travel ban and argued that although not all Muslims 
were dangerous, extremists were using principles of Islam to engage in 
terrorist activity and that the ban was thus justified.
We followed the same approach as in the earlier analysis to create di-
chotomous dependent variables (Negative Latino Mentions and Negative 
Muslim Mentions) that capture whether an MC discussed Latinos and 
Muslims in a negative light. Given the previous findings, we expect that the 
same variables, Freedom Caucus Member and Primary Vote %, to correlate 
with negative characterizations of Latinos and Muslims. This examination 
can provide more evidence that the Freedom Caucus and those who are 
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electorally vulnerable to intraparty competition are more closely aligned 
with the president’s philosophy on immigrants from Latin America and 
Middle Eastern countries.
We include the same control variables as in our earlier analyses, ex-
cept we omit the variables District Latino Population % and % Change in 
Latino Population from the model predicting negative characterizations 
of Muslims. Figure 5.2 presents the results. First, members of the House 
Freedom Caucus are more hostile towards Latino immigrants than other 
Republicans. Estimated predicted probabilities suggest that these MCs 
are 9% more likely to characterize Latino immigrants in a negative light. 
They are also 11.5% more likely to focus their comments on Muslims as 
FIGURE 5.2 Republican views toward immigrants.
Freedom Caucus Member
District Vote % for Trump
District Latino Population %




Negative Latino Mentions Negative Muslim Mentions







LR Chi2 18.80 15.58
Prob > chi2 .01 .01
Pseudo R2 .11 .21
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terrorists and a national security threat. Primary Vote % also continues to 
exert an effect, with the most vulnerable MCs nearly 14.5% more likely to 
take on a negative tone towards Latinos in their floor speeches compared 
to those more electorally secure legislators.
CONCLUSION
President Trump has achieved much during his first two years in office. 
Internationally, he worked on renegotiating NAFTA, implemented tar-
geted import taxes, and met with North Korea to work toward greater 
security in the region. Domestically, Trump passed a major income tax 
cut for individuals and corporations — a plan championed by congres-
sional Republicans. Other key legislative accomplishments in the 115th 
Congress include increasing benefits for veterans, elimination of the 
PPACA individual mandate, increasing opioid prevention and treatment 
efforts, and creating stiffer penalties for human trafficking, just to name a 
few. Thus, Republicans in Congress had many accomplishments to cam-
paign on in the 2018 election. Even still, comprehensive immigration 
reform, a central issue in the 2016 election cycle, was not one of these ac-
complishments. Overall, our data analyses suggest that most Republican 
MCs simply were not supportive of the president’s immigration agenda 
during the 115th Congress, and, as such, they largely avoided addressing 
the topic in their floor speeches.
As mentioned above, Trump’s hardline approach to immigration re-
form has consequences on the treatment and experiences of Latinos in 
America. A counterattack to these out-group anxiety messages expressed 
by Trump and some in Congress are congressional efforts to find compas-
sionate methods for immigrant Latinos to obtain citizenship and reduce 
the number of undocumented immigrants living in the United States. If 
these efforts in Congress are bipartisan, the message becomes even stron-
ger. With a powerful Freedom Caucus holding onto hardline conservative 
solutions to immigration, the nation moves farther from finding such 
compassionate and reasonable reforms.
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APPENDIX 5.1: CODING C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY CONTENT
Two undergraduate students were trained in content analysis for this proj-
ect. Each student was given the same grouping of C-SPAN videos from 







Support with reservations/concerns ___________
Oppose ___________
Costs too high ___________
Will not work ___________
Mexico will pay for it ___________
Sanctuary Cities
Support their efforts ___________
Oppose their efforts ___________
Muslim Travel Ban
Support for an immigration ban on all Muslims entering  
U.S. ___________
Support for a partial immigration ban of persons some Islamic coun-
tries ___________
Support for stronger immigration screening of persons from Islamic 
countries ___________
Oppose immigration ban directed towards Muslims ___________
Muslim Ban Support Reasoning
Extremist terrorism/Islamic threat ___________
Sharia law threat ___________
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Muslim Ban Oppose Reasoning
Unconstitutional (due process, gov. establishment of religion, or  
other) ___________
Racist ___________





agreement (%)a Cohen’s Kappa Standard error
Border wall speeches
Border wall support 73.2 36.6 0.58 0.07
Border wall reasoning 76.3 49.8 0.53 0.07
Anti-immigration mentions 94.9 76.0 0.78 0.10
Positive immigration mentions 88.7 78.9 0.46 0.10
Sanctuary cities speeches
Sanctuary cities support 81.0 53.9 0.59 0.10
Anti-immigration mentions 81.0 50.2 0.62 0.13
Positive immigration mentions 93.1 84.2 0.56 0.13
Travel ban speeches
Muslim travel ban support 69.4 39.4 0.50 0.08
Muslim travel ban reasoning 96.5 82.7 0.80 0.09
Anti-immigration mentions 94.1 90.0 0.41 0.11
aExpected agreement should be interpreted as the by chance agreement level between coders. 
Cohen’s Kappa should be interpreted as follows: <0 = Poor agreement; 0.01–0.2 = Slight agreement; 
0.21–0.4 = Fair agreement; 0.41–0.6 = Moderate agreement; 0.61–0.8 = Substantial agreement; 
0.81–0.99 = Almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).
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NOTES
1. See The New York Times (2010) coverage for further details.
2. In response to the collapse of negotiations on immigration reform in the 
113th Congress (2013–2014), Obama issued an executive action that both ex-
panded the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and delayed 
deportations for those who have resided in the United States for at least 5 years 
(Ehrenfreund, 2014).
3. Arrests and deportations from ICE have increased during the Trump ad-
ministration, but apprehensions by U.S. Border Patrol agents have decreased 
during this same time (Associated Press, 2017).
4. Henceforth called “travel ban.”
5. This is not to say that the Latinos are strongly opposed to Trump. Indeed, 
not all Latinos are in favor of open borders or other strongly liberal approaches 
to immigration reform. Further, economic considerations deeply affect all 
Americans. Evidence suggests the strong economy and Trump’s tax cut plan im-
proved his approval among Latinos in 2018 (Cortes, 2018).
6. From their public statements, this unpopularity was only temporary for 
some Republicans like Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Rand Paul (R-KY), though.
7. H.R. 4760 failed by a vote of 193–231 on June 21, 2018, as well. It elim-
inated the diversity visa program also, chain migration (also known as family 
reunification), strengthened immigration deportation powers for the Department 
of Homeland Security, along with other provisions.
8. Specifically H.R. 6136 and H.R. 4760 (discussed above).
9. No longer in operation, as the Freedom Caucus replaced it.
10. The caucus has no official government website. This statement was taken 
from its bio on the House Freedom Caucus Twitter account @freedomcaucus.
11. The key terms used in our C-SPAN search were “border wall,” “Muslim 
ban,” “travel ban,” “Trump + ban + entry,” and “sanctuary cities.” The results 
from these searches are video clips, some of which are brief segments of an MC 
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floor speech while at other times the entire speech is prompted. If a video was 
unrelated, coders double-checked with the text of the speech also provided in 
the C-SPAN results.
12. A “mention” is considered if a position of interest (from the code sheet) 
is stated in a sentence. Thus, multiple mentions could exist per speech. However, 
for our regression models below, these variables from the content analysis are 
dichotomous (discussed further below).
13. There are 156 Democrats in the dataset as well, but Democrats are 
omitted from the analyses below, given that our primary interest is with House 
support for strict immigration policies and no Democrats voiced such support 
on the House floor.
14. These district Latino population variables are dropped in the travel 
ban models.
15. The independent variables are standardized from 0 to 1 for presenta-
tion purposes.
16. All predicted probabilities are calculated by holding the other variables 
at their mean values.
17. Trump’s relationship with the Freedom Caucus was rocky at first, with the 
caucus temporarily blocking his measure to repeal only portions of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). However, this relationship has 
developed into an alliance whereby members of the Caucus have been the pres-
ident’s fiercest supporters, particularly in terms of the FBI investigation led by 
Robert Mueller (Bacon, 2018).
18. There is no incident of a negative mention by a Democratic MC.
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CHAPTER 6
USING THE JUDICIARY: C-SPAN, JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM, AND THE CONSTITUTIVE 
FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE TRUMP ERA
Joseph Sery
The hyperpartisanship that has defined American political discourse in 
the recent past and the advent of the Trump presidency have intensified 
the use of the judiciary as a means of ideological identification and divi-
sion. Whether it’s the travel ban, Russian voting interference and campaign 
collusion, immigration, gerrymandering, religious liberty, voter suppres-
sion, the nominations of Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, affirmative 
action, or the litany of other issues on the table, the administration, politi-
cal candidates, and broader public use the ongoing legal drama as a means 
to construct and signal their ideological commitments to key democratic 
values for their constituents. Understood rhetorically, ideological appeals 
direct the attention of the public and offer them a grammar with which to 
address social values and their legal implications. Issues concerning the 
judiciary are one of, if not the most, prominent site for public argument 
about our values as a country, the direction we are headed, and the role of 
158 PART 2 Using the C-SPAN Video Library to Study Congressional Rhetoric
the judiciary throughout the process. Importantly, these issues transcend 
the technical sphere of legal argumentation as they enter public debate.
In order to better understand the great divide in the American public, 
this essay examines the ways in which public arguments about the judiciary 
serve as enthymematic, ideological signals wherein politicians and public 
intellectuals invoke the judiciary in order to perform their own ideolog-
ical identities while simultaneously constituting their audience. Drawing 
from the rhetorical tradition — particularly Mary Ann Glendon’s (1991) 
idea of “rights talk,” Edwin Black’s (1970) “second persona,” James Boyd 
White’s (2004) conception of law as distinctly constitutive, and Michael 
Calvin McGee’s (1980) “ideograph” — I argue that politicians and public 
figures turn to law as a rhetorical object through which they identify and 
divide the public. This focus on rhetoric and ideology stresses the essential 
role that discourse plays in the construction and reconstruction of iden-
tity. Whereas some scholars argue that ideology is an important defining 
characteristic for elites but not the public writ large (Achen & Bartels, 
2016; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017), I draw from the critical tradition that pos-
its ideology as inherent to the human condition (Deetz & Kersten, 1983). 
Ideology not only is a set of beliefs and attitudes but also shapes our un-
derstanding of what exists, what is good, and what is possible (Therbon, 
1980). While individual speeches may not sway the public in a traditional, 
Aristotelian sense, they nonetheless direct the attention of the audience 
and provide a set of what Kenneth Burke (1969) calls terministic screens 
that reflect, select, and deflect particular aspects of reality. When it comes 
to ideology and the judiciary, the invocations of the court, whether to cel-
ebrate or decry, craft a public philosophy of law that attempts to frame 
what constitutes appropriate judgment and how this ought to function 
within American democratic culture. These discourses also attempt to 
connect seemingly disparate spheres of argumentation. On the one hand 
is the technical sphere of law, with its highly regulated rules and dense 
legalese, and on the other hand is the messier, somewhat mercurial pub-
lic sphere, which plays fast and loose with terms and ideas while being 
guided by more ideological concerns. As such, the political figures using 
the judiciary as a means of constituting an audience should be understood 
as navigating and exploiting the tensions within civic culture.
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After establishing the constitutive function of law and the ways it can 
be used to call multiple publics into being, I turn to the ideograph of “ju-
dicial activism” and utilize the C-SPAN Video Library to illustrate how 
rhetors draw from the rhetorical power of the term to signal their ideo-
logical commitments while they craft competing ideas of and expectations 
for the judicial branch. In particular, I will address the ways in which 
judicial activism has been utilized as an ideological token since the inau-
guration of Donald Trump. Unlike much of the work in rhetoric and law, 
this project addresses the often-neglected “publicness” of the judiciary. 
As such, I am not so much interested in the law qua law, but in how the 
law and judiciary are used as rhetorical, ideological tools in constructing 
and maintaining the identities of the speaker and audience. In doing so, 
political leaders and pundits are able to marshal the court’s legitimacy in 
order to pursue partisan ends.
CONSTITUTING AN AUDIENCE
Law holds a prominent role in the public sphere in its ability to frame 
behavior and legitimate state action. Landmark cases such as Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka and Roe v. Wade serve as catalysts both for 
reform and opposition. Despite the prominence of generation-defining 
cases, law conceives of itself as an insular, technical sphere with its own 
set of norms, dense legalese discourse, and professional gatekeeping. Yet, 
in recent decades, legal discourse has started seeping out of its technical 
sphere and into everyday argument. As legal and political theorist Mary 
Ann Glendon (1991) argues, “Legal discourse has not only become the 
single most important tributary to political discourse, but it has crept into 
the languages that Americans employ around the kitchen table, in the 
neighborhood, and in their diverse communities of memory and mutual 
aid” (p. 3). Law, for good or ill, has infused itself into contemporary public 
discourse and goes well beyond its traditional bounds, but with different 
parameters of accountability. Law may be a technical discourse, but it 
faces nontechnical resistance when it enters a changing, contingent public 
discussion. When this happens, the norms and processes that undergird 
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the legal system do not restrict public opinions on the issues before the 
court. Rather, ideology collapses legality and morality into one, yet still 
adorns the veil of blind justice.
While the judiciary is guided by the various technical restrictions that 
frame their judgments, including the Constitution, statutes, precedent, ac-
cepted norms of adjudication, and the facts of a given case, the broader 
public is not beholden to such limitations and understands them in differ-
ent, sometimes contradictory ways. That does not minimize the rhetorical 
power of judicial issues in the public sphere, as they are prominent figures 
in public argument. Rather, they are imbued with an ideological commit-
ment that often makes them forceful rhetorical frameworks. The judiciary 
is not absent ideology (Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, & Sawicki, 2006), yet 
they are nonetheless reined in by their institutional duty. The public has 
no such obligation (or, at least, tends to abandon it more readily), so when 
the judiciary is invoked during public argument, the rhetor often does 
so as a way to signal their ideological commitments to their audience. 
Although the specific cases are no doubt important, the greater concern is 
about the values that the cases underscore. If we accept Glendon’s (1991) 
argument that “rights talk” is becoming increasingly pervasive, these in-
vocations are becoming more prominent and more powerful. Moreover, 
the hyperpartisan tribalism tends to exacerbate these rhetorical appeals 
and their impact.
In order to understand why and how politicians and public intellec-
tuals use the judiciary in this way, one must understand the relationship 
between rhetor and audience. Edwin Black’s (1970) notion of the “sec-
ond persona” is a useful starting point when thinking about the ways in 
which a political rhetor invokes the judiciary so as to indicate their ideo-
logical orientation and direct the audience. One of the reasons politicians 
turn to issues related to the judiciary is because the law is so intimately 
connected to morality and ethical norms. Despite legal philosophers ar-
guing otherwise, the public tends to view the judiciary as the ultimate 
defender (or, depending on the issue, usurper) of morality (Glendon, 
1991). When the legislative and executive branches fail us, we turn to the 
priests of the judicial branch to offer salvation as a testament to their higher 
calling. Their judgments on key issues often carry a heavy moral weight 
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and become touchstones for future arguments in the public sphere. Black 
argues, “Moral judgments, however balanced, however elaborately qual-
ified, are nonetheless categorical. Once rendered, they shape decisively 
one’s relationship to the object judged. . . . Moral judgments coerce one’s 
perceptions of things” (p. 109). As the final arbiter of the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court sets the tone, not only for the judiciary in the form 
of precedent, but also by establishing the discursive framework through 
which the public understands the issue, whether or not they agree with 
the conclusion. Consider, for example, the issue of privacy. Although it 
is not mentioned in the Constitution, privacy has become a cornerstone 
democratic value, due in large part to the Supreme Court’s continuous 
articulation, expansion, and reification.
Black (1970) continues, claiming, “It is through moral judgments that 
we sort out our past, that we coax the networks and the continuities out of 
what has come before, that we disclose the precursive patterns that may in 
turn present themselves to us as potentialities, and thus extend our very 
freedom” (p. 109). Given the judiciary’s role in reviewing, maintaining, 
and dissolving important issues concerning public morality, it is no won-
der why politicians return to its well as a way to express “eternal signs of 
internal states” (p. 110). As the judiciary and public arguments about its 
decisions coerce attention and perception, they create what Kenneth Burke 
(1969) calls a “terministic screen” through which one understands the is-
sue. He writes, “Men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections 
of reality. To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections of 
reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, func-
tion as a deflection of reality” (p. 59). All language and discourse functions 
as a filter that impacts perception. When it comes to public arguments 
about the judiciary, the terministic screens create and reinforce a par-
ticular ideological worldview that can be utilized for rhetoric effect. By 
connecting Black’s idea of the second person and Burke’s understanding 
of terministic screens, the symbolic function of rhetoric connects rhetor 
and audience through language.
Black’s (1970) notion of the second persona, or the “implied audi-
tor” of a rhetorical discourse, is useful as it illustrates how the ideological 
signaling takes place and the impact it has on the audience. Black calls 
162 PART 2 Using the C-SPAN Video Library to Study Congressional Rhetoric
attention to the “tokens” that serve as terministic screens and indicate who 
the rhetor perceives the implied auditor to be (p. 112). In the 1950s, ar-
gues Black, the token “communism as cancer” was an oft-repeated trope 
that illustrated the ideological worldview of those who invoked the term. 
The rhetorical salience of the phrase and the ideological attitude it sum-
moned stoked the fear and paranoia surrounding the Cold War and enabled 
rhetors to capitalize. Notably, the idea of the second persona is not lim-
ited to who the audience is perceived to be — their values, cultural norms, 
ideological worldview, and other significant traits. The second persona 
also indicates what the rhetor wants the audience to be. “In discourse of 
the Radical Right,” Black argues, “as in all rhetorical discourse, we can 
find enticements not simply to believe something, but to be something” 
(p. 119). There is a constant flux between what the audience is and what 
the audience can be, and the discursive tokens reflecting the second per-
sona serve to transition from the former to the latter.
Michael Calvin McGee (1999) echoes this idea as he examines the 
problem of labeling particular views or beliefs as belonging to “the people.” 
McGee argues that “the people” are created in a speech act if individuals 
make the choice to agree with the speaker:
When “one man stands up as the proclaimer of a general will,” what 
he says, at the time he originally says it, is a fiction, for it is his per-
sonal interpretation of his “people’s” history. Though he warrants 
his argument with abundant examples, he creates, not a description 
of reality, but rather a political myth. (p. 344)
Whether it’s the idea of “communism as cancer” or “judicial activism,” 
the group of individuals composing said “people” must accept the politi-
cal myth and thus live in “mass illusion” (p. 345). The desire to maintain 
a collective identity belies the need to perceive the ideological tokens as 
oriented toward similar goals. Given its pervasiveness throughout U.S. 
public argument, legal discourse has a distinct constitutive function: it 
creates, maintains, and changes our ideas of what it means to be a public 
and a people.
James Boyd White (2004) underscores the constitutive role of law:
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To conceive of law as a rhetorical and social system, a way in which 
we use an inherited language to talk to each other and to maintain 
a community, suggests in a new way that the heart of law is what 
we always knew it was: an open hearing in which one point of 
view, one construction of language and reality, is tested against 
another. (p. 273)
Law is a primary space where the public deliberates about its collective 
values and ambitions. Law impacts everyone and carries with it the power 
of the state. As White conceives of the constitutive function of law, rhetors 
are attempting to call a public into existence with their interpretations 
of what constitutes good legal judgment as a way to assess the successes 
and failures of the judiciary in particular and institutional power more 
broadly. Such rhetorical engagement is not reserved for lawyers, judges, 
and other legal professionals; the broader public plays an active role as 
well. In doing so, rhetors invoking the judiciary not only signal the goals 
of their “team,” but, because they view their team as inherently right and 
good, they are also creating an idea of democratic culture with particular 
values and ideals. Rather than persuading the audience through classic 
argumentation, they are crafting an identity they want their audience to 
embody. White (2004) continues:
It is the constitution of a world by the distribution of authority 
within it; it establishes the terms on which its actors may talk in 
conflict or cooperation among themselves. The law establishes roles 
and relations and voices, positions from which and audiences to 
which one may speak, and it gives us speakers the materials and 
methods of a discourse. It is a way of creating a rhetorical commu-
nity over time. It is this discourse, working in the social context 
of its own creation, this language in the fullest sense of the term, 
that is the law. It makes us members of a common world. (p. 266)
Under his understanding, the community created by law is always in 
negotiation, but it is singular: a community. The state of contemporary 
public discourse, however, suggests that multiple, competing, contradictory 
164 PART 2 Using the C-SPAN Video Library to Study Congressional Rhetoric
communities (or publics) are being created and maintained. Despite liv-
ing in the same country, liberals and conservatives in the United States 
appear to be living in two different worlds. Reinforced by a self-imposed 
echo chamber that becomes distilled into group polarization, liberal and 
conservative rhetorics are increasingly “us vs. them” and often use the ju-
diciary to stoke the flames of resentment. Their idea of what constitutes 
good and appropriate legal judgment may not represent a thorough, con-
sistent legal philosophy, nor is it able to withstand strict challenges from 
legal scholars. Being unbound by the technical limitations of expertise, 
the broader public relies upon their ideological commitments to under-
gird their idea of what good legal judgment ought to look like. Moreover, 
they want to align themselves with good judgment because it serves as an 
institutional validation and a way in which to rally in opposition to their 
political opponents who seemingly flaunt the rule of law.
Examining the ideological tokens that contribute to such divisive worl-
dviews offers a glimpse into the way in which each public is conceived 
and the moral touchstones guiding their self-conception. When it comes 
to the judiciary, the options are numerous, but for the sake of time and 
space only one will be examined in this essay: judicial activism.
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: A BRIEF HISTORY
In C-SPAN’s annual “Cram for the Exam” series, which helps to prepare 
students for their upcoming AP U.S. Government exam, a caller asked, 
“What is the difference between judicial activism and judicial restraint?” 
Andrew Conneen, a high school teacher, responded by describing the 
common law tradition from which the U.S. judiciary emerged:
Judicial activism and judicial restraint, it’s really this concept of 
common law that our judges in the American system that we in-
herited from the British have a lot of deference in terms of decid-
ing how to interpret law. Then the judges are supposed to follow 
that precedent, or stare decisis, over the course of that law, and it’s 
really a rare thing, a landmark case if you will, when the Supreme 
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Court overturns that precedent. So if a Supreme Court justice is 
going against that precedent or going against established law they’re 
known as an activist. And if they’re more constrained, if they’re 
reading very strictly what the law and the Constitution says, and 
they don’t want to infer what was meant by the law, then they’re 
using more constraint or what we sometimes call original inter-
pretation. (2018, May 5)
His co-panelist, fellow teacher Daniel Larsen, reinforces this interpreta-
tion by noting how activist judges are more willing to “bring in the times” 
and embrace the “living Constitution,” which liberals and Democrats 
“tend to favor.” The conservatives and Republicans, he argues, are more 
inclined toward judicial restraint as they “let the legislative branch do 
the politicking and the courts merely arbitrate disputes in the law as the 
law is specifically written.” Contemporary public argument echoes these 
characterizations, with liberals being associated with judicial activism and 
conservatives being associated with judicial restraint. Yet, such a descrip-
tion ignores the many ways in which each group has their own particular 
domains of restraint and activism. These are rhetorically negotiated spaces 
with each side vying for their framework and reinforcing the ideologies 
of their respective audiences. Nevertheless, judicial activism has earned 
a bad reputation, and judges, politicians, and pundits avoid associating 
decisions with which they agree and judicial activism.
The concern of judicial activism has been hanging over the judicial 
branch ever since Chief Justice Marshall legitimized the power of judicial 
review in Marbury v. Madison (1803), which, ironically, could be viewed 
as an example of judicial activism. The sentiment behind judicial activism 
is best captured in Chief Justice Roberts’s (Figure 6.1) metaphorical turn 
in his opening remarks in the nomination hearing: “Judges are like um-
pires,” argued Roberts. “Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them. 
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody 
plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game 
to see the umpire” (C-SPAN, 2005, September 12).
Roberts later reinforced his analogy by claiming it was his job “to call 
balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.” The courts have the power to 
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review the constitutional validity of laws and cases, but must refrain from 
stepping on the toes of the legislature within their sphere of interpretation. 
Juxtaposing the idea of judicial activism are calls for “judicial restraint” 
and “judicial neutrality,” which implicitly draws attention to the separa-
tion of powers and the need for judges to stay in their Constitutional lane. 
Furthermore, restraint and neutrality reinforce the idea that justice is blind 
and judges are bound by the rule of law and nothing else.
In practice, legal judgment is not so simple. For legal theorists and 
philosophers of law, there is no settled idea of what constitutes good 
legal judgment, even though each approach likes to advocate their supe-
riority. Moreover, there is no guidance in the Constitution as to how the 
Constitution ought to be interpreted by the judiciary branch, which is why 
so many models of judgment have been created and deployed through-
out the history of the Court. There are also numerous ways in which the 
Constitution and statutes remain ambiguous given the language used, thus 
making a narrow interpretation on a complicated, nuanced case all but 
impossible. Justice Potter Stewart captured this sentiment well in his fa-
mous description of pornography: “I know it when I see it.” Can the same 
be said for what Kenneth Burke described as the “generalized wishes” of 
the Constitution? Do we know liberty when we see it? Or equality? What 
about privacy, which has been read into the Constitution but does not ap-
pear in the text? One of Laurence Tribe’s (2008) recent books, The Invisible 
Constitution, makes a strong case for a number of these “invisible” influ-
ences that are part and parcel of any judicial decision.
FIGURE 6.1 Chief Justice John Roberts confirmation hearing.
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Originally coined by Arthur Schlesinger, judicial activism was used to 
describe the judicial temperaments of some of the sitting justices (Kmiec, 
2004). However, Schlesinger did not use the term as an indictment of er-
rant responsibility; rather, activism was juxtaposed against restraint to 
illustrate two distinct views of the relationship between law and politics. 
They each have their strengths and their flaws, and neither is justified to 
be the “correct” judicial mindset. Despite such ambiguity, lamentations 
of judicial activism have been a prevalent talking point for politicians and 
the public for quite some time. Characterizing judges as activists is short-
hand for calling into question their integrity and motivation, suggesting 
they are violating their core constitutional responsibility and undermin-
ing John Adams’s notion that we are a “government of law and not men.” 
Whether the form of activism strikes down constitutional acts of the other 
branches, ignores precedent, creates judicial legislation, departs from the 
accepted norms of interpretation, or is guided by results rather than pro-
cess, judges are criticized for purportedly shirking their duty in favor of 
extrajudicial predilections (Kmiec, 2004). Yet, whether a decision falls 
into one of the categories is an act of interpretation and up for debate. 
Moreover, even if a decision is justifiably responsible for doing one of 
the aforementioned forms of activism, it is also debatable whether such 
a judgment was incorrect. Brown v. Board of Education is the most fa-
mous example of judicial activism, as it broke precedent and was guided 
by the consequences of a decision, but few look back on it as a bad deci-
sion. Instead, cases like Brown v. Board of Education draw on a narrative 
of righting an historic wrong.
Keenan Kmiec (2004) traces the meandering history of judicial ac-
tivism since its original invocation by Schlesinger wherein it has been 
celebrated and decried, yet one thing remains constant: the ambiguity in 
its meaning and the ideological divide that underscores its use. “Ironically,” 
Kmiec argues,
as the term has become more commonplace, its meaning has be-
come increasingly unclear. This is so because “judicial activism” is 
defined in a number of disparate, even contradictory ways; scholars 
and judges recognize this problem, yet persist in speaking about the 
concept without defining it. Thus, the problem continues unabated: 
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people talk past one another, using the same language to convey 
very different concepts. (p. 1443)
Judicial activism does not constitute a distinct act; rather, it functions as 
an ideograph, a rhetorical token wherein the rhetor simultaneously ad-
dresses the implied auditor and calls the audience into being. Michael 
Calvin McGee (1980) describes the ideograph as “an ordinary language 
term found in political discourse” with several distinct features such as 
its representation of collective commitment to a normative goal, justifica-
tion for the use of power, and ability to guide behavior (p. 15). The most 
prominent ideographs in American culture are undoubtedly “liberty” and 
“equality,” which are culture bound and impact collective consciousness. 
McGee notes, “Each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, 
to the vocabulary of ideographs as a prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the 
society” (p. 15). In other words, ideographs are vague yet immensely pow-
erful concepts that a rhetor utilizes in order both to tap into and to direct 
the ideological commitments of the audience. Unlike liberty and equality, 
which signal democratic virtues, judicial activism is more akin to the evo-
cations of communism and socialism as it “[guides] behavior and belief 
negatively by branding unacceptable behavior” (p. 15). In short, because 
of its stigma and connotations, mainstream political thinkers and com-
mentators do not want to be associated with judicial activism. Instead, 
those defending a decision that may be viewed as activism will draw from 
a different discursive framework in order to justify it, such as the afore-
mentioned narrative of righting a wrong.
Furthermore, the only way to understand such abstract concepts is to 
address how they are used (McGee, 1980). Due to its ambiguity and the in-
creasingly partisan state of public discourse, both liberals and conservatives 
want to defend the decisions that support their ideological commitments 
and criticize the opposition of judicial activism. Such a strategy has been 
longstanding for conservative groups in response to the Warren Court and 
culminating in Roe v. Wade, whereas liberals have invoked the term more 
recently in response to Bush v. Gore, Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, and others. Because of the 
increased attention to the judiciary in public argument, both liberals and 
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conservatives use judicial activism as an enthymematic signal and rally 
their constituents behind their cause.
THE CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
For decades, conservatives have dominated the narrative surrounding 
judicial activism. FDR’s threat to pack the court with sympathetic lib-
eral justices followed by the impact of the Warren Court throughout the 
1950s and 1960s instigated a keen conservative focus on the judiciary 
since at least the 1970s. GOP voters have long considered Supreme Court 
appointees a top priority on their agenda, and the results have paid off. 
Appointing 13 Supreme Court justices since 1969, Republicans have se-
lected far more justices than their Democratic counterparts. If not for 
the ideological shift of justices like John Paul Stevens and David Souter, 
a conservative judiciary would have been much more pronounced. With 
the newest addition to the court, Brett Kavanaugh, conservatives have a 
lock on the court for a generation to come. One of the important political 
and jurisprudential reasons for the GOP’s success has been their use of 
judicial activism as an enemy to the Constitution, democracy, checks and 
balances, and conservative (read: morally superior) values. Yet, since the 
judicial nominations have been more conservative given the predisposi-
tions of President Trump and the Republican Congress, judicial hearings 
were not the appropriate rhetorical moment to introduce charges of judi-
cial activism. Instead, conferences, conventions, and campaigns featured 
more prominently, yet concerned standard talking points.
Two rhetorical themes merit attention: first, given the decades-old 
strategy of associating liberal decisions with judicial activism, conservatives 
portray their judicial philosophy as synonymous with judicial restraint. 
Conservative judges and justices are de facto restrained and are aligned 
with the correct model of judgment. Conservative rhetors continually 
reinforce this idea, creating in their audience a sense of authority and 
legitimacy. Second, conservative arguments criticizing liberal judicial ac-
tivism and celebrating their own judicial restraint tend to be grounded 
in appeals to liberty, whether the liberty to own and carry firearms, the 
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liberty of religious conscience, the liberty of a fetus to fully realize its per-
sonhood, or the liberty of corporate speech; their “rights talk” is grounded 
in a conception of rule of law guided first and foremost by liberty. Just 
like judicial activism, however, their conception of liberty caters to their 
own ideological worldviews. Since liberty is at stake, their arguments are 
often imbued with the “paranoid style.” Echoing Barry Goldwater’s fa-
mous speech, they suggest that extremism in the face of liberty is no vice.
Concerning the first strategy, conservative politicians, pundits, and 
public intellectuals consistently return to the refrain that conservative judg-
ment is judicial restraint. Doing so legitimizes conservative opinions and 
creates a sense of historical integrity. For example, Steven Aden, chief legal 
officer and general counsel for the Americans United for Life, addressed 
the reasons why Brett Kavanaugh (Figure 6.2) would be a model justice:
The second thing that made us high on him was his commitment 
to constitutionalism. When we look at a judge, we want to see a 
judge who is committed to what the terms of the nation’s charter 
were intended to mean and not impose his or her own value judg-
ments on what those terms should mean. . . . The point is that Roe 
v. Wade is itself the best example of judicial activism that you can 
imagine. My colleague, Clark Forsyth, wrote in his book Abusive 
FIGURE 6.2 Justice Brett Kavanaugh confirmation hearing.
CHAPTER 6 C-SPAN, Judicial Activism, and the Constitutive Function of Law in the Trump Era 171
Discretion how what Justice White said in dissent was true: it was 
an exercise of raw judicial power. It was the majority in Roe v. Wade 
finding a right that hadn’t been in the Constitution before and an-
nouncing it, imposing that on all 50 states. We think that kind of 
judicial activism is not only misguided, wrong for a nation’s court, 
it’s also passé. Today, people are looking for judges that really care 
about what the Constitution was intended to mean and not what 
the Supreme Court might have said that it meant many years later. 
(C-SPAN, 2018, July 31)
While reinforcing the importance of judicial restraint, Aden is simultane-
ously portraying liberal judgments as inherently misguided. By turning 
to the idea of what the Constitution “was intended to mean,” Aden tacitly 
evokes what Robert Bellah (1967) described as “American civil religion,” 
where the Constitution serves as a sacred text. Judicial activism, like 
that exhibited in Roe v. Wade, is a sacrilegious violation. Only conser-
vative-minded judgment represents judicial restraint and embodies the 
right way of interpreting the law.
This idea is reinforced by various conservative rhetors. At the 2017 
National Lawyers Convention, Attorney General Jeff Sessions claimed:
Appointing restrained judges has always been popular with the 
American people. It is deeply ingrained in their vision of what 
the role of a judge should be. . . . American people well know that 
activist judges effectively invalidate votes. Unprincipled ideologues 
want unelected judges to do for them that which they cannot win 
at the ballot box. This is not a partisan question; it’s a question of 
fairness and fidelity to the judicial oath and adheres to the con-
stitutional role assigned to the judicial branch and to the other 
branches. Judicial activism puts the prejudices and politics of the 
judge above the law. (C-SPAN, 2017, November 17)
Like Aden, there is no explicit reference to conservatism, but it is unde-
niably present. The “unprincipled ideologues” serves as an enthymeme, 
and the audience fills in the gaps. Sessions also distances himself from 
any partisanship because the terms are “fairness and fidelity” rather than 
172 PART 2 Using the C-SPAN Video Library to Study Congressional Rhetoric
ideological motivation. Through the lens of Black (1970) and McGee 
(1980), Aden and Sessions are both creating an audience with particular 
dispositions concerning the judiciary and reinforcing the political myths 
they believe. Fairness and fidelity are easy to accept in the abstract, but 
there is significant disagreement about what that means when it comes 
to their application. By remaining abstract, they can avoid these more 
difficult issues and maintain the myth.
As the aforementioned AP Government Exam review highlights, the 
argument that judicial restraint is synonymous with conservative judg-
ment has been so successful that it is accepted as common knowledge. 
Yet, with the growing conservative stronghold on the Court and the public 
criticisms that go along with being in power, simply decrying the acts of 
judicial activism are not enough, since they can be overturned. Even if the 
liberal justices do not have a majority position, their model of judgment 
is still a threat. Consider how Roy Moore used his Republican nomina-
tion acceptance speech as an opportunity to celebrate his dedication to 
the Constitution while simultaneously decrying his opposition:
The Constitution has been my life. I was sworn in many, many years 
ago on the banks of the Hudson River as a cadet in the Military 
Academy. I fought in a war to defend the Constitution. I fought in 
the courts against liberal judges who have usurped their authorities. 
(C-SPAN, 2017, September 26)
While Moore never outright calls out judicial activism, the idea that “lib-
eral judges who have usurped their authorities” is all but saying that he 
fought against judicial activism. There is an implied call to fear as well, 
suggesting that if he (and, by extension, all conservative judges) had not 
been there, then the Constitution itself would be at risk. For Moore, it is 
not a single case that represents a moment of judicial activism; rather, 
liberal judges and their judicial philosophy embody activism. 
Other conservative rhetors have taken a similar argumentative path. 
In a speech at the 2017 Conservative Political Action Conference, National 
Rifle Association Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre claimed:
The left’s violence against America has taken many forms. For ex-
ample, left-wing judicial activism can be a form of violence against 
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our constitutional system. Look at judicial efforts to block President 
Trump’s executive order to take a longer look at people coming from 
countries that sponsor or harbor terrorists. Yet the protesters show 
up, the media amplify their anger, and the elites go into meltdown. 
It’s not that the Constitution is unclear on this issue: the President 
handles foreign affairs of this country. It’s an executive function 
and the U.S. laws on the issue couldn’t be clearer. . . . Folks, when 
unelected, unaccountable judges can take that clear, unambiguous 
language and then twist it and pervert it to make it mean whatever 
they want, they might as well throw a Molotov cocktail at the U.S. 
Constitution. They do violence to the Constitution’s separation of 
powers. They do violence to the U.S. Code and Supreme Court 
precedent. And they do violence to the checks and balances that 
keep government under control because making the law mean 
anything they want, they make the law mean nothing. (C-SPAN, 
2017, February 24)
Much like Moore’s appeal to fear, LaPierre’s invocation of “violence” is 
meant to stoke mistrust and animosity, not only of a different judicial 
philosophy, but the left wing writ large. LaPierre is also trying to turn the 
tables on a regular criticism used against the National Rifle Association. 
Whereas firearms may be used for violence, they are merely tools to be 
used at the discretion of the legal owners. The liberal judicial activist 
agenda, however, is a manifestation of violence against democracy itself, 
threatening all the rights and privileges therein.
Whereas Moore and LaPierre focus more broadly on judges with liberal 
ideological predilections, others use the specter of judicial activism to call 
attention to particular liberal causes and decisions. Representative Steve 
King (R-IA) exhibits this well in a speech on the House floor on the most 
prominent issue conservatives use to criticize judicial activism: abortion.
I would take you back to 1973 and Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolten. 
Those two Supreme Court cases, working in conjunction with each 
other, essentially translated into abortion on demand. And we saw 
abortions go from who knows what the number was, no, we do 
know: about 35,000 abortions a year in America, a number of that 
I’d say, I thought was horrible then, to something like 1.6 million 
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abortions in America. Now ratcheted down by the weight of the 
conscience of our society to some number of a million or maybe 
a little less than a million. Mr. Speaker, we don’t get to count that 
difference between 1.6 million, roughly the peak, and a little under 
a million, as 600,000 babies saved every year. Instead, it goes on 
our conscience the other way, and that’s the cumulative total of 60 
million babies who have been sacrificed at the altar of this subject 
called pro-choice, judicial activism. (C-SPAN, 2018, February 5)
King collapses prochoice, abortion, and judicial activism into one and 
charges it with the “sacrifice” of 60 million babies. Such a conflation is 
extreme, to be sure, but not for the audience he has in mind. By King’s 
logic, without judicial activism there could have never been the decision 
in Roe v. Wade, and without Roe v. Wade there could have never been le-
galized abortion. King ignores some important facts in history, namely, 
that individual states were legalizing abortion in the years leading up to 
Roe and access to abortion was becoming increasingly easier.
All of these examples cultivate a looming sense of fear and portray 
their opposition as a dangerous, if not evil, force that requires vigilance to 
stop. Such appeals fall in line with Richard Hofstadter’s (1965) analysis of 
the paranoid style. In his seminal essay “The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics,” Richard Hofstadter argues that there is an inherent “feeling of 
persecution” and a belief in “grandiose theories of conspiracy” (p. 4). 
Hofstadter continues:
The paranoid is a militant leader. He does not see social conflict 
as something to be mediated and compromised, in the manner of 
the working politician. Since what is at stake is always a conflict 
between absolute good and absolute evil, the quality needed is not 
a willingness to compromise but the will to fight things out to a 
finish. Nothing but complete victory will do. (p. 31)
Enemies cannot be reasoned with, argues the paranoid, therefore they 
must be destroyed. The conservative lamentations against liberal decision 
like Roe v. Wade exhibit this all-or-nothing tendency. Moreover, there is a 
brilliant, sinister quality to their opposition. Hofstadter again: 
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This enemy is clearly delineated: he is a perfect model of malice, 
a kind of amoral superman: sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, 
sensual, luxury-loving. . . . He is a free, active demonic agent. He 
wills, indeed he manufactures, the mechanism of history himself, 
or deflects the normal course of history in an evil way. (pp. 31–32)
Karen Horney (1950) elaborates upon the paranoid position, focus-
ing on the paranoid’s insatiable need for perfection:
Under inner stress, however, a person may become alienated from 
his real self. He will then shift the major part of his energies to the 
task of molding himself, by a rigid system of inner dictates, into a 
being of absolute perfection. For nothing short of godlike perfec-
tion can fulfill is idealized image of himself and satisfy his pride 
in the exalted attributes which (so he feels) he has, could have, or 
should have. (p. 13)
The paranoid envisions a perfect life, individually and socially, and con-
stantly strives to attain the unattainable. Horney goes on to claim “the 
idealized image becomes an idealized self. And this idealized self becomes 
more real to him than his real self ” (p. 23). The paranoid seeks power, 
shows “an utter disregard for himself, for his best interests” (p. 29), dis-
torts and fabricates information, and disregards evidence contrary to his 
paranoid perspective such that the idealized image of himself can be not 
only maintained, but strengthened as well. Certainly, the entirety of the 
conservative criticism of judicial activism does not go this far, but many 
of the most prominent appeals, including those used by Moore, LaPierre, 
and King, fall squarely into this category.
The Republican critiques reflect what Glendon (1991) describes as a 
“culture struggle,” which she characterizes as “a contest over the fundamen-
tal understandings of what kind of society we are, and the role of common 
moral intuitions in contributing to those understandings” (p. 110). Ignited 
most recently in the 1990s, the cultural divide between conservatives and 
liberals has only grown as political leaders and pundits stoked the flames. 
With the advent of social media and ubiquity of “fake news,” the possibil-
ity of finding common ground, especially on issues framed in legal and 
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moral terminology, seems increasingly fleeting. As a rhetorical token that 
orients the audience toward a particular mindset, Republican lamenta-
tions of judicial activism reinforce rather than repair the culture struggle.
THE LIBERAL CRITIQUE OF CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
For the sake of scope, I will limit my analysis of the liberal use of judi-
cial activism to the last two Supreme Court nomination hearings as they 
are a primary site for arguments over judicial activism and were closely 
followed by the public. It goes without saying that the nominations have 
become increasingly polarized. Although the judiciary committee hear-
ings serve an internal, procedural function in the Senate, they are also 
a lightning rod for public argument. Senators are not only vetting the 
nominee but also performing for the American public. The nomination 
of Robert Bork brought this in to clear view, and ever since nominees to 
the highest court have faced a gauntlet of judicial critique and public re-
view. Since the last two nominees have been conservatives, liberals have 
used the hearings as a site to invoke their criticisms of judicial activism. 
When it comes to liberal critiques of conservative judicial activism, there 
tends to be three general categories: (1) case or issue, where the focus is 
on a single case/issue; (2) group solidarity, where the focus is on judges or 
justices standing together through multiple issues; and (3) jurisprudence, 
where the focus is on the legitimacy of originalism as a legal philosophy.
Regarding the first, the Gorsuch nomination provides a paradigmatic 
example. Gorsuch was critiqued for his judicial activism over the “frozen 
trucker” case he heard as an appellate judge. The case involved a truck 
driver, Maddin, who was delivering goods in the winter of 2009. When 
his vehicle froze up because of low temperatures, Maddin contacted the 
company, TransAm, who advised him to stay with the truck until re-
pairs could be made. After waiting for hours, Maddin unhitched the cab 
and drove away without the trailer and the goods it was carrying. After 
the incident, Maddin was fired for deserting the trailer. After suing for 
unlawful termination, the lower courts agreed with Maddin and order 
him to be reinstated. The case was appealed to the Tenth Circuit where 
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Gorsuch sat on the three-judge panel. Maddin’s case was again upheld, 
but Gorsuch dissented. Citing the “refusal to operate” clause in Maddin’s 
contract, Gorsuch argued that the trucker had abdicated his legal respon-
sibility and, consequently, nullified his contract with TransAm.
Drawing attention to this case, the general counsel for Communications 
Workers of America, Guerino Calemine, lamented the judicial philosophy 
of the future Supreme Court justice. Calling attention to Gorsuch’s dissent 
in TransAm Trucking v. Alphonse Maddin, Calemine claimed,
Our concern about Judge Gorsuch ascending to the Supreme Court 
is about as fundamental as they can get. His jurisprudence is a threat 
to working people’s health and safety. This hearing has already 
paid some attention to Judge Gorsuch’s dissent in the TransAm 
Trucking case and that attention is justified. That dissent, issued 
seven months ago, reveals an antiworker bias and reveals a judicial 
activism that will ultimately put worker’s lives at risk. (C-SPAN, 
2018, June 28)
Calemine’s criticisms underscore a recurring theme in Democratic cam-
paigns: deference to corporate power has gone too far. Although this has 
been an issue throughout American history, there has always been an ebb 
and flow with regard to the public’s attention. The 2008 economic crash, 
Citizens United, and Hobby Lobby returned focus to the scope of corpo-
rate power and the limits of governmental regulation.
The first category, case or issue-driven criticism, is perhaps the most 
prominent on the campaign trail, with both Democrats and Republicans 
using the judiciary to call a particular audience into being and reinforce a 
distinct ideological worldview, whether it is TransAm and Citizens United 
on the left, or Roe v. Wade and Obergefell on the right. The second cate-
gory, however, examines the composition of the Court and warns of the 
danger of the tyranny of the majority. For Republicans, the Warren Court 
has long been the representative example of such a court run amok. In 
recent years, Democrats have used a similar strategy when character-
izing the Roberts Court. During the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing, 
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) offers a broader critique along the 
178 PART 2 Using the C-SPAN Video Library to Study Congressional Rhetoric
same lines and uses the idea of the “Roberts Five” — the five Republican 
Supreme Court appointees — as shorthand for a group utilizing their ma-
jority power to illegitimately impact otherwise healthy political process.
When does pattern prove bias? I wish this was an idle question. It’s 
relevant to the pattern of the Roberts court, when its Republican 
majority goes off on partisan excursions through the civil law. That 
is when all five Republican appointees — the Roberts Five, we can 
call them — go raiding off together and no Democratic appointee 
joins them. Does this happen often? The Roberts Five have gone 
off on almost 80 of these partisan excursions since Roberts became 
chief. That’s a lot of times. And there’s a feature to these 80 cases: 
they almost all implicate interests important to the big funders 
and influencers of the Republic Party. When the Republican jus-
tices go off on these five-justice partisan excursions, there is a big 
Republican corporate or partisan interest involved 92% of the time. 
The tiny handful of these cases that don’t implicate an interest in 
the big Republican interests is so flukishly few that we can set them 
aside. . . . Thus, the mad scramble of big Republican interest groups 
to protect a Roberts Five that will reliably give them wins. Really 
big wins, sometimes. I note that when the Roberts Five saddles up, 
these so-called conservatives are anything but judicially conser-
vative. They readily overturn precedent, toss out statutes passed 
by wide bipartisan margins, and decide on broad constitutional 
issues that they need not reach. Modesty? Originalism? Stare de-
cisis? All these supposedly conservative judicial principles all have 
the hoofprints of the Roberts Five all across their backs wherever 
those principles got in the way of those wins for the big Republican 
interests. (C-SPAN, 2018, September 4)
Rather than focusing on a particular case, Whitehouse paints a picture 
of a unified cabal set to dismantle healthy legislative policies and judicial 
precedent in favor of “big Republican interests.” Whitehouse goes on to 
illustrate the various issues that have been impacted: gerrymandering, 
voter suppression, campaign contributions, consumer protection, labor 
power, environmental protection, abortion and contraception, gun rights, 
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executive power, and others. Traditionally, judicial activism had been a 
talking point primarily utilized in Republican campaigns, but the rhetor-
ical grounds are shifting in response to changes in the composition of the 
court and the decisions the court has made in the last 20 years. With the 
rise of a more conservative Supreme Court since the 1970s, paired with 
a more pronounced conservatism in the legislature, liberals are trying to 
use their lack of power to draw attention to the need for a united front 
both in the officials serving in office and the citizens with a liberal ideol-
ogy in the public sphere.
Finally, the third category steps back even further and critiques the 
judicial philosophy of originalism and suggests it is at best a fool’s errand 
when difficult cases are being decided, and at worst it is a flagrant hypocrisy 
that veils itself in neutrality when it is just as ideological as loose construc-
tivism. Such a line of argument tends to be in line with the old adage that 
if you torture the text long enough, it will tell you what you want to hear. 
Senator Al Franken (D-MN) offers a strong example of this third type of 
criticism. During his questioning of Neil Gorsuch, Franken uses his time 
to condemn the judicial record of Justice Antonin Scalia, the intellectual 
force behind textual originalism, in order to criticize what he considered 
to be the hypocrisy of conservative jurisprudence:
During oral arguments for Shelby County, Justice Scalia seemed to 
suggest that it’s the Court’s job to step in when Congress’s motives 
can’t be trusted. Justice Scalia questioned the significant rise and 
support for the Voting Rights Act when Congress voted for reau-
thorization in 2006, which passed the Senate 98–0 and the House 
390–33. Essentially, he said a senator would have nothing to gain 
by voting against reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act and that as a 
result, the Court should not read anything into the overwhelming 
support for the bill. Justice Scalia said, “It’s a concern that this is not 
the kind of question you can leave to Congress.” He went on to say, 
“Even the name of it is wonderful, the Voting Rights Act. Who is 
going to vote against that in the future?” When the solicitor general 
suggested that it would be unusual to analyze Congress’s judgment 
in this way, Justice Scalia said, “I’m not talking about dismissing it, 
meaning Congress’s judgment. I’m talking about looking at it to 
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see whether it makes any sense.” Now, this highlights two things 
that are pretty concerning to me. One, Justice Scalia’s cynicism 
about lawmakers’ motives, his remarks demonstrate a contempt 
for Congress that in my view also demonstrates a willingness to 
engage in the kind of judicial activism that many of my colleagues 
are quick to condemn. A willingness to “legislate from the bench.” 
Justice Scalia’s willingness to reach beyond the legislative history to 
question Congress’s political motivations disrespects the separation 
of powers. And two, Justice Scalia’s remarks ignored the facts when 
Congress voted to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act of 2006, it 
developed a significant legislative record. 15,000 pages of hearing 
testimony, documentary evidence and appendices, state records, 
and reports from outside experts that demonstrated continued 
need for the legislation. To suggest Congress’s support for the bill 
was based on anything other than substance ignores the reality 
that more members of Congress supported the Voting Rights Act 
because the legislation accomplished on an ongoing basis exactly 
what Congress designed the Voting Rights Act to accomplish. 
(C-SPAN, 2018, June 27)
Franken’s argument suggests a degree of rhetorical prestidigitation 
exhibited by Scalia (and, by extension, conservative judges operating un-
der the auspices of textual originalism). On the one hand, Scalia argued 
that his model of adjudication followed closely the strictures of textual 
originalism, which he had expounded upon in judicial opinions, essays, 
books, and speeches throughout this life. The premise of his argument is 
enticing, as it frames the Court in a manner conducive to Madison’s ar-
gument that it is the “least dangerous branch.” Yet, with the other hand, 
Scalia dredges the annals of history in order to produce his desired con-
clusion. Arguably, District of Columbia v. Heller illustrates this point, as 
Justices Scalia and Stevens go tit for tat in documentary evidence support-
ing their opposing conclusions.
All three of these categories of criticism utilize the ideographic token 
of judicial activism so as to create and maintain the particular audiences to 
whom the rhetors are speaking. No doubt the audiences are aware of the 
idea of judicial activism, but they are turning the criticism once charged 
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against Democrats and liberals into a powerful talking point. Given the 
ascension of Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court, the left wing 
will no doubt pay closer attention to the courts and use the idea of judi-
cial activism as a way to rally their respective audiences.
Just as the Republicans reinforce a conservative ideological world-
view with their use of judicial activism, so too do Democrats reinforce 
their liberal ideology. Whereas conservatives tend to rely on liberty as a 
guiding principle, liberals tend to rely on equality. And both believe their 
idea of judgment to be correct. As such, reconciliation appears impossible. 
However, following Glendon (1991), “Judicial adroitness at applying the 
constitutional principles of liberty and equality is rarely matched by a cor-
responding skill in implementing the congressionally endorsed principle 
of solidarity” (p. 115). Such solidarity is all but absent in federal politics, 
and attention is so often given to the moments that cause the greatest di-
vide. Through their use of judicial activism, Democrats sought to constitute 
and reinforce a particular audience and predispose them toward viewing 
conservative jurisprudence as inherently biased and politically motivated.
CONCLUSION
Whether one agrees with the conservative critiques of liberal judicial ac-
tivism, the liberal critique of conservative judicial activism, or something 
in between, the debate over the idea is undergirded by an abdication 
of responsibility from political leaders. In her critique of public legal 
argument, Glendon (1991) stresses that the people, whether inert or im-
movable, are not the biggest challenge for political renewal. Rather, those 
in positions of political leadership bear a heavy responsibility for the caus-
tic political environment because they model a polemical performance 
of political engagement that works to stifle productive democratic delib-
eration rather than attempting to create opportunities for discussion. If, 
following James Boyd White, our society is a culture of arguments and law 
is the most prominent site where this happens, then the current state of 
public legal argument is a testament to the great divide in our country. The 
disparate conceptions of judicial activism are a poignant symptom of a 
broader ideological problem wherein two completely different audiences, 
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two alien publics, are being created, addressed, and directed. The relation-
ship between ideology, audience, and ideograph fuels group polarization, 
the vilification of opposition, and the performative umbrage taking that 
has become prominent in public controversies surrounding the judiciary. 
This analysis does not offer a way out; rather, I hope to call attention to the 
ways in which one particular concept — judicial activism — is used create, 
maintain, and direct two contrasting, competing audiences. Despite the 
same ideographic token, liberals and conservatives tend to follow sepa-
rate, perhaps irreconcilable political myths. Only by being aware of these 
appeals do we have any hope of seeing through them. And with a new 
era of the Supreme Court underway, the judiciary will no doubt continue 
to play a prominent role in political rhetoric in the upcoming elections 
and beyond.
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C-SPAN in Critical Scholarship
Edited by Diana Zulli
The utility of the C-SPAN Network goes far beyond airing congressional 
hearings and notable political events. As the upcoming chapters demon-
strate, the C-SPAN Video Library is useful for scholars and journalists 
who are interested in the unedited and uninterrupted political coverage 
that only C-SPAN can provide. In particular, the chapters assembled for 
this book demonstrate the many methodological, theoretical, and topical 
orientations facilitated by the C-SPAN Video Library, such as responses 
during joint press conferences, issue framing, and online engagement. 
Below, I provide a summary of the Part 3 chapters, focusing on important 
takeaways and the unique ways C-SPAN has been used in critical scholar-
ship. Building off this work, I offer future directions for research utilizing 
the C-SPAN Video Library.
POLITICIAN RESPONSES AND JOINT PRESS CONFERENCES
In Chapter 7, Nicole Russell, Alexandra Johnson, and Patrick Stewart ex-
amine communicative interactions between President Trump and other 
foreign leaders during joint press conferences. The authors make clear 
that joint press conferences are unique communicative events, where the 
type of response given by world leaders might reveal more information 
than the actual content itself. In this case, the authors specifically ex-
amine the extent to which President Trump and other foreign leaders 
directly respond to journalist questions, offer intermediate replies where 
only part of the question is answered, or use equivocation language to 
evade answering the question altogether. To better understand these types 
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of replies and how they are used, the authors systematically and quan-
titatively analyze 12 joint press conferences between President Trump 
and other leaders from countries with free or partly free press ratings. 
Several interesting patterns emerge from this analysis. The results reveal 
that leaders across the world are most likely to use equivocation lan-
guage and offer nonreplies during joint press conferences. Put another 
way, when asked a question by a member of the press corps, President 
Trump and his international counterparts typically do not answer the 
question posed to them but instead side-step the question by discussing 
other topics related to their personal and political agendas. The results 
also reveal that President Trump is more likely than other foreign lead-
ers to offer intermediate replies, which suggests that when Trump is not 
evading questions altogether, he still only answers a portion of the ques-
tions asked by journalists. Overall, Russell, Johnson, and Stewart offer 
important insight into an understudied communicative event: joint press 
conferences. This research also provides future scholars and journalists 
with a unique analytical framework for evaluating joint press conferences.
ISSUE FRAMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE
In Chapter 8, Heather Cann and Janel Jett call for a comparison of 
Donald Trump’s climate change frames in televised speeches and Twitter 
discourse. Following key scholarship on framing effects (e.g., Chong & 
Druckman, 2007; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 
1997), the authors work from the perspective that issue framing can shape 
political reality, public opinion, and policy decisions. In the digital me-
dia environment, however, there are more opportunities for the political 
elite to disseminate information, which leads the authors to question if 
news platform or outlet affects issue frames. A qualitative content analysis 
confirms that this is indeed the case. The authors find that Trump empha-
sizes an “antiscience” or “science-denier” frame in his Twitter discourse, 
compared to the “policy” frame that emerges from his televised dis-
course. Results also reveal that Trump rarely ever frames climate change 
in terms of the “benefits,” which is consistent with previous literature 
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of Trump’s rhetorical style in general (see Cann & Raymond 2018). The 
authors argue that the dramatic difference in issue framing across news 
formats speaks to larger trends in the digital media environment. In par-
ticular, the authors conclude that issue framing is the result of multiple 
discursive moments and formations. Cann and Jett leave us wondering 
which types of discursive formations — Twitter discourse or more formal 
speeches — are echoed in the mainstream press. It is perhaps the case that 
social media discourse contributes more substantially to issue framing in 
the digital media environment.
NONVERBAL CUES AND CONGRESSIONAL SPEECHES
In Chapter 9, Amber Williams Lusvardi and Terri Towner focus on the 
nonverbal cues elicited by congressional representatives and their effect 
on Twitter engagement. Nonverbal cues, such as smiling, hand gestures, 
and body movements, are an effective political strategy that can have a 
considerable impact on perceptions of and responses to political discourse 
(see Jackob, Roessing, & Petersen, 2011). Traditionally, nonverbal behav-
ior has been studied in the context of presidential speeches. Lusvardi and 
Towner’s research, instead, looks at the nonverbal behavior of congressio-
nal representatives to examine if and how these cues motivate engagement 
in the online space. Using clipped videos on C-SPAN’s verified Twitter 
account, the authors find that nonverbal cues do not function similarly 
in the online space. In fact, the only predictor of likes, comments, and 
retweets on Twitter is controversial and/or ethical topics. That is, Twitter 
users are more likely to engage with C-SPAN Twitter content if the topic is 
controversial, rather than if the congressional speaker is dynamic and non-
verbally engaging. The authors note that this null finding is perhaps more 
an indication of the limitations of Twitter than an indictment on the effects 
of nonverbal communication. It is perhaps the case that engagement on 
C-SPAN’s Twitter feed is determined before users watch the clipped videos, 
and thus users may never encounter the nonverbal cues of congressional 
representatives. Lusvardi and Towner leave us wondering how interaction 
and engagement have changed in the digital media environment.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The research presented herein leaves us with many interesting and import-
ant questions about how the C-SPAN Video Library can further be used 
to better understand the modern political context. Russell, Johnson, and 
Stewart note that the topology of direct replies, intermediate replies, and 
nonreplies is a useful analytical framework for understanding joint press 
conferences. Currently, this framework only takes into consideration di-
rect responses to journalist questions and does not consider the moments 
when leaders interrupt each other to make a comment or answer a ques-
tion not directed toward them. In this case, what are the nature of these 
interruptions? Do political leaders directly respond, offer intermediate 
responses, or continue to use equivocation language? Is it possible another 
type of response emerges out of these interruptions? Additionally, because 
journalistic questions start these turn-taking interactions, how might 
initial questions or journalistic aggression affect the type of responses 
political leaders offer? Do ideological bias and network affiliation affect 
response type? Taking into consideration journalist affiliation, question 
tone, the risks and rewards for answering certain questions, and the cur-
rent topology of replies, is there a way to anticipate how political elites will 
respond? Attention to these additional factors could be useful in devel-
oping a model for explaining and predicting politician responses during 
an array of communicative events. Such a model would be particularly 
instructive for scholars, journalists, political strategists, and politicians.
The effects of issue framing and elite discourse are well known. Framing 
in today’s media environment is the result of many discursive moments 
cascading through levels of elite, mainstream media, and now social me-
dia discourse (see Entman, 2004). But which frames are echoed in “official 
discourse?” Issue frames are certainly produced and circulated in various 
formats (e.g., Tweets vs. presidential speeches), but which discourse formats 
are directly quoted by mainstream media? Because elite discourse contrib-
utes to the public’s understanding of issues (see Druckman & Holmes, 2004; 
Page, Shapiro, & Dempsey, 1987), knowing which discursive formation 
gets the most attention in mainstream media warrants attention. Given 
Twitter’s restricted character limit, it may be the case that Twitter discourse 
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is more “quotable” in the current media landscape. Also, if Twitter frames 
are more uncivil or aggressive, as found in Chapter 8, then we may see 
more tweets echoed in mainstream media compared to speech discourse 
because they offer greater opportunity for drama and controversy, and 
are thus more newsworthy. Cann and Jett’s discussion on climate change 
frames also raises questions about how media platforms affect the frames 
that emerge. Twitter — the way President Trump communicates on the 
platform — is primarily a written medium. Twitter also restricts discourse 
to 280 characters. Instead, content delivered by the C-SPAN Network is 
primarily visual and aural. Political speeches are less restricted by time, 
and thus it is common to hear more lengthy discussions of critical is-
sues on the C-SPAN network. Undoubtedly, these platform and network 
differences affect how issues can be and are discussed. Will we ever see 
longer and more thorough policy frames emerge on Twitter? Do the for-
mal conventions of political discourse in presidential and congressional 
speeches mitigate more “aggressive” issue framing? Because political dis-
course is increasingly disseminated on multiple platforms and networks, 
a platform studies approach to understanding issue framing is warranted.
Engagement and interactivity are inherent features of social media 
sites. C-SPAN has taken advantage of these tools and now features content 
on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. These clipped videos of congres-
sional speeches offer social media users a digestible way to interact with 
more formal content. Because the results in Chapter 9 show no significant 
relationship between nonverbal cues and Twitter engagement, future re-
search should once again consider the limitations of the platform. How 
are engagement decisions being made on specific social media sites? What 
content is needed to determine if a post deserves a like, retweet, or com-
ment? Are users ever watching full C-SPAN videos on social media sites 
before they engage? How might the structure of Twitter encourage a cer-
tain type of engagement? Because text foregrounds the content of a video 
on Twitter, it is possible that engagement decisions are made at the level of 
discourse, not the visual images. Is engagement with C-SPAN content the 
same on Instagram? On Instagram, viewers encounter videos and images 
first and then have the opportunity to read the associated caption. Given 
that the video/text placement on these different social media platforms 
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varies, it is likely that engagement with content will also vary. Once again, 
a platform studies approach could help isolate and explain engagement 
with C-SPAN content on popular social media sites.
Collectively, the studies presented herein demonstrate the wide ar-
ray of research that can be conducted using the C-SPAN Video Library. 
Future scholars might also consider how C-SPAN resources can facilitate 
their research that aims to understand the important and ever-changing 
nature of political communication.
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TALKING HALF ANSWERS: EXAMINING 
PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP’S JOINT 
PRESS CONFERENCE EQUIVOCATION 
DURING HIS FIRST YEAR
Nichole A. Russell, Alexandra Johnson, and Patrick A. Stewart
Throughout Donald Trump’s presidency, it is clear the U.S. president does 
not enjoy dealing with news professionals. He frequently labels media 
coverage of his presidency as unfair and decries reputable news organi-
zations such as CNN, The Washington Post, and The New York Times as 
“fake news” (Britzky, 2017). Instead of interacting with traditional me-
dia outlets directly, Trump frequently takes to Twitter to “correct” facts 
and give statements to the public about his policies and worldview. It is 
apparent that Trump does not trust the media to convey his messages as 
he would prefer, thus he attempts to usurp the media’s control of his po-
litical narratives.
This may well be a strategic decision to avoid media scrutiny. When 
Trump does interact directly with the media, it tends to occur via one specific 
type of political communication event — joint press conferences — which 
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dominated his press interactions during his first year. In this time, Trump 
held only 1 solo press conference and 21 joint press conferences (Gerhard, 
2018). In comparison, during their first years President Barack Obama 
held 11 solo and 16 joint, President George W. Bush held 5 solo and 14 
joint, and President Bill Clinton held 12 solo and 26 joint press conferences 
(Gerhard, 2018). Also, considering he does not do one-on-one interviews 
with journalists frequently, these joint press conference appearances are 
the rare instances where journalists and the U.S. president interact directly.
To provide insight into Trump’s behavior in joint press conferences, 
we use Bull and Mayer’s (1993) typology of replies to consider his — in 
comparison with other national leaders (Table 7.1) — political discourse 
with journalists. This approach assesses political leaders’ answers to jour-
nalist questions on the basis of three categories — replies, intermediate 
replies, and nonreplies. Bull and Mayer (1993) initially conducted con-
tent analysis of eight televised political interviews during the 1987 British 
general election between Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock and found 
that while political leaders do have stylistic differences in rhetorical style, 
what they share is the use of equivocative language when responding to 
questions they would rather not answer (Bull & Mayer, 1993; Bull, 2008).
The focus of this study is on analyzing the types of responses President 
Trump gives, not in terms of substance, but in terms of style — simply put, 
does Donald Trump answer questions posed to him? Twelve joint press 
conferences from Trump’s first year in office are analyzed (Table 7.2). This 
sets a baseline for his often-contentious relationship with the American 
and foreign media from the respective nations of the United Kingdom, 
Israel, Canada, Germany, Japan, Italy, Columbia, Romania, Poland, France, 
Lebanon, and Norway. In this chapter we first discuss the literature on 
joint press conferences and political equivocation, underscoring both the 
importance and establishing the analytic process we use. Next, we discuss 
how the data was collected and analyzed before we examine and explain 
TABLE 7.1 President Trump’s Speaking Time and Number of Responses Compared to All Foreign Leaders
Country Date Political leader Speaking time in seconds Number of responses
United States . Donald Trump 3,531.78 48
Other countries . Foreign leaders 3,038.72 38
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the different response categories. We close by discussing the results and 
drawing conclusions.
POLITICAL LEADER EQUIVOCATION DURING JOINT PRESS CONFERENCES
The study of presidential press conferences has been the subject of works 
in political communication, political psychology, and journalism schol-
arly research since the presidency of John F. Kennedy (Cornwell, 1965; 
Manheim, 1979; Press & VerBurg, 1988). JFK was the first president to 
participate in televising press conferences, essentially establishing the 
presidential press conference as an institution in U.S. politics (Clayman 
& Heritage, 2002; Kumar, 2003). For its part, the presidential joint press 
conference, which was first used by President George H. W. Bush, is 
an institution that political leaders use more as a venue for diplomatic 
discourse with a foreign leader than a serious setting for one-on-one in-
teractions with journalists (Kumar, 2003; Manheim, 1979).
TABLE 7.2 Joint Press Conferences by Countries, Political Leader, Speaking Time, and Number of Responses for 
All Foreign Leaders





United Kingdom 1/27/17 Theresa May 124.16 4
Japan 2/10/17 Shinzō Abe 214.72 3
Canada 2/13/17 Justin Trudeau 229.56 3
Israel 2/15/17 Benjamin Netanyahu 524.40 4
Germany 3/17/17 Angela Merkel 204.48 3
Italy 4/20/17 Paolo Gentoloni 337.48 4
Colombia 5/18/17 Juan Manuel Santos 264.24 3
Romania 6/9/17 Klaus Iohannis 164.04 3
Poland 7/6/17 Andrzej Duda 270.60 3
France 7/13/17 Emmanuel Macron 489.44 3
Lebanon 7/25/17 Saad Hariri 98.04 3
Norway 1/10/18 Erna Solberg 117.56 2
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While disagreement exists regarding the substantive value of joint press 
conferences to either political leaders or journalists (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2012; 
Kumar, 2005), the optics of two heads of state meeting to take questions 
from an independent press benefits a political leader’s agenda in multi-
ple ways, even if the two leaders disagree. One, politicians gain credibility 
when they appear in front of press professionals; taking questions from 
the press makes them appear transparent and willing to work within the 
democratic system. Second, the most important narrative political leaders 
can espouse within the context of joint press conferences is one of shared 
interests, if not unity, between their countries; there are few better ways 
to assert the unity of nations than their leaders standing side-by-side and 
shaking hands. Third, while politicians must address the uncertainty re-
garding the content and tone of questioning from journalists, there is 
the countervailing benefit of sound bites and image bites (Grabe & Bucy, 
2009) and the overall beneficial optics of having their remarks and image 
appear in news segments.
Journalists may seek to test this narrative of unity between political 
leaders via their questioning or may seek to only address pressing domestic 
issues. Certainly, journalists may choose to accept the narratives politicians 
promote during these press conferences. They may also develop a more 
aggressive line of questioning that departs from the politician’s preferred 
theme while attempting to fashion their own narrative.
Press and VerBurg in their book American Politicians and Journalists 
say that press conferences have become “a game of hounds chasing a fox, 
of reporters trying to corner the president before a national audience” 
(1988, p. 199). While the press conference is a way of communicating with 
the public, the event can be more of a headache to political figures than 
help. There are, for political leaders, perhaps better ways of communicat-
ing with the public. Joint press conferences are highly structured but still 
leave the politician vulnerable to unknown questions by the press. Political 
officials are risk averse, and televised press conferences leave a politician 
vulnerable to news-hungry journalists (Press & VerBurg, 1988). Not only 
do journalists endeavor to shake loose precious information from political 
leaders regarding current events, but the way this information is presented 
by the political leaders may come at the expense of their messaging strat-
egy and the persona they have constructed for the public.
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Long-time news anchor Dan Rather, in his book The Camera Never 
Blinks, says presidents most often try to not answer questions posed by 
the press — Eisenhower used his “peculiar syntax,” Kennedy used humor, 
Johnson used biting critiques, and Nixon equivocated (Rather & Diehl, 
2012, p. 292). Some critics say press conferences have become so con-
tentious that the practice should stop altogether, because seldom does 
any actual news come out of the conference and little context is ever 
given to issues (Johnson-Cartee, 2005; Linksy, 1986). Instead, it provides 
a place for politicians to equivocate and journalists to grandstand. Larry 
Speakes, President Ronald Reagan’s press secretary, said the tradition of 
press conferences
in its present form is . . . East Room extravaganza . . . [and] a battle 
of wits . . . [where] too much of it boils down to: How can we get 
’em to say what they don’t want to say? Somehow, we need to get 
away from this “I gotcha” syndrome. (Johnson-Cartee, 2005, p. 200)
Even though politicians may feel at a disadvantage in their quest to 
maneuver the media, Press and VerBurg make the argument that poli-
ticians have the advantage in many ways. They control the information 
channels and many of the normative ways the press accesses their sources, 
which journalists need to write high-quality and reliable stories (1988). In 
essence, even though press conferences may appear to be a risky choice to 
reveal their message, ultimately, the politician is still the one in control.
JOINT PRESS CONFERENCES AND THEIR PURPOSE
Joint press conferences are defined by several characteristics, specifically 
turn-taking interactions. In studying turn-taking interactions, it is im-
portant to understand how these exchanges normally take place. The 
turn-taking process in joint press conferences is highly constrained, put-
ting pressure on journalists to ask the single best question that would 
help them achieve their information gathering needs. At the beginning 
of the press conference, both political leaders address the crowd and 
viewers with the domestic political leader speaking first, setting the host 
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country’s agenda. Typically, the foreign leader then gives thanks for the 
host country’s welcome, discusses what brought the leaders together, and 
then comments on the history and future relationship between the two 
nations. Occasionally, pleasantries are exchanged before the press con-
ference portion of the event (Kumar, 2003).
Turns are taken when calling on journalists, with each political leader 
calling on journalists from their home countries (Kumar, 2003). During 
joint press conferences political leaders call on two journalists to ask a ques-
tion of each political figure before waiting for their responses. Journalists 
remain seated until called on and usually do not call out questions at ran-
dom to the political leaders. If a political leader seems to be struggling with 
which journalist to call on, journalists may raise their hands to signal to 
the political leader. Journalists only receive one questioning opportunity 
and are generally not given follow-up questions (Kumar, 2003).
Politicians use press conferences to promote their political stances and 
persuade the public (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2012; Kumar, 2010). To accomplish 
this they must rhetorically navigate questioning by journalists, which at 
times could threaten their public persona (Bull, 2008). In the television 
era, political leaders must also persuade an unseen, mediated audience that 
is not in the room, while at the same time navigating questioning from a 
press corps they cannot control. Regardless of the difficulties posed, tele-
vised press conferences are beneficial for public leaders because they are 
able to verbally deliver exactly the message they want to their audience 
without journalist mediation. However, because these relatively unmed-
iated press conferences are digested and delivered by journalists to their 
readers and viewing audiences, political figures must remain vigilant con-
cerning what they say and how they deliver their messages(s).
Joint press conferences differ from regular press conferences — in which 
a single political figure addresses a gaggle of reporters — by their potential 
to structurally limit journalistic aggression. As a result, political figures at-
tempt to limit the prospective damage to themselves and their message in 
multiple ways. With joint press conferences, the norms of the event dictate 
a limited number of questions, roughly four, that the president and other 
national leaders must face. Additionally, due to the nature of alternating 
between answers, both politicians receive a respite in time and pressure 
while their political counterpart is responding. Furthermore, due to the 
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presence of foreign dignitaries, there is a norm of politeness that likely 
limits the aggressiveness of questioning (Russell, 2018). Specifically, the 
formal atmosphere with a guest makes it that much harder for journalists 
to employ the aggressive questioning techniques and follow-up queries typ-
ically used in regular press conferences (Banning & Billingsly, 2007). Thus, 
political leaders benefit from being seen as participating in the give-and-
take of a press conference while seriously stunting journalistic aggression.
POLITICAL LEADER EQUIVOCATION
Try as they might, political leaders do not define what will be the political 
news of the day. Politicians need journalists to communicate messages 
to the public; of course, even after taking their message public, polit-
ical figures would rather the news directly promote their policies and 
not scrutinize and criticize them (Iyengar, 2015; Bull, 2008). To com-
bat any negative exposure, political leaders want to control the stories 
involving them (Linksy, 1986) and attempt to accomplish this goal by 
managing the press (Press & VerBurg, 1988; Iyengar, 2015). Politicians 
do this by leaking specific pieces of information they want to the press, 
withholding information they are not ready to reveal, and holding press 
conferences in which they set as many of the terms as possible (Kumar, 
2010; Sabato, 1991).
As we have discussed regarding joint press conferences, the context 
where politicians and journalists interact sets boundaries of acceptable be-
havior, and with it, message control. While political debates are arranged 
and controlled by the governing news organization and thus provide a 
relatively unmediated event, and the one-to-one political interview in-
vites probing questions and follow-up inquisition, the structure of press 
conferences makes journalists abide by event norms. This typically leads 
them to cloak their questions in polite speech to nudge answers out of 
politicians (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2012; Kumar, 2010; Manheim, 1979).
For their part, politicians equivocate when it serves their interests. Bull 
and Mayer’s 1993 study of Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock catego-
rizes political leader responses into varying types of equivocation. Political 
equivocation is defined as a politician’s hesitancy, inability, or unwillingness 
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to completely answer a question (Bull & Mayer, 1993). Politicians equivo-
cate when they do not want to provide a complete answer to a journalist; 
they may do so through several different rhetorical approaches, although 
in general politicians will provide the answer they want to give as opposed 
to actually answering the question posed.
Despite this pioneering research, which occurred over a quarter-century 
ago, research into what factors lead journalists to ask follow-up questions 
is limited. More specifically, both cross-national and situation-specific re-
search on political leader replies in joint press conferences provides the 
opportunity to explore not only an American leader but also leaders from 
multiple other countries. The study we carry out here provides perspective 
on Trump’s political discourse in mediated communication events while 
considering his interactions with the press and in the presence of foreign 
political leaders during joint press conferences.
A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL EQUIVOCATION
If questioning is an essential skill for journalists, politicians must be adept 
at responding to their queries. Political leaders must be skilled at self-pre-
sentation when facing any kind of confrontation that could affect their 
public persona (Bull, 2008), particularly when presenting their policies 
and issue positions (Bull, 2008; Iyengar, 2015). Broadcast press and poli-
tician interactions provide opportunities for politicians to speak directly 
to a mediated audience (Bull & Mayer, 1993; Heritage, 1985) with the 
possibility of convincing or influencing them. A mediated audience is 
made up of individuals who hear, view, or experience rhetorical or pub-
lic events in a different manner or setting than it is presented from the 
speaker (Iyengar, 2015). Mediated political events provide a medium for 
politicians to explain their “motives, objectives, and policy positions, to 
justify their activities, and to affect the standards by which citizens eval-
uate political groups, policies, and issues” to a much large audience than 
those who are in the room (Feldman, Kinoshita, & Bull, 2016).
In order to fully understand the different types of political equivo-
cation, Bull and Mayer (1993) created a typology of answer types that 
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could be applied to political leader answers in interviews, debates, and 
press conferences. Here they conducted content analysis of eight tele-
vised political interviews during the 1987 British general election between 
Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock by categorizing their answers into 
three categories — replies, intermediate replies, and nonreplies. The study 
showed that both politicians gave proportionately fewer replies than non-
replies throughout the interviews (Margaret Thatcher 56%; Neil Kinnock 
59%). The dataset included eight different interviews where Thatcher and 
Kinnock each received 94 questions. Bull and Mayer also point out that 
while both politicians equivocated in response to questions from jour-
nalists, there were stylistic differences in their answers.
The findings of this study underscored the need for a spectrum of 
political leader responses to include intermediate replies, instead of the 
previous dichotomy between replies and nonreplies (Harris, 1991). Bull and 
Mayer’s study found that while political leaders do have stylistic differences 
in rhetorical style, politicians use equivocative language when responding 
to questions they would rather not answer either due to aggressive ques-
tioning and self-preservation (Bull, 2008; Bull & Mayer, 1993). However, 
it is important to note the political equivocation typology does not assess 
truthfulness, instead estimating the completeness of a politician’s answer 
based on the question posed by journalists. Before comparing different 
response types with questioning by journalists, a clear understanding of 
replies, intermediate replies, and nonreplies is needed. The following defi-
nitional explanations were used in the coding of this study, with examples 
taken from the joint press conferences between Donald Trump and other 
national leaders during the president’s first year in office (Table 7.3).
Replies
Contrary to popular belief, political leaders do give straightforward and 
complete replies, which is defined as a comprehensive and direct response 
to all aspects of a question posed by a journalist (Bull & Mayer, 1993). 
It is in a politician’s best interest to answer questions as fully as possible 
(Bull, 2012), with equivocation in answering questions being costly for a 
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Complete replies not only reinforce the political leader’s credibility but 
also help eliminate any contention with journalists (Clayman & Heritage, 
2002). In other words, by giving a complete reply, a political leader ap-
pears to be compliant with press overtures while appearing to honestly 
answer for the audience following the event unmediated or through tele-
vision, Internet, or alternative forms of news coverage. Replies do not 
mean a political leader is being truthful; the politician could reply to a 
posed question with an untruth or purposeful misdirection. Due to joint 
press conferences norms, it would be difficult for a journalist to chal-
lenge a political leader who completely replied to a posed question with 
an untruth.
Intermediate Replies
At times, political leaders respond to one portion of a journalist’s question 
but do not reply to the entirety of the question. This results in intermediate 
replies, also referred to by Harris (1991) as indirect replies, which “can be 
placed midway on a scale of evasiveness between direct answers and out-
right evasion” (Bull, 2003, p. 110). Intermediate replies show hesitancy by 
the political leader to answer a certain part of the query. Characteristically, 
this type of reply enables the political leader to direct attention to a par-
ticular point or statement they want to make. By partially answering the 
question, a political leader’s intermediate reply might satisfy a journalist 
enough for them to not challenge the answer. The politician still risks the 
journalist taking initiative in following up with a clarification question in 
retaliation to the incomplete response.1
Intermediate replies are broken down into three superordinate cate-
gories: incomplete answers, implication answers, and interrupted answers. 
An incomplete answer occurs when a political leader only responds com-
pletely to one part of a question posed while ignoring the rest of the query 
(Bull & Mayer, 1993). Whether to a single question or question cascade (a 
question technique where a journalist follows one question with several 
others in succession), this answer type shows initiative on the politician’s 
part to answer specific parts of a question. While a politician could be an-
swering the part of the question they remember if multiple questions are 
204 PART 3 C-SPAN in Critical Scholarship
posed in a turn (Clayman & Heritage, 2002), typically incomplete answers 
indicate hesitancy in their response (Bull & Mayer, 1993).
For their part, implication answers occur when a politician implies or 
suggests an answer to what a journalist is asking but does not explicitly 
give an opinion or answer the question (Bull & Mayer, 1993). In many 
ways, this type of response does provide a reply to a journalist’s query al-
beit not as direct, because the journalist and the overhearing audience 
must infer what the politician believes.
Finally, at times a journalist will interrupt a political leader before 
they finish responding to a question. These interrupted answers typically 
occur in one-on-one broadcast interviews and political debates where 
journalists have greater power to control the flow of talking turns (Bull 
& Mayer, 1993) and would not be an expected approach from journalists 
in the highly structured environment of joint press conferences.
Nonreplies
Nonreplies occur when a political leader decides a question posed by a 
journalist leaves no positive outcome, and they instead choose to equivo-
cate rather than give a complete answer (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullet, 
1990). These nonreplies do not answer the intended question, instead 
refocusing the subject of the question on a topic the politician wants to 
answer (Bull, 1994; Bull & Mayer, 1993). Whether specific politicians tend 
to be inherently evasive or the political situations faced by them require 
them to be evasive (Bavelas, Black, Bryson, & Mullett, 1988; Bavelas et al., 
1990), instances of nonreplies provide a means for politicians to respond 
to questions but also avoid uncomfortable or impolite answers they are 
unable or unwilling to give.
Nonreplies show the greatest hesitancy by politicians to answer a given 
question and create an atmosphere of contention between the politicians 
and journalists. While nonreplies may benefit the politician immediately, 
they might create a contentious relationship with journalists who expect 
complete answers to their questions (Bull & Mayer, 1993). Unlike inter-
mediate replies, nonreplies from politicians do not meet the needs of the 
journalist; if used, political leaders risk follow-up and future aggressive 
questioning from journalists.
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STATISTICALLY ANALYZING REPLY TYPES
To constrain our analysis of President Trump’s joint press conferences 
during his first year, we chose only countries with free or partly free press 
ratings based upon Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press index (2017) 
comparing complete replies, intermediate replies, and nonreplies to six 
free and six partly free foreign and domestic press corps and their re-
spective political leaders. Data analysis for this study was carried out in 
multiple steps using conversation analysis. Conversation analysis looks to 
understand specific dimensions of interactional and “turn-at-talk” dia-
logue going on between two or more individuals (Atkinson, 1984; Masters 
& Sullivan, 1989). First, C-SPAN videos of joint press conferences were 
downloaded and analyzed through transcripts via an established code-
book and video coding software, ANVIL. Transcripts for each joint press 
conference were gathered from the C-SPAN database and cross-refer-
enced with transcripts provided on whitehouse.gov. Second, the unit of 
analysis — political leader response (whether complete reply, intermediate 
reply, or nonreply) during each joint press conference was coded using the 
typology and codebook of reply types from Bull and Mayer (Bull & Mayer, 
1993). Intercoder reliability on the qualitative aspects of this framework 
was assessed and is discussed in the chapter appendix.2
FINDINGS
Analysis of the 86 responses by Donald Trump and the assortment of 
world leaders he met during his first year in office suggests that Trump 
was responsible for answering over 10% more questions than the leaders 
from the other nations (55.8% vs. 44.2%). However, when time per re-
sponse is considered, Trump spent less time during each speaking turn 
(73 vs. 80 seconds) when compared to the other world leaders, although 
the difference is not statistically significant (t [84] = .672, p = ns).
The slight difference in time spent on each response is offset, how-
ever, by Trump’s verbal fluency. The average number of words spoken per 
minute by Trump was significantly higher than that of the other world lead-
ers, t (84) = 2.970, p = .004. At nearly 170 words per minute (M = 167.15, 
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SD = 34.99), Trump said nearly 25 words more per minute than that enun-
ciated by the other world leaders (M = 144.41, SD = 35.63). As can be 
seen in Figure 7.1, Trump spoke more words per minute than Gentoloni 
and Santos, yet fewer words per minute than May. As can be expected, 
this might be due to the former speakers not having English as their na-
tive language.
This difference might also be due in part to the comparatively un-
sophisticated means by which we consider speech rate, with word count 
not necessarily capturing verbal aptitude. Specifically, individuals using a 
larger vocabulary of multisyllabic words would appear relatively dis-flu-
ent in comparison with those using a less complex, yet more verbose 
approach to speaking.
Consideration of the answer type shows that of the three response types 
considered, nonreplies made up the majority of responses (52.3%) for all 
political leaders; there was a near even split between replies (24.4%) and 
intermediate replies (23.3%) for all the leaders. Comparisons of Trump 
to the other political leaders during these joint press conferences shows a 
statistically significant difference (χ2 [2] = 6.191, p = .045) with a medium- 
sized effect (φ = .268). As can be seen in Figure 7.2, Trump provides 
proportionately fewer replies, substantially more intermediate replies, and 
fewer nonreplies than the other world leaders.
FIGURE 7.1 Word count and speaking time by political leader.
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When the source of the question is considered, whether journalists 
from the United States or from the nation represented by the other national 
leader, we see a significant albeit weak relationship with type of equiv-
ocation in reply (χ2 [2, 86] = 4.673, p = .097, φ = .332). Further probing 
suggests Trump is the driving force (χ2 [2, 48] = 5.303, p = .071, φ = .332) 
when compared with all other political leaders (χ2 [2] = 1.307, p = .520, 
φ = .185). Analysis of Figure 7.3 suggests that Donald Trump is equally 
likely to give a nonreply to a journalist from other nations as he is to an 
American journalist; however, where he differs is in proffering more re-
plies to U.S. journalists and more intermediate replies than expected to 
foreign journalists.
While the distribution and number of intermediate replies preclude 
statistical analysis, comparisons of patterns in response are illustrative. 
Both Trump and foreign leaders rely on implication answers a quarter 
of the time. While foreign leaders’ incomplete answers comprise the re-
mainder of their intermediate reply types, for Trump they comprise the 
majority (56.3%) of answers, or if considering them as part of his rhetorical 
strategy with the final category that combines incomplete and implication 
answers, three-quarters of his intermediate replies.
FIGURE 7.2 Percentage of answer type by political leader.
Answer Type



















208 PART 3 C-SPAN in Critical Scholarship
When nonreplies are analyzed in greater detail, we find that President 
Trump and foreign leaders differ substantially. The modal category of 
nonreply by foreign leaders was acknowledging the question (N = 8), 
followed by ignoring the question (N = 3), and either declining to an-
swer due to unwillingness (N = 2) or acknowledging then ignoring the 
question (N = 2), with the remaining eight nonreplies being of different 
types. For Trump, no one particular approach predominated, with only 
him acknowledging the question then talking up his side to make a po-
litical point occurring multiple times (N = 3). Throughout the remaining 
19 nonreplies, he used 19 different types.
DISCUSSION
Clearly, President Trump is selective when it comes to how he interacts 
with the press. Though it was not possible to pinpoint every journalist 
and their affiliation for this study,3 Trump has preferred journalists who 
are called on frequently in his press conferences — John Roberts of FOX 
News, Blake Berman of FOX Business Network, and Jonathan Karl of 
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FIGURE 7.3 Percentage of political leader answer type by nationality of journalist.
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in these press conferences — Berman and Karl twice each and Roberts 
three times. While Trump goes back to his preferred reporters regularly 
in the U.S. press, he has even called on a foreign journalist in his press 
conference with French Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron. Calling on 
the foreign journalist, who identified himself as being from “Phoenix TV 
of China,” breaks the norm of politicians calling on their own press corps 
during these conferences.
Considering this behavior, it is not surprising that Trump is equally 
as choosy when answering questions posed to him by journalists. With 
a proportionately greater amount of his answers being intermediate re-
plies, questions may be raised regarding his strategic intent toward the 
press and if a strategy exists. With President Trump being the personifica-
tion of the nontraditional politician, and apparently not solely focused on 
staying on message, the reasons may range from strategic misdirection to 
coached intellectual disinterest. Regardless, one could speculate as to why 
intermediate replies are more advantageous for a politician rather than a 
nonreply more generally. When posed with several questions at once, as is 
the norm in joint press conferences (Clayman & Heritage, 2002; Russell, 
2018), a politician could pick out the most favorable portion of the ques-
tion, ignoring the other parts, and be perceived as giving an actual reply 
to a journalist’s question. While this tactic could cost them legitimacy 
during press conferences, which later lingers on in the public sphere, they 
are satisfying the journalist in some respects by giving them more than a 
distinct and identifiable nonreply.
Additionally, the use of an implication reply allows the politician a sort 
of freedom to answer a question in such a way as to satisfy the question 
asked of them but not tread too deeply into the affirmation of an answer 
that could be held against them later. An intermediate reply could be the 
perfect response to journalistic questioning in joint press conferences, 
and combined with Trump’s use of ridicule in his rhetoric, he could be 
better at the art of the politician response than first expected (Eubanks, 
Stewart, & Dye, 2018).
While Trump’s preferred answer type, nonreplies, are especially dif-
ficult for journalists to deal with in press conferences, his increased use 
of intermediate replies is not easy to follow up on for reporters either, 
because of not only the substance but also the prescribed norms of joint 
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press conferences. Considering his lack of experience in politics, this tactic 
shows Trump’s communication skills are surprisingly savvy in responding 
to journalists by using response types that give journalist an answer to his 
preferred question. His reliance on intermediate “half ” answers combined 
with his use of jokes and answering questions out of turn allows President 
Trump to take full control of the press conference, using his brash rheto-
ric and behavior to his advantage.
CONCLUSIONS
There is no doubt that representative democracies thrive when their 
leaders come under the scrutiny of a watchful and incisive press; this 
is accentuated in our mediated era where both journalists and political 
leaders are intrinsic parts of political stories. Increasingly, political lead-
ers — even in those nations with a free or mostly free press — recognize 
the effect of such light being shed upon their political machinations. Thus, 
they work to delineate and delimit the influence of the press through 
various means, including the structural impediments as seen in the joint 
press conferences and relied upon by President Trump. Here, the presence 
of another national leader makes President Trump appear more states-
manlike (Grabe & Bucy, 2009) beyond that their joint attendance in a 
presumed diplomatic endeavor blunts the journalistic aggression that may 
be employed (Russell, 2018), while making it appear that a free and open 
press is operative.
Most interesting in these press and political leader interactions is when 
turn-taking norms are broken and heated communication is exchanged. 
During his press conference with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany 
(Figure 7.4), Trump is asked the following question from Kristina Dunz 
of the German News Agency:
And then, Mr. President, America First — don’t you think that this 
is going to weaken also the European Union? And why are you 
so scared of diversity? In the news and in the media, you speak 
so awful of fake news and that things, also, cannot be proven. For 
example, the fact that you have been wiretapped by Mr. Obama.
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FIGURE 7.4 Trump joint news conference with Chancellor Merkel.
In response, Trump provides a seemly sarcastic comment about the re-
porter and corrects her assertions:
Nice, friendly reporter. First of all, I don’t believe in an isolationist 
policy, but I also believe a policy of trade should be a fair policy. 
And the United States has been treated very, very unfairly by many 
countries over the years. And that’s going to stop.
But I’m not an isolationist. I’m a free trader, but I’m also a 
fair trader. And free trade has led to a lot of bad things happen-
ing — you look at the deficits that we have and you look at all of the 
accumulation of debt. We’re a very powerful company — country. 
We’re a very strong, very strong country. We’ll soon be at a level 
that we perhaps have never been before. Our military is going to 
be strengthened — it’s been depleted.
But I am a trader. I am a fair trader. I am a trader that wants 
to see good for everybody, worldwide. But I am not an isolationist 
by any stretch of the imagination. So I don’t know what newspaper 
you’re reading, but I guess that would be another example of, as 
you say, fake news.
This response from Trump is not a reply or even an intermediate re-
ply; instead, Trump spends the majority of his nonreply (according to the 
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typology) attacking the interviewer, attacking the question for factual inac-
curacies, and largely ignoring the questions posed by Dunz. While it might 
be easy to cast blame on Trump for not answering this question, it could 
be said that Dunz’s question was aggressive toward the U.S. president. If 
a question is overtly aggressive, there is reason to think that a politician 
would not want to respond with a full reply. Here, not only would it not 
be helpful for Trump’s public image to answer a question like, “And why 
are you so scared of diversity?” but the journalist’s approach in question-
ing him is less conversational and more accusatory; even if the questions 
posed by Dunz were important, the way she asked the questions did not 
incentivize Trump to give her an answer related to her question.
While understanding Trump’s typical answer style in press conferences 
is helpful in studying his presidential rhetoric, there are several factors 
at play in joint press conferences not yet considered in this study. First, 
the current study does not consider journalistic aggression. According to 
Banning and Billingsley (2007), journalists are less likely to ask aggressive 
questions of politicians in joint press conferences than solo press con-
ferences because of the norms of the event. This finding does not mean 
that instances of aggressive questioning do not exist and moving forward 
should not be considered. An initial sampling of Trump’s joint press con-
ferences found that journalists use aggressive techniques to question the 
U.S. president (Russell, 2018). Combining the question techniques jour-
nalists use and the types of answers politicians give to those questions 
could be revealing of the turn-taking behavior in joint press conferences.
Second, not much is known about how much often Trump breaks the 
norms of press conferences himself. Again, the person in power during 
these press conferences is the politician. While the journalists show up 
to joint press conferences hoping to get answers to their questions, they 
ultimately must take what they can get from the politician. Many times 
in these press conferences, President Trump answers out of turn — often 
answering a question posed to the other political leader and interrupting 
whoever is speaking to take back control of the turn. A deeper under-
standing of when these turns are usurped and what the circumstances 
surrounding those breaks are in turn is needed moving forward.
Practically, the use of Bull and Mayer’s typology to apprehend how a 
politician answers a question or dodges it is useful for both journalists and 
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political scientists. Journalists could use this technique in action during 
press conferences to question politicians more effectively by recognizing 
and anticipating political figures’ equivocation strategies. The journalists 
can thus construct either better and more incisive questions or be prepared 
to break with norms of politeness when this approach is used. Political 
scientists and those focusing on the strategic attributes of politics can use 
this typology and methodology to analyze foreign policy communication 
and, in conjunction with other types of analysis, consider the dynamics of 
press-political interaction with implications for international policy and 
predicting potential actions by political leaders.
Philosophically, citizens of a free society have the right to know, not 
only what their public officials are saying, but also what they mean when 
they say it. The public deserves to know whether a politician answers a 
question posed to them, and most definitely deserve to know how they 
answered that question. Particularly in a democratic republic, and above 
all in this time of polarized politics with dramatic coverage fueling acri-
mony, the citizens of the United States should at the very least have direct 
access to what politicians said and how they said it. This, fortunately, is 
provided by C-SPAN’s coverage and archives. Furthermore, providing 
journalists and interested citizens the tools to better deconstruct and ap-
prehend what was said can only serve to strengthen a political system that 
relies upon popular assent. Even if a politician does not mean what they 
say, lies, or retracts their statement before the 5-o’clock news, citizens in a 
free society should be aware when a question is left unanswered, whether 
incompletely or totally. This is especially true for the highest office of the 
United States, and perhaps the most powerful executive on the planet: 
while presidential words might be freighted with political equivocation, 
when the executive office speaks, the people it serves should be aware of 
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NOTES
1. In Bull and Mayer’s 1993 study, Thatcher and Kinnock only responded to 
journalists’ questions with intermediate replies 6% and 1%, respectively, making 
it the answer type used the least by both politicians. Bull and Mayer posited this 
observation could have resulted because of the great hesitancy in answering the 
types of questions posed by the interviews or because during broadcast inter-
views a journalist controls the setting and has more power when controlling the 
turns-at-talk. With the journalist in control of the conversation, they are freely 
able to ask questions and follow-up without breaking norms of the political com-
munication interaction.
2. Intercoder Reliability: Analysis of thematic content categories is highly 
interpretive (Krippendorff, 1980), and while analysis of question structure and 
design is more concrete, intercoder reliability is used to validate the results of this 
coding approach. Nichole Russell, first author; Alexandra Johnson, second au-
thor; and two paid coders, Molly Matney and Lisa Darden, coded for this research 
project. Johnson was secondary coder on Russell’s study (2018) and had previous 
experience with the codebook. Matney and Darden were given training materi-
als and coded a press conference between President Trump and President Putin. 
After the initial training, press conference assignments were given. After initial 
analysis, agreement was assessed, and mediation sessions were used in the case of 
definition disagreement in the codebook or coding correction between the coders.
The two mediation sessions covered five press conferences in the first session 
and the remaining seven in the following session. Secondary coding was con-
ducted on the entire dataset. Each press conference was coded by three coders; 
conferences assignments were picked at random, with the only exception being 
that Russell coded all press conferences. Before coding, a minimum of 70% agree-
ment was decided upon for each press conference. The lowest level of agreement 
found in mediation was 72%, and the highest level of agreement at 91%. Median 
agreement for all press conferences 80.63%.
3. A complete listing of journalists and their affiliations is missing from this 
analysis due to the structure of joint press conferences. While a journalist may 
sometimes state their name and affiliation, they are not required to. A politician 
may also call on a journalist by name, but often times the political leader points 
to a journalist to indicate a turn. This norm makes it very difficult to know which 
journalist is asking a question.
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IGNORE THE HOAXSTERS AND UNLEASH 
AMERICAN ENERGY: PRESIDENT TRUMP’S 
RHETORIC ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Heather W. Cann and Janel Jett
INTRODUCTION
Public perceptions of President Trump, as both an individual and politi-
cian, are invariably shaped by his virtual presence on the popular social 
media platform Twitter. An active user for years prior to his formal par-
ticipation in American politics, Trump reliably uses Twitter to share his 
oftentimes idiosyncratic views on numerous issues.
One such idiosyncratic view is the president’s statements on anthro-
pogenic climate change — broadcasted to the world through Twitter since 
2011, as well as shared in a range of more formal video recordings. In a 
2018 Associated Press interview, for example, the president stressed his 
skepticism concerning the human-caused nature of climate change, as well 
as the motivations for those who push for climate-energy policy.
The president’s persistence at disseminating contentious statements 
highlights important emerging questions on the lines between formal and 
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informal discourse, especially when these contentious statements are in 
such stark contrast with the expert consensus around important current 
issues. Recent scholarship suggests that this type of communication can 
shape not just the public and the media but also elite discourse and the 
discussion of policy solutions more broadly.
Indeed, environmental politics and communications scholars have 
long been interested in how elites shape public discourse around conten-
tious policy problems, such as climate change. Researchers have found 
that controlling political rhetoric is a central concern of political elites, 
and both the creation and disappearance of key terms and frames are of-
ten a “signal of political triumph and defeat” (Kinder & Sanders, 1990). 
Central to this body of work are questions related to how rhetoric spreads 
among political elites, particularly during elections. Additionally, in our 
current hybrid media system, it is critical to understand how messag-
ing differs between different communication methods and how frames 
might disseminate from one political leader to another. This is especially 
important given how elites signal appropriate policy beliefs to their ideo-
logical constituencies. Such questions remain timely — and occasionally 
vexing — with the recent presidency of Donald Trump. As such, it is critical 
to understand how Trump’s linguistic choices, presentation style, and cli-
mate change rhetoric — both in formal and informal communication — may 
have shifted elite discourse on climate change.
In this chapter, we begin to investigate this broader research program 
through systematic qualitative content analysis. First we ask, how does 
President Trump talk about, or “frame,” climate change and energy pol-
icy? Second, how might the prevalence of different climate change frames 




After more than a year in office and following a dramatic campaign, 
President Trump has cemented his reputation as a bombastic communi-
cator with stylistic and substantive particularities that are unprecedented 
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within the presidential office (see Figure 8.1). While anomalous in some 
ways, Donald Trump is not the only president to have a distinctive style. 
Clinton’s shifting speech patterns and George W. Bush’s “folksy-ness” 
have both been commented on by popular media and linguistics scholars. 
Scholars have noted the influence these stylistic choices have on both the 
tone and content of political discourse (Hart, 1987; Landau et al., 2004) 
and how stylistic choices can influence perceptions of leadership perfor-
mance (de Vries, Bakker-Pieper, & Oostenveld, 2010).
Trump’s communication style is also uniquely suited for the frac-
tured media landscape and rising forms of new media. Stemming from 
work on the rhetorical presidency (Tulis, 1987), new scholarship explores 
the ubiquitous presidency as a framework for understanding presiden-
tial communication in this fragmented landscape (Scacco & Coe, 2016). 
Presidential ubiquity is based on an understanding that “modern presi-
dents cultivate a highly visible and nearly constant presence” in modern 
American life by leveraging these different media sources to broaden their 
reach (Scacco & Coe, 2016, 2017). Scholars have also explored Trump’s 
use of celebrity tactics to drive attention (Wells et al., 2016) and how his 
simple and often uncivil tactics on Twitter normalize right-wing popu-
list discourse by reinforcing ideas of a “dangerous other” (Kreis, 2017; 
Ott, 2016).
FIGURE 8.1 President Trump on Paris climate change agreement.
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Related to the ubiquitous nature of the modern presidency, presidential 
communication is critically linked with new technologies for dissemi-
nating messages, from the rise of the radio to social media (Scacco, Coe, 
& Hearit, 2018). Elites, including the president, use these tools to set a 
legislative agenda, spread issue frames, and build their image with both 
the media and the public (Conway, Kenski, & Wang, 2015, Scacco et al., 
2018). These tools shift traditional dynamics between these different pow-
ers and, while past research found that the president is typically responsive 
to news media agendas (Edwards & Wood, 1999), new work examines 
whether leveraging these new media sources shifts presidential leader-
ship relative to the news media, particularly in the president’s ability to 
“narrowcast” and appeal directly to bases of support, circumventing the 
media (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2016).
In addition to the ability to bypass traditional media gatekeeping, 
the nature of these new technologies changes the nature of the commu-
nication itself. Social media communication is fundamentally personal, 
intimate, and often more emotionally driven than formal communication 
strategies (McGregor, Lawrence, & Cardona, 2017) and challenges the 
boundaries between what is public and what is personal (Papacharissi, 
2015). In particular, there is a desire for “authenticity” in social media 
communication, presenting a challenge to professionalized campaigns 
and politicians that often relegate social media posts to staffers. As Enli 
(2017) highlights, this creates a window for an “authentic outsider,” like 
Trump, whose tweets often included political incorrectness, name calling, 
and capital letters, all of which serve as markers that the tweets genuinely 
came from Trump himself. Interestingly, upon becoming president, Trump 
has continued to use his long-standing personal Twitter account — @real 
DonaldTrump — as opposed to using the @POTUS account that is more 
formally associated with the office.
The hybrid campaign strategy of presidential candidates and the ubiq-
uitous nature of the presidency mean that politicians and presidents need 
to have “performative flexibility” in the way they communicate, “moving 
comfortably between different format criteria and expectations, from the 
formal to the informal, from the professionalized to the personalized” 
(Enli, 2017, p. 52). To be successful in this environment, presidents and 
presidential candidates must develop a consistent message, but also vary 
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that message across media types to reach the intended audience, in a way 
that seems authentic but still frames the message in a way that promotes 
policy goals and drives support for their platform both as a candidate and 
an acting president.
Climate Change: It’s All a Hoax!
President Trump’s most colorful political rhetoric often focuses on under-
mining legislation championed by the Obama administration, including 
climate change policy. Work from climate change framing and communi-
cation research has reinforced the important role that elites like President 
Trump play in shaping climate discourse. In particular, political elites gen-
erate party cues, which signal to the American public what their opinions 
on contentious policy topics like climate change ought to be (Merkley & 
Stecula, 2018). For example, Republican voters develop climate change at-
titudes based on their own party leaders rejecting the scientific consensus 
and as a reaction to Democratic elites who openly support climate change 
science and policies. This highlights both the power of elite framing and 
the presence of boomerang effects that can compound partisan polariza-
tion and increase pushback against climate change policies (Zhou, 2017).
Such climate change “denialism” has successfully promulgated issue 
frames, or arguments, that undermine the legitimacy and urgency of cli-
mate change as a problem (Cann & Raymond, 2018), and contributed to 
delayed political action (Dunlap, 2014; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). However, 
recent climate change framing and media literature suggests that me-
dia attention to climate change skeptics has decreased across all media, 
especially as the scientific understanding of climate change has solidi-
fied (Boykoff, 2007; Young, 2011). While many Republican elites still act 
to stifle climate legislation, language of outright “denialism” has become 
increasingly rare. For example, in a 2013 sample of 340 climate-skeptic 
thinktank documents, Cann and Raymond (2018) find that the argument 
that climate change is not happening and there is no warming is present 
in only 17% of all documents. In contrast, nearly 30% of documents from 
the same sample argued a more moderate position that climate change 
may be happening, yet pinpointing why and how is difficult given the 
complexities of climate science.
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The election of President Trump has almost certainly challenged this 
conventional understanding of how political elites talk about environmental 
issues like climate change. Instead of avoiding denialism, he doubled-down 
on both skeptical language and a broad “anti-intellectual” narrative, both 
as a candidate and a president. In tweets, he has called researchers “idi-
ots,” suggested that scientists studying the safety of vaccines have ulterior 
motives, and implied that climate scientists have political agendas and are 
working for the Chinese (Motta, 2017). While this trend of anti- intellectual 
discourse goes beyond just Trump, his unprecedented rhetoric has likely 
expanded the “window” of acceptable discourse, highlighting the poten-
tial ability for a president to change the course of the conversation in ways 
that have long-lasting consequences for policy possibilities.
The Power of Framing
Framing theory describes the process by which individuals attempt to 
interpret and make sense of the world around them (Goffman, 1974). 
A “frame” is a specific message unit that strategically emphasizes certain 
aspects of an issue while downplaying others, with the intention of in-
fluencing how people consider or perceive a particular issue or situation. 
Framing highlights “the process by which people develop a particular 
conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007a, p. 104). Specially, we focus our attention 
here on “issue frames,” which refers to the persuasive and strategic choices 
made by political actors intent on shaping the boundaries of political 
communication around a certain issue.
Overall, framing theory suggests that how an issue is characterized 
will powerfully shape the way it is interpreted and understood by its au-
dience, as well as shaping perceptions around which actors should be 
held accountable for problems. For example, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 
(1997) demonstrate how a Ku Klux Klan rally is tolerated by the public, 
to very different degrees, depending on whether the rally is framed as an 
issue of public order or as an issue of free speech.
The impacts of such strategic framing endeavors on audiences, known 
as framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007a), thus pose powerful conse-
quences for shaping the realm of possible policy responses to social issues. 
Besides work investigating the use of specific frames as related to distinct 
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policy topics, research has also explored various elements of frame deliv-
ery, such as frame strength (Chong & Druckman, 2007b) or the lasting 
power of frame effects through time (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011), among 
other elements of framing in action.
Framing theory serves as a useful tool for beginning to think about 
the nature and potential impacts of President Trump’s climate change 
discourse. Framing research has often sought to categorize the effective-
ness of different frames in shaping attitudes toward issues like climate 
change, influenced in turn by frame persuasiveness or “strength.” Existing 
scholarship suggests that perceived frame strength, while moderated by a 
variety of factors, is most notably influenced by several attributes: when 
a frame comes from a source that the audience deems credible (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007b), when it is congruent with an audience’s previously 
held beliefs (Druckman & Nelson, 2003), or, more simply, when a frame 
is ubiquitously repeated, increasing its prevalence and making it more 
mentally “available” (Zaller, 1992).
Given this prior literature, we pose some general expectations for 
what our analysis will suggest about Trump’s use of climate change and 
energy frames:
1. Frames will utilize (1) antiscience rhetoric and (2) proeco-
nomic justifications against acting on climate change.
2. Twitter frames will focus on simple messages and potential-
ly more “uncivil” framing.
3. Formal messaging (e.g., speeches) will utilize more moder-
ate and nuanced framing.
4. There will be minimal differences between “informal” 
(Twitter) and “formal” (videos) messaging with consistency 
across mediums supporting a cohesive narrative.
METHODS
We capitalize on the C-SPAN Video Library to complete a qualitative 
content analysis of both Donald Trump’s speeches and floor speeches in 
Congress, and his tweets related to climate change and renewable energy. 
Our sample is composed of all Trump C-SPAN video clips, or “mentions,” 
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from June 16, 2015, to August 31, 2018, and all relevant tweets created 
prior to August 31, 2018. This time span contained several significant 
climate events, such as the Trump administration’s announced intention 
to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, rollback of the Obama-era 
Clean Power Plan, various extreme weather events, and all milestones 
of the election cycle. We used keywords to search both Twitter and the 
C-SPAN Video Library to assemble our sample: “climate,” “warming,” 
“emissions,” “energy,” “carbon,” and “greenhouse.”
Items were considered relevant if they contained an argumentative 
frame connected to climate change and climate-related energy policy. More 
specifically, items discussing energy policy may not have been included in 
the sample if they did not make at least an implicit argument about climate 
change or climate policy. For example, a video clip that briefly mentioned 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge would be excluded from the sam-
ple. In contrast, a video where Trump describes “Unleashing American 
Energy” would be included, given the clip’s implicit argument about the 
need to undo Obama-era climate change regulations that are perceived 
as hampering energy development. Again, this time frame runs through 
the 2016 campaigns and into Trump’s presidency, and thus captures vari-
ation in his own political status as well. The relevant sample of C-SPAN 
videos and tweets were imported into qualitative coding software NVivo, 
and then human-coded for the presence or nonpresence of each detailed 
frame. As such, each item could contain multiple frames.
In terms of coding, we base our typology on the work of Cann and 
Raymond (2018). This exhaustive typology describes the frames used by 
actors who both oppose or support climate change policy and is grounded 
both in recent original research as well as prior work on climate change 
policy framing, especially in the range of climate-energy frames used by 
conservative think tanks (such as the Heartland Institute) who are inter-
nationally recognized for their longstanding opposition to action on the 
climate crisis. While scholars conceptualize and label climate-energy frames 
in diverse ways, we follow in the example of Cann and Raymond by iden-
tifying climate-energy frames as belonging to one of three broad “frame 
families”: Science Frames, Climate Impact Frames, and Policy Design 
Frames (see Table 8.1). We further delineate each family by detailed frames, 
allowing for a more fine-grained assessment of frame content and nuance 
(not noted in Table 8.1).
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RESULTS
Our preliminary results highlight several interesting patterns in Trump’s 
use of different energy and climate-related frames (Table 8.2). We are able 
to note initial trends in Trump’s framing strategies, particularly in terms 
of comparing his Twitter statements and his televised speech events.
Science Frames: “Global Warming”? It’s Cold Outside!
As a group, science frames are arguments that focus on the technical real-
ity and evidence for climate change. More to the point, Trump’s portrayals 
attempt to undermine the legitimacy of climate change as a serious prob-
lem by questioning the quality of the scientific evidence for human-caused 
warming, or by attacking the motives of the researchers and actors who 
generate or promote a reality-based understanding of the problem.
In relation to science frames, our baseline assessment of Trump reveals 
interesting patterns in his use of science frames. One of the most striking 
observations is his divergent use of science frames in Twitter versus in his 
televised appearances. Just over 70% of all Trump’s climate-energy tweets 
TABLE 8.1 Overview of Three Major Frame Families
Science frames
The evidentiary basis of climate change is weak and even wrong. To varying degrees, 
contends that climate change does not exist and is not happening. Criticizes the 
scientific evidence that supports the existence of climate change: that it is human 
caused, poses negative consequences for humanity and planetary ecosystems, and 
requires policy action. Undermines the legitimacy of actors who generate evidence 
for climate change or call for climate action.
Climate impact frames
Climate change would be beneficial if it were to occur. Argues for the possible 
benefits of climate change. If global climate change does exist, it does not present 
a problem for human well-being — rather, it provides a range of benefits for both 
humans as well as natural systems.
Policy design frames
Climate change policies would do more harm than good. Posits that solutions 
for climate change are more detrimental than helpful, and specifically that policy 
proposals described by environmental proponents would generate a range of negative 
impacts outweighing any potential benefits.





N % N %
Science frames*
The evidentiary basis of climate change is weak and 
even wrong.
97 70.3 3 3.8
S1 Climate change is not happening and there is 
no warming. 72 52.2 0 0
S2 Climate change is a function of natural cycles and 
unrelated to human activity. 4 2.9 0 0
S3 Mainstream climate research is “junk” science. 5 3.6 0 0
S4 Climate change is a myth or scare tactic perpetuated by 
environmentalists, bureaucrats, and political leaders. 35 25.4 3 3.8
Climate impact frames*
Climate change would be beneficial if it were to occur. 0 0 0 0
B1 Climate change would improve or damage our quality of 
life and health. 0 0 0 0
B2 Climate change would improve or damage our 
agriculture (including natural systems). 0 0 0
Policy design frames*
Climate change policies would do more harm than good. 54 39.1 76 98.7
E1 Policy harms or helps the national economy. 28 20.3 52 67.5
E2 Policy economically harms or helps businesses. 1 0.7 9 11.7
E3 Policy harms or helps consumers. 2 1.4 12 15.6
E4 Policy harms or helps workers. 2 1.4 28 36.3
SO1 Policy would threaten international sovereignty. 1 0.7 23 29.9
SO2 Policy would infringe on sovereignty, at the state or 
local level. 0 0 2 2.6
EN Policy would harm or help the environment. 4 2.9 2 2.6
UE Policy would promote unreliable energy systems, leading 
to energy shortages or blackouts. 5 3.6 0 0
QL Policy would harm or help quality of life. 6 4.3 0 0
NE Climate policy would not be effective. 5 3.6 3 3.9
LP Policy would be unnecessary, because climate change is 
not a priority compared to other issues. 13 9.4 18 23.4
*Percentage of videos featuring at least one frame of the Science, Impact, or Policy Design type.
Typology modified from Cann and Raymond (2018).
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contain at least one of the climate science frames, as compared to only 3.8% 
of his C-SPAN videos — a 66.2 percentage-point difference. Of the more 
detailed subframes, the most widespread was what might be considered 
the most explicitly climate change “denier” claim: that climate change is 
simply not happening and that there is no evidence of warming (frame 
S1). This portrayal appeared in half of all climate-energy tweets in our 
sample. These frame iterations typically included Trump’s assertions that 
regions of the United States were uncharacteristically cold, thus proving 
that climate change was not happening:
Snow and ice, freezing weather in Texas, Arizona and Okla-
homa — what the hell is going on with GLOBAL WARMING? 
(Nov ember 23, 2013)
Another science frame, S4, casts climate change as a ploy used by 
dishonest actors for their personal gain. This argument also appeared dis-
proportionally in tweets versus video appearances: appearing in 25.4% of 
videos sampled, versus 3.8% of tweets. Here, Trump often contests that 
climate change is a con, by arguing that the shift from “global warming” to 
the more scientifically accurate term “climate change” was a deliberate tac-
tic from actors attempting to manipulate the public for their personal gain:
President Obama spends so much time speaking of the so-called 
Carbon footprint, and yet he flies all the way to Hawaii on a massive 
old 747. (December 19, 2015)
Any and all weather events are used by the GLOBAL 
WARMING HOAXSTERS to justify higher taxes to save our planet! 
They don’t believe it $$$$! (January 26, 2014)
Last, science frames that cast climate change as a function of natural 
cycles (S2, 2.9%) and a critique of mainstream climate science (S3, 3.6%) 
both appeared to a lesser extent in the Twitter portion of our sample.
Policy Design Frames: Deregulate and Unleash American Energy
In contrast to science frames, policy design frames focus on the alleged 
benefits or burdens of climate-energy policy, whether in describing 
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specific policies or by discussing regulation more broadly. Given Trump’s 
emphasis on deregulation, Obama-era rollbacks, and critiques of Clinton, 
our framing analysis of these kinds of arguments includes frames that are 
both positive and negative in nature, with Trump’s policy goals contrasted 
against those of his predecessor and political opponent.
In our sample, we find that policy design frames are prevalent in both 
forms of media, though become nearly ubiquitous in Trump’s video ap-
pearances: 98% percent of the C-SPAN sample contained at least one of 
the policy design frames, versus less than half of all tweets, at 39.1%. Of 
these policy frames, the most prevalent by far were financial claims. On 
both Twitter and in recorded speeches, the president’s most widespread 
economic frame drew attention to the state of the national economy (frame 
E1). This frame featured in 20.3% of our sampled tweets and in 67.5% of 
C-SPAN video appearances.
This kind of framing strategy highlights the allegedly negative conse-
quences that climate-energy policies would pose for the national economy, 
and how the Trump administration’s policy rollbacks would lead to nation-
wide economic growth. This sentiment is widely expressed by Trump with 
a statement about “releasing American energy” — that is, by terminating 
climate-energy policies that are meant to support renewable energy and 
decrease carbon emissions.
Another economic frame that differs between the two mediums is 
an argument about how a policy would harm or help specific types of 
American workers (such as steel workers and miners) who Trump claims 
are harmed by climate-energy regulations (frame E4). This frame was ev-
ident in 36.3% of all videos in our sample, as compared to only 1.4% of 
relevant tweets. Two other types of economic frames appear to a lesser extent 
and highlight how policies would help or harm businesses (frame E2) or 
consumers, including low-income and minority communities (frame E3).
Besides economic frames, two other policy design frames are notable. 
First, Trump characteristically emphasized how climate-energy policies 
would infringe on America’s internal sovereignty (frame SO1). This ar-
gument was apparent in 36.3% of video appearances, and to a strikingly 
lesser extent in Twitter posts, at 0.7%. This colorful frame argues that 
American engagement with international climate change policy, such as 
the Paris Accord, is damaging to U.S. independence and is generally unfair:
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Under the agreement, China will be able to increase emissions by a 
staggering number of years. . . . they can do whatever they want. . . . 
not us . . . there are many other examples. But the bottom line is that 
the Paris Accord is very unfair, at the highest level, to the United 
States. (C-SPAN Video Library, 2018, February 23.)
While this statement does feature financial concerns, the primary argu-
ment is more accurately understood as a protest against international 
intrusion onto American sovereignty: that the United States does more 
than its “fair share” and is taken advantage of by other states. An argu-
ment about harm to sovereignty at the state level is also present, to a much 
lesser extent, and highlights the perceived unfairness of Environmental 
Protection Agency intrusion onto family farms, for example.
Second, Trump also employed a frame contending that climate-energy 
policies were unnecessary because climate change is not a priority com-
pared to other kinds of issues (such as terrorism or the threat of nuclear 
attack). This frame, LP, appeared in 23.4% of video appearances and in 
9.4% of tweets. This argument was often linked to specific political actors 
who advanced climate-energy policies, who Trump would then disparage 
for their misplaced priorities:
We should be focusing on beautiful, clean air & not on wasteful 
and very expensive GLOBAL WARMING bullshit! (December 
15, 2013)
The Obama-Clinton crew spent $50 billion on climate pro-
grams when they should have used that money to help Florida 
farmers fight diseases that threaten your crops. (C-SPAN Video 
Library. October 12, 2013)
Several other policy design frames also appeared in small numbers. 
These less common arguments highlighted how climate-energy policies 
actually harm the environment (for example, that wind turbines kill ea-
gles, frame EN), that policies would create unreliable energy systems 
(UE) that decrease quality of life (frame QL), and that policies would 
not be effective, especially given the inaction or duplicity of other states 
(frame NE).
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Climate Benefit Frames
We note in passing that no climate benefit frames appeared in any items 
in our sample. This is consistent with prior research, which has found the 
minimal presence of climate change benefit frames in “skeptic” publica-
tions (McCright & Dunlap, 2000; Cann & Raymond, 2018), which may 
indicate their waning influence in public discourse.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Broadly, this preliminary analysis confirms our belief that Donald Trump 
is using antiscience arguments in discourse against climate change. 
Critically, it also shows a dramatic difference in the way Trump frames 
climate change on Twitter versus in more formal speeches. In his tele-
vised appearances, he talks primarily about policy, compared to his tweets 
where he focuses on denigrating climate science. Videos also feature a 
greater diversity of framing strategies compared to the repetitive nature 
of his tweets on climate change. These findings support recent commu-
nication scholarship on both the nature of Trump’s communication and 
discourse on Twitter. Scholars have found that Trump ranks among the 
top three least civil presidents since Franklin Roosevelt (an honor shared 
with Harry Truman and George H. W. Bush), even when looking only at 
formal speeches. This incivility is only exacerbated by scholarship arguing 
that discourse on Twitter is markedly different than in traditional arenas 
and tends to be simplistic, impulsive, and uncivil (Ott, 2017).
Trump does make use of contentious science frames in his discourse, 
but relatively speaking, these kinds of combative frames are largely ab-
sent from the president’s televised speeches. Rather, they emerge through 
his personal Twitter account. Importantly, many of the most aggressive 
or far-fetched anti-climate-science tweets produced by Trump date from 
prior to his bid for presidency. This indicates that he could be moderating 
his positions in response to his new public position or that new scru-
tiny is limiting the impulsivity of his comments. This, and the relatively 
simplistic and uncivil nature of discourse on Twitter, are evidenced by 
the repetitive nature of his tweets and the disproportionate prevalence of 
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S1 and S4 frames. In some ways, S1 and S4 are the most extreme or in-
flammatory science frames. The first declares unequivocally that climate 
change is simply not occurring — in contrast to the significant body of ex-
pert scholarship indicating otherwise — while S4 often contains personal 
attacks about the motives and morality of specific actors.
Additionally, E4 being so widely prevalent in Trump’s video speeches 
(especially campaign speeches) is indicative of his distinct communica-
tion style of personal engagement and seeming authenticity. Trump often 
frames environmental policy as destructive to the working class and makes 
personal appeals to workers (particularly coal workers) about getting them 
their jobs back. This is reflective of his “everyman” stylistic approach to 
reaching voters.
While there are many key differences between Trump’s framing of cli-
mate change through informal and formal channels, there are also some 
similarities. We find that Trump has a consistent voice across both me-
diums when he refers back to the economy and when he makes claims 
about climate change being low priority compared to other policy con-
cerns. When looking at economic frames in particular, while they are 
much more common in speeches (67%), they are also a core part of his 
Twitter messaging strategy as well, with 20% of tweets containing an eco-
nomic frame. Relatedly, E3, the consumer frame, is not as prevalent as 
potentially expected (Raymond, 2016), despite research that shows that 
consumer frames have become more important in on-the-ground policy 
development.
This is a particularly important finding, as scholars have noted that 
personalized frames are influential at shaping public sentiment and support 
for renewable energy policies (Boyd, Liu, & Hmielowski, 2018; Harrison 
& Sundstrom, 2010), and that individually borne financial costs may be 
one of the public’s highest concerns when it comes energy discussions 
(Bessette & Arvai, 2018). Indeed, Stokes and Warshaw (2017) find that 
survey respondents’ support for renewable energies is tied closely to per-
ceived changes in their electricity bills, as well as perceived opportunities 
for job creation. Other scholarship convincingly argues that discussion 
around personalized financial impacts are also important as part of ac-
tual policy processes (Raymond, 2016; Rabe, 2018). It could be that these 
worker appeals are Trump’s way of highlighting the personal financial 
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costs, but, in this case, he deviates somewhat from what scholars believe 
to be the most effective strategy for either building or reducing climate 
policy support.
In closing, future stages of this project will assess, more broadly, the 
climate change framing strategies of elected officials using these data as a 
comparison to understand if Trump’s climate change rhetoric shapes broader 
elite discourse on climate change, and, based on this analysis, what elements 
of his rhetoric are most effective at shaping these elite responses. Because 
his formal and informal framing of climate change differs so clearly, this 
will be an important test of whether lines are blurred between informal 
and formal discourse in our current system. Future content analyses will 
code for a broad range of demographic and other attributes, such as gen-
der, party, which specific policy is under discussion, and whether speech 
is in support or opposition to the policy, or if discussion is on a specific 
bill versus grand strategy, audience reaction, emotion of speaker (e.g., Do 
we see increase in Democratic aggression?), and if and under what con-
ditions other actors mention Trump explicitly in their own discussion of 
climate-energy issues.
This project advances our knowledge of how the president’s use of 
holistic tools of communication can shape elite discourse, which has pow-
erful ramifications for important policy issues. Climate change is a critical 
case both as a substantive field of interest, as well as to explore President 
Trump’s rhetoric more broadly and how it may shape the wider elite dis-
course around a contentious policy topic.
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NONVERBAL CUES IN CONGRESSIONAL 
SPEECHES: A WINK AND A NOD 
TO TWITTER ENGAGEMENT
Amber Williams Lusvardi and Terri L. Towner
Starting in 1979, the creation of C-SPAN gave Americans across the na-
tion something new: a chance to watch their legislators in action as they 
made laws in real time. Since C-SPAN is a visual medium, it offers viewers 
at home a sense of not only what their legislators said but also the style in 
which it was said. Recently, C-SPAN has expanded its reach to post con-
tent on its fully archived website and social media sites, allowing viewers 
to connect with the content across multiple platforms. This research uti-
lizes C-SPAN videos on the Twitter platform to measure what content 
from Congress is most engaging to viewers. We examine what aspects of 
congressional floor speeches and press conferences posted by C-SPAN on 
Twitter lead to engagement with that video content. Particularly interest-
ing to this study is whether viewers are more engaged with speeches when 
members of Congress are using a persuasive speaking style. A body of re-
search from communication has indicated that specific nonverbal cues, 
such as facial expressions, gaze, body orientation, and use of gestures, can 
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have as much or greater impact on viewers’ perceptions than the content 
of the message itself (Bucy, 2011; Gong & Bucy, 2016; Sullivan & Masters, 
1988). We further test these theories by applying them to the speeches 
of Congress members when they are viewed on a social media platform.
While congressional scholars have investigated the content of floor 
speeches and their implications for the policy process (Maltzman & 
Sigelman, 1996), little is known about how these speeches influence con-
stituents at home. How voters respond to the floor speeches and press 
conferences of senators and representatives has yet to be fully investi-
gated. We specifically measure whether the public speaking style itself is 
particularly engaging to viewers. That is, if members of Congress employ 
persuasive nonverbal cues while speaking, does that create a more engag-
ing impression on speech viewers?
It is important to study whether speeches given by members of Congress 
are more effective if delivered in a way that is consistent with the most per-
suasive public speaking practices. Of relevance both to the field of political 
science and members of Congress is whether the performance aspect of 
debate and speeches is necessary or beneficial to the preparation for floor 
speeches. Members of Congress make strategic and rationally motivated 
decisions in how they present information based on the proximity of their 
reelection and their need to connect with constituents (Fenno, 1978; Hill 
& Hurley, 2002). We build on this knowledge to better understand how 
members might integrate speaking style to their strategic choices on mak-
ing floor speeches and holding press conferences. If style and manner of 
presentation have an impact on exciting interest from constituents, then 
it should influence the type of preparation and effort that members put 
into their use of speaking time on the floor.
This research addresses an open question in the political communi-
cation literature of how important speaking style is to engagement with 
members of Congress, especially in the era of social media dominance. 
We provide context on whether it is essential for members of Congress 
to develop a dynamic speaking style to build a compelling way for voters 
to connect and engage with them, mainly via the social media platform 
Twitter. Using clipped videos posted on the official C-SPAN Twitter ac-
count (@CSPAN), this research builds on the literature by measuring the 
relationship between the level of engagement between Twitter users and 
CHAPTER 9 Nonverbal Cues in Congressional Speeches: A Wink and a Nod to Twitter Engagement 243
videos of Congress members with more or less persuasive speaking styles. 
We find evidence that, in contrast to the literature on presidential speech 
making, Twitter viewers of congressional speeches react more to speech 
on trending issues than persuasive nonverbal cues.
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH MAKING AND NONVERBAL ASSESSMENTS
The visual aspects of speech have a marked impact on viewers, with par-
ticular nonverbal cues resulting in more positive or agreeable reactions 
to the speaker, both in conjunction with and in isolation of the speak-
ing topic. Speeches that are presented with greater vocal emphasis, facial 
expressions, and gestures are evaluated by viewers as more powerful, 
self-assured, and lively (Jackob, Roessing, & Petersen, 2011). Other eval-
uations have rated speakers with frequent eye contact, body proximity 
movements, and smiling as having better competence, character, com-
posure, or sociability. Body tension or stiffness is negatively associated 
with credibility and sociability judgments (Burgoon, Birk, & Pfau, 1990).
Much of the existing literature on the impact of nonverbal cues in pol-
itics comes from presidential speeches or debates. Nonverbal cues, and 
particularly facial expressions, have been found to have a considerable 
impact on viewer response to presidential candidates. Viewer perceptions 
of candidate likability have been connected to their appropriate use of 
facial expression (Lanzetta, Sullivan, Masters, & McHugo, 1985). Visual 
expressions of happiness/reassurance from a leader result in feelings of 
joy and warmth in the viewers. Interestingly, these positive impacts are 
more pronounced when video is presented without the sound (McHugo, 
Lanzetta, Sullivan, Masters, & Englis, 1985). In a 2012 study of the first 
and third presidential debates between President Barack Obama and Mitt 
Romney, researchers found viewers evaluated candidates based on non-
verbal cues such as facial expressions. Viewers were perceptive of the 
nonverbal cues given by both Obama and Romney and evaluated each 
differently in segments where they displayed more appropriate or con-
fident nonverbal cues than when they did not (Gong & Bucy, 2016). In 
step with previous research on the topic (Ekman & Oster, 1979; Sullivan 
& Masters, 1988), viewers were more likely to recall their impressions of 
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the candidate’s nonverbal cues than they were the substance of the debate 
itself. Viewers are more likely to use nonverbal shortcuts for the analysis 
of the speaker when the information provided is particularly complex, as 
is common with political messaging (Gong & Bucy, 2016). Other research 
has concluded that all parts of speech are valuable to the evaluations of 
leaders’ speaking styles, including the audio and visuals in isolation and 
together (Nagel, Maurer, & Reinemann, 2012).
C-SPAN IN THE TWITTER ERA
C-SPAN’s mission is to provide content on government proceedings 
without editing or filtering. All video, on television and Twitter, is to be 
presented without a point of view (C-SPAN, 2017c). C-SPAN provides 
gavel-to-gavel coverage of all proceedings of the House of Representatives, 
and C-SPAN2 does the same for Senate proceedings. The C-SPAN3 net-
work covers public affairs (C-SPAN, 2017b). All proceedings of the House 
and Senate are presented on C-SPAN without editorial content. In 2010, 
the media company expanded to provide digitized video on the C-SPAN 
Online Video Library (C-SPAN, 2017d), allowing users to view, clip, and 
share almost 250,000 hours of C-SPAN footage (Browning, 2014).
Videos from all three C-SPAN networks are represented in the veri-
fied C-SPAN Twitter account, which has been active since July 2008. As 
of January 2018, the C-SPAN Twitter account had 1.91 million followers, 
975 likes, and 34,000 tweets. Unlike C-SPAN on television, the C-SPAN 
Twitter account provides C-SPAN video content in two ways. The first 
is to link via tweet to longer videos or live feed. The other is to embed a 
short video clip that can be watched in the tweet without leaving Twitter. 
The present research focuses on examining the influence the latter — the 
embedded video clip.
C-SPAN has a high percentage of users who access its content via the 
Internet either instead of or in conjunction with traditional television view-
ing. Fifty-six percent of C-SPAN users use a laptop, tablet, or smartphone 
as one method for accessing C-SPAN video (C-SPAN, 2017a). Recognizing 
that more people are accessing video outside of the traditional realm of 
the television, C-SPAN CEO Susan Swain said in 2013 that the company 
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is adapting to disseminating content in a changing marketplace, and that 
includes social media sites:
So we sometimes say, “It’s not your father’s C-SPAN,” but the reality 
is we have to today be both our father’s C-SPAN and our grandson’s 
C-SPAN, because there are all kinds of people who are interested 
in what happens in this town, but they’re interested in accessing 
that in different ways — through the Internet, Twitter, and mobile 
devices such as their smartphones — and we want to be there for 
them. (Steinberg, 2013)
This expansion of content to multiple C-SPAN platforms creates more op-
portunities for new and existing C-SPAN users to interact with the video.
A new body of research measures what happens when consumers of 
political events react to their leaders using social media sites on their com-
puters, smartphones, or tablets. Similar to previous experimental findings 
that have measured how viewers react to content of politicians speaking 
on television, more recent research has tested these ideas with the addition 
of how viewers react to the same kinds of content on social media or “the 
second screen.” Similar to what has been found using traditional televi-
sion media, the nonverbal displays of politicians during debates also drive 
responses on social media more so than the actual content of the debate 
(Shah et al., 2016). During the 2012 Obama and Romney debates, facial 
expressions and physical gestures were more predictive of the volume and 
valence of Tweets than other coded variables of verbal utterances, voice 
tone, and persuasive strategies (Shah, Hanna, Bucy, Wells, & Quevedo, 
2015). Political leaders are taking note of the power of social media as a 
communication medium. As the general public has moved away from 
sending letters and even making phone calls, the availability of social 
media allows for an interactive connection between elected officials and 
constituents in a manner that did not exist previously (Glassman, Straus, 
& Shogan, 2013; Shogan, 2010). More communications resources are shift-
ing to social media as senators and representatives employ it as a strategy 
to reach large audiences and influence campaign outcomes (Glassman 
et al., 2013); thus they are interested in and responsive to how they are 
viewed on social media.
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After C-SPAN’s 10 years on Twitter and building to 1.91 million fol-
lowers, it is important to examine what type of content — images, text, 
and video — tweeted on @CSPAN is effective concerning a user’s level 
of Twitter engagement. It is well known that the impact of posts and 
tweets depends on the content and format of the tweet itself. For exam-
ple, tweets with photos garner a 35% increase in retweets, followed by 
tweets with videos (28%), quotes (19%), and hashtags (16%) (Rogers, 
2014). Engagement on Twitter is also dependent on the platform’s tech-
nological design. Unlike Facebook and Instagram, Twitter is designed to 
perform as a megaphone to followers, allowing bursts of content with a 
shorter lifespan (most engagement occurs within the first hour of a tweet). 
Thus, Twitter’s short-form platform only allows one “type” of post, rather 
than an “event” or “note” on Facebook or a “story” on Instagram. Tweets 
primarily include text, hashtags, tags, photos, and video, with images and 
videos embedded directly below text. As of 2015, tweeted videos automat-
ically play in a user’s Twitter feed.
Recent studies examine this critical link between visual images on 
social media and online engagement in a variety of contexts, such as pro-
test movements (Neumayer & Rossi, 2018; Vraga, Bode, Wells, Driscoll, & 
Thorson, 2014), political campaigning (Muñoz & Towner, 2017a), presi-
dential debates (Shah et al., 2016), and health information dissemination 
(Guidry et al., 2018). Image content and its relationship to digital en-
gagement has been studied by examining content (Hu, Manikonda, & 
Kambhampati, 2014), filter use (Bakhshi, Shamma, Kennedy, & Gilbert, 
2014), the inclusion of faces (Bakhshi, Shamma, & Gilbert, 2014; Muñoz 
& Towner, 2017b), and candidate self-framing with photos and pictures 
(Muñoz & Towner, 2017). For instance, Muñoz & Towner (2017a) found 
that candidates who employed the “ideal candidate image” on Instagram 
received the highest number of user likes and comments. Similar research 
conducted on Instagram also has found that images that contained the 
faces received more likes and comments (Bakhshi et al., 2014; Muñoz & 
Towner, 2017b).
For Congress members, their face and image are a central feature of 
their “brand.” Their face, body language, and hand movements are power-
ful nonverbal communication tools that are likely to influence a Congress 
member’s likeability and credibility. Our research offers insight as to which 
nonverbal visual strategies Congress members employ in C-SPAN clipped 
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videos are most successful in garnering higher rates of digital engage-
ment on Twitter. Past research has urged the use of C-SPAN content for 
measuring facial expression and emotion in public figures (Kowal, 2014) 
User engagement on Twitter is vital to Congress members, as they seek 
to reach a broad audience, increase relationships with their constituents, 
and garner media and public attention. In the same vein, a Twitter user’s 
likes and comments are important to C-SPAN as a nonprofit company, 
as it seeks to make government more open and accessible to both offline 
and online citizens. Therefore, to test how much Twitter users engage with 
@CSPAN videos that display leaders utilizing different speaking styles, 
this research examines C-SPAN video clips posted on Twitter of House 
and Senate floor speeches and press conferences. Below, we propose the 
following research question and hypothesis:
RQ1: On C-SPAN’s Twitter feed, to what extent do video clipped 
speeches given by members of the House of Representatives 
and Senate employ nonverbal body language, such as smile, 
gestures, torso movement?
RQ2: On C-SPAN’s Twitter feed, to what extent do video clipped 
speeches given by members of the House of Representatives 
and Senate employ nonverbal visual aids or cues, such as 
floor charts or props?
Hypothesis 1: Video clipped speeches given by members of the 
House of Representatives and Senate using more nonverbal 
cues will more be likely to receive engagement on Twitter 
than speeches that use less nonverbal cues.
METHOD
To address the above research questions and hypothesis, we content an-
alyzed clipped videos of U.S. Congressional House and Senate members 
tweeted by C-SPAN’s verified Twitter feed (@CSPAN) between January 3, 
2018, and August 31, 2018. The starting date represents the first day that 
the 2nd Session of the 115th Congress convened. The end date was set 
to the end of August to capture the Senate chamber’s shortened summer 
recess and return to Washington in August. During this 8-month period, 
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the House was in session for 89 days and the Senate was in session 135 
days. To be included in the sample, clips must include: (1) a member of 
Congress speaking during floor debate, speeches, or press events in his 
or her official capacity; and (2) one central figure speaking. We excluded 
clips that were: (1) retweeted by C-SPAN from other Twitter accounts; 
(2) clips of committee action, because speakers in those videos are typ-
ically in a seated position rather than standing with trunk movement; 
and (3) linked video that must be viewed via the C-SPAN Video Library 
website and live feed video. Therefore, the data include 144 clipped vid-
eos — 68 clips from the House and 76 from the Senate.
Coding Scheme
Twitter engagement
Our dependent variable, Twitter engagement, is defined as when someone 
interacts with posted content, such as liking, retweeting, and commenting 
on a tweet (Twitter, 2018). To capture Twitter engagement for C-SPAN 
House and Senate video clips, we recorded the number of comments, 
retweets, and likes for each clip at midnight EST on the day the clip was 
tweeted. Then, comments, retweets, and likes are summed into an over-
all index of engagement for each video. At the beginning of the period 
(January 2018), the C-SPAN Twitter account had 1.91 million followers, 
975 likes, and 34,000 Tweets. By August 2018, the C-SPAN Twitter ac-
count had the same number of followers but increased to 1,068 likes and 
36,000 tweets. Indeed, internal research from Twitter indicates that the 
inclusion of a video or photo in a Tweet increases engagement with the 
tweet compared to tweets without video. Tweets with videos garner 28% 
more retweets. Thus, we can expect that engagement on all the sampled 
tweets would be more substantial than engagement with other tweets on 
the C-SPAN account without photos or videos (Rogers, 2014).
Nonverbal visual cues
To systematically code for the first independent variable — nonverbal body 
language cues in C-SPAN House and Senate video clips — we adapted the 
visual coding schemes from Burgoon, Birk, and Pfau (1990) and Nagel, 
Maurer, and Reinemann (2012). Each C-SPAN video clip was viewed in 
its entirety and then, focusing on the speaker, we coded for the presence of 
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the following characteristics: (1) smile, (2) torso movement, and (3) hand 
gesture. A Congress member’s “smile” was coded based on two different 
smile prompts: a smile must consist of the upper teeth or both upper 
and lower teeth, and a smile with upturned mouth corners (Sullivan & 
Masters, 1988). “Torso movement” was coded when a member had a 
loose body posture throughout their torso/trunk. In this case, the torso 
is moving loosely, and arms are held loosely at sides or moving slightly 
(Burgoon et al., 2000). “Hand gestures” include when a member is moving 
their hands and arms while speaking and in synchrony with their speech. 
Hand gestures are considered expressive when members are emphasizing 
a point or raising their hand(s) to refer to themselves or other members.
To code for our second independent variable — nonverbal visual 
aids — we coded for the presence of a floor chart, poster, or prop that re-
lates to the speech being delivered. A poster can be held in the hand(s) or 
on an easel that is adjacent to the speaker. A floor chart must be visible in 
the video frame while the speaker is talking. Professionally printed post-
ers, handwritten posters, or oversized papers are also included. Regarding 
props beyond posters and floor charts, we also code for a member holding 
or referring to an item(s) for any length of time, particularly when illus-
trating a point in the speech. If a member were to lift a glass of water to 
take a drink, this is not a prop, unless the drink was to illustrate a point 
about drinking water.
Each nonverbal characteristic — smile, torso movement, hand gesture, 
and poster/prop — was coded as a “1” if present in the video clip and a 
“0” if not present. The three nonverbal body language characteristics are 
combined into an index so that each video has an overall score of non-
verbal cues present in the video on a scale of 0 to 3 with 0 representing no 
nonverbal cues in the video and 3 representing the presence of all three 
possible nonverbal characteristics. The poster/prop, visual aid variable 
remained dichotomous: “1” for the presence of chart or poster and “0” if 
a chart or poster was not present.
Control variables
We controlled for a number of additional factors that might explain likes, 
retweets, and comments on C-SPAN video clips. We coded for speaker 
characteristics, particularly if the speaker in the video clip is a woman, a 
leader, and a Senate member. Presently, women hold 19% of the House 
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seats and 23% of the Senate (Center for American Women and Politics, 
2018). Hence, the presence of a female speaker might boost Twitter 
engagement, as Twitter users may feel video clips of female legislators 
are more engaging due to their status as underrepresented House and 
Senate members. In addition, female candidates and officeholders are 
often viewed as a novelty in politics at the national level, and as a re-
sult may draw more attention on C-SPAN’s Twitter feed (i.e., Lawless & 
Pearson, 2008; O’Regan & Stambough, 2011). We also coded if a speaker 
in the video clip was a leader in the House and Senate, particularly the 
Speaker of the House, House Minority Leader, Senate Majority Leader, 
and Senate Minority Leader. Leadership is likely linked to Twitter en-
gagement because leaders in the House and Senate are better known and 
more immediately recognizable by the American public. That is, their 
“celebrity status” increases likes, retweets, and comments. Each character-
istic — female, leader, and Senate member — was coded as a “1” if present 
in the video clip and a “0” if not present. Last, we include a dichotomous 
variable to indicate if the clip was of a Senator or Representative — a “1” if 
the clip was of a Senator and “0” if the clip was of a House member. Since 
Senators are usually more visible and well known, video clips from the 
Senate chamber may generate more engagement.
We also controlled for features commonly found in tweet content, 
particularly the presence of hashtags, tags, and web links, which might 
be linked to engagement. We anticipated that hashtags and tags might in-
crease Twitter engagement because they allow users to more easily find 
the content, people, and organizations on Twitter in which they are inter-
ested. Moreover, tweets with hashtags receive a 16% increase in retweets 
than tweets without hashtags (Rogers, 2014). In addition, we controlled 
for the presence of a web link or URL in clipped video tweets, as we ex-
pected web links to boost the number of likes, comments, and retweets. 
Oftentimes, a web link to the full C-SPAN video was tweeted along with 
the clipped video. Followers might use the C-SPAN Twitter feed as a hub 
for trending content, quickly linking them to the main C-SPAN website 
for more information. Studies have shown that tweets containing links 
receive 86% more retweets than regular tweets (Cooper, 2013). Last, we 
controlled for the length of the clipped C-SPAN video in seconds be-
cause we expected Twitter engagement to decrease with video length. 
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That is, Twitter users will watch more of a short, 30-second clipped video 
than a 5-minute video. Fishman (2016) reports that engagement remains 
steady for up to two minutes but then engagement declines beyond the 
two-minute mark.
While this study focuses on the impact of nonverbal visual cues, we 
also control for some verbal communication in each clipped video. We con-
trolled for a speaker’s reference to President Trump because we expected 
that — similar to the presence of House and Senate leaders — his news-
worthy role as commander-and-chief would bolster Twitter engagement. 
The video clip was coded as a “1” if the House or Senate member referred 
to the president and a “0” if there was no mention. Next, we coded for 
political issues referenced by House and Senate speakers in each clipped 
video. We expect the discussion of some issues, such as immigration, may 
generate Twitter engagement as they are more prominent in the current 
media agenda and are the most important problems among the citizenry 
(see Newport, 2018). Based on prior research (e.g., Conway, Kenski, & 
Want, 2015; Tedesco, 2001, 2005), we crafted a coding sheet including 23 
issue categories: abortion, affirmative action, banking, budget, campaign 
finance, crime/guns, corruption/ethics, drugs, economy, education, envi-
ronment, equality, foreign policy, health care, immigration, income equality, 
intelligence, military, minimum wage, religion, social security, tax, and 
welfare. (See Appendix 9.1.) Each C-SPAN video clip was watched in its 
entirety and coded for one issue. For example, if the speaker was discuss-
ing foreign policy, the video clip was coded as “1” for foreign policy and 
“0” for no mention of foreign policy. If the speaker mentioned several is-
sues, only one main issue was coded.
Coding procedure
Before coding clipped videos, we created a codebook containing each 
nonverbal visual characteristics as well as the verbal categories for men-
tions of the president and political issues. (See Appendix 9.2.) For training 
purposes, a small sample of clipped videos was examined before coding 
took place. Once adjustments were made to the codebook, we watched all 
clipped videos in their entirety and coded for the presence of a character-
istic as a “1” and the absence as “0.” Intercoder reliability was measured 
using Krippendorff ’s alpha, where values above .80 represent strong 
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reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). A third coder, an undergradu-
ate student trained in content analysis, independently coded a randomly 
selected 10% subsample of the previously coded nonverbal visual cues. 
The Krippendorff ’s Alpha score is .81 across all characteristics — smile, 
torso movement, hand gesture, and poster/prop.
RESULTS
Table 9.1 presents the reliability coefficients for the dependent and main 
independent variables as well as the descriptive statistics for all variables 
examined. On C-SPAN’s Twitter page, the median number of video clips 
posted each day was about two clips, with eight video clips being the 
highest number of clips posted in one day. Fifty-two percent of the video 
clips were of senators. The majority of Twitter engagement was “liking” 
posts, averaging 339.1 likes. The latter is not surprising, as liking content 
is the easiest and fastest way to engage on Twitter. The number of “likes” 
was followed by the number of retweets, averaging 157.8 retweets, and 
then comments, averaging 80.4 comments. Commenting on posts re-
quires the most time and commitment and is commonly the lowest form 
of engagement on social media. Overall, video clips on C-SPAN’s Twitter 
feed attracted a fair amount of Twitter engagement from users (mean 
= 577.36).
The first research question (RQ#1) asked the extent to which video 
clipped speeches given by Congress members employ nonverbal body lan-
guage, such as smile, gestures, and torso movement. The content analysis 
reveals that a majority of body language visuals in video clips were hand 
gestures (67%), followed by torso movement (56%), and then smile (35%). 
As Table 9.1 shows, the average Total Visuals score was 1.58 (SD = 1.09) 
with a range of 0 to 3. Almost 80% of the video clips examined contained 
1 or more forms of nonverbal body language. This indicates that a consid-
erable proportion of clipped videos on Twitter portray Congress members 
delivering speeches with visual communication and body language. For 
instance, hand gestures, such as quick flicks of the hands emphasizing 
a certain word, were often employed by speakers to draw attention to a 
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certain point. Other visual cues included choppy body movements be-
hind the chamber podium, moving body and arms around forcefully to 
convey a message. For example, a video clip of Representative Lee Zeldin 
includes all elements — smile, torso movement, and hand gestures (January 
19, 2018, https://twitter.com/cspan/status/954358085476372481).
The second research question (RQ#2) asked the extent to which 
video clipped speeches given by members employ nonverbal visual aids 
or cues, such as floor charts or props. The content analysis reports that 
very few clipped speeches — only 10% — included visual aids, with floor 
charts (6%) more frequently used by speakers than props (4%). For exam-
ple, a video clip of Representative Hakeem Jeffries (Figure 9.1) delivering 
a speech alongside a floor chart with the word “Treason?” (February 6, 
TABLE 9.1 Descriptive Statistics: Twitter Engagement, Nonverbal Visuals, and Other Characteristics
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. Percentage
Dependent Variable
Twitter Engagement Index
Cronbach’s alpha = .60
577.36 1386.30 25 10822 —
Independent Variables
Nonverbal Visual Body Language Index
Cronbach’s alpha = .76
1.58 1.09 0 3 —
Nonverbal Floor Charts/Props — — — — 10
Control Variables
Clip Time (in seconds) 139.93
(2 min.)




Female — — — — 19.5
Leader — — — — 56.9
Hashtag — — — — 20.1
Tag — — — — 91.6
President — — — — 27.7
Web link — — — — 41.1
Senate — — — — 52.7
Note: N = 144 clips.
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2018, https://twitter.com/cspan/status/960895816251707393). Similarly, 
the Twitter feed included a video clip of Representative Nancy Pelosi 
referring to a floor chart on “Congress Must Act Now” during a press 
conference on gun safety (February 15, 2018, https://twitter.com/cspan 
/status/964176668624646144). In the posted clipped videos, props were used 
minimally by speakers but consisted of photos (June 13, 2018, https://twitter.
com/cspan/status/1006912310957543424), a paper heart on Valentine’s Day 
(February 14, 2018, https://twitter.com/cspan/status/963813779564781568), 
and Congress members’ children (June 20, 2018, https://twitter.com/cspan 
/status/1009433637962514439). Considering the results of RQ#1 and #2, 
clipped videos of congressional speakers on Twitter include more non-
verbal body language cues than nonverbal visual aids.
Another interesting descriptive result reported in Table 9.1 is that 
over half (56.9%) of the video clips included a House or Senate leader. 
From the Senate, Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) was frequently 
clipped making statements in response to events, such as Justice Kennedy’s 
retirement, and relevant legislation. Similarly, the C-SPAN Twitter feed 
included clips of Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) speaking on 
the chamber floor about criminal allegations against President Trump 
(April 10, 2018, https://twitter.com/cspan/status/983724930775830531) 
FIGURE 9.1 Rep. Jeffries one-minute speech.
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as well as immigration issues (June 18, 2018, https://twitter.com/cspan 
/status/1008802725709172737). From the House, Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) 
and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) were regularly clipped and 
posted on Twitter, due to their weekly press conferences. Of the total 67 
House clips, 43 (64%) of the clips featured Pelosi or Ryan as the main 
speaker. Notably, this includes five clips where Pelosi exceeded the House 
of Representatives record for the longest address on the House floor for her 
8-hour speech on protecting undocumented migrants (February 7, 2018, 
https://twitter.com/cspan/status/961341001821573120). The recorded clips 
of women skew heavily towards the House, with Pelosi as minority leader. 
The Senate clips had only six clips that featured a female speaker. Not sur-
prisingly, the increased presence of leaders in clipped videos coincides with 
the higher presence of tags (90%) in posted Twitter content. The C-SPAN 
tweets mainly tagged a Congress member’s username (@username), par-
ticularly the usernames of the House and Senate leadership.
To test Hypothesis #1, which asserts that video clipped speeches given 
by Congress members using more nonverbal cues will more be likely to 
receive engagement on Twitter than speeches that use less nonverbal cues, 
we estimate a set of linear regression models with the Twitter Engagement 
Index regressed against the Nonverbal Visual Body Language Index. Control 
variables, particularly those listed in Table 9.1, were included. In addition, 
the top three issues — immigration, corruption/ethics, and foreign pol-
icy — discussed by Congress members in the clipped video sample were 
included as control variables. (See Appendix 9.1 for the percentage of is-
sues discussed.) Due to the low number of clips featuring speakers with 
charts or props (N = 15), the measure for Nonverbal Floor Charts/Props 
is not examined as an independent variable and is thus removed from the 
remainder of the analysis. All fitted models were analyzed with standard 
goodness of fit diagnostic tests for OLS models to test for heteroscedasticity 
and the presence of outliers. These problems were resolved by regressing 
the independent and control variables on the log transformation of the 
dependent variable in the model.
We expected a significant, positive correlation between the index of 
nonverbal characteristics and the Twitter engagement index, indicating 
that C-SPAN clips covering Congress members employing persuasive 
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nonverbal cues increase comments, retweets, and likes among Twitter 
followers (H#1). The outcome of the regression model with controls test-
ing Hypothesis #1 is shown in Table 9.2. The main independent variable 
of interest in the regression model, Total Visuals, is not statistically signif-
icant nor has a substantial effect on the log of Twitter engagement index. 
The coefficient is also negatively signed, meaning the independent vari-
able does not have a positive relationship with Twitter engagement as 
predicted in Hypothesis #1. Surprisingly, the use of nonverbal cues has a 
slight opposite effect on Twitter engagement. Likewise, most of the con-
trol variables had no statistically significant effect on whether viewers of 
tweeted C-SPAN clips engaged more with the videos.
There was one exception, however, as the regression results in Table 
9.2 show that the dummy variable representing the issue of “corruption 
and ethical concerns” had both a strong and statistically significant rela-
tionship with Twitter engagement. This issue category made up 13% of all 
the clipped videos and the majority of the videos coded as corruption or 
ethics came out of the House of Representatives. (See Appendix 9.1.) Some 
of the issues discussed that were coded as corruption and ethics included 
debates on Russian interference in the 2016 election, whether President 
Trump should face impeachment, whether Environmental Protection 
Agency chief Scott Pruitt should be fired, and whether President Trump 
could pardon himself. The majority of these videos categorized as “cor-
ruption or ethics” were discussed by Democrats. Clipped videos that were 
categorized as “immigration” made up a larger percentage of all videos 
(15%) but did not have a statistically significant effect on the Twitter en-
gagement index.
TABLE 9.2 Regression Estimates of the Visual Cues, Selected Issues, and Controls on Logged Twitter Engagement
Total Visuals -.0242 (.100)






Web link .0629 (.207)
Issue — Corruption/Ethics .8367*(.303)
Issue — Immigration .2205 (.276)





Standard errors are in parentheses.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research was to examine the influence of Congress 
member’s nonverbal presentation style when they deliver their floor 
speeches and press conferences, particularly in the context of viewing 
posted C-SPAN video content via Twitter. Consistent with the literature 
of evaluations on presidential speechmaking (Bucy & Grabe, 2007; Bucy 
& Newhagen, 1999; Gong & Bucy, 2016; Shah et al., 2016), our expec-
tation was that viewers of congressional videos on the C-SPAN Twitter 
page would engage more with posted video content in which members of 
Congress used a persuasive speaking style — smile, torso movement, and 
hand gestures (H#1). The empirical results shown in Table 9.2, however, 
suggest that visual cues used by political leaders in official speeches do 
not drive viewer Twitter engagement, particularly the number of likes, 
comments, and retweets, the same in all contexts. Previous research has 
stated that nonverbal behaviors in presidential speeches drove people to 
the “second screen” to engage with the content on Twitter (Shah et al., 
2015, 2016). Other previous findings revealed that viewer evaluations of 
presidential debates or addresses influenced them to make higher eval-
uations of presidents or contenders when they speak using appropriate 
nonverbal behavior (Gong & Bucy, 2016; Sullivan & Masters, 1988). In 
contrast, our results suggest that Congress members do not need to uti-
lize more nonverbal visual body language in the floor speeches to increase 
their influence on Twitter followers.
Instead of being engaged by persuasive speaking styles, viewers of 
C-SPAN videos on Twitter were driven more by the content of the clips than 
the visual cues displayed by the speaker. Despite the salience of other topics 
in the clipped video at the time, “corruption and ethics” had the strongest 
and most statistically significant relationship with the Twitter engagement 
index (see Table 9.2). As noted previously, speeches in this category often 
featured highly partisan topics, such as election security and the ethics of 
the U.S. president and his cabinet members. These clips overrepresented 
members of the Democratic Party in a currently Republican-controlled 
House and Senate. This may suggest that viewers who utilize Twitter for 
news and information on politics may be drawn to particular trending 
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issues, including those that have a more scandalous element to them. The 
lack of a significant finding for the issue of “immigration” is a surprising 
result, however, since this issue represented a higher percentage of clips 
and immigration was a highly salient issue in 2018 (Newport, 2018).
Perhaps it should be expected that @CSPAN followers are more po-
litically interested in and engaged with political issues than nonverbal 
presentation style, as traditional C-SPAN viewers are more politically active 
than the average U.S. citizen (C-SPAN, 2017a; McDonald, 2017). Seventy 
percent of C-SPAN users voted in the 2016 election, as opposed to only 
59% of the eligible voters in the nation (C-SPAN, 2017a; McDonald, 2017). 
Although this voting behavior is self-reported, the large voting discrep-
ancy between viewers of C-SPAN content and the general population leads 
to the conclusion that C-SPAN viewers are more politically engaged than 
the public at large. The latter suggests that when members of Congress do 
have speeches shown on C-SPAN, they are more likely to reach those who 
are already politically engaged. Indeed, it is likely that both the offline and 
online C-SPAN audience overrepresents citizens who have an increased 
commitment to politics. Considering the latter, this highly interested au-
dience likely relies on a variety of sources — both C-SPAN television and 
@CSPAN on Twitter — to thoroughly understand issues to form their own 
opinions better. Citizens may turn to the @CSPAN Twitter feed to “get the 
full story” or cross-check information on trending topics.
It is important to briefly conclude with research limitations as well 
as groundwork for future scholarship. First, we examine only one social 
medium platform. We do not know the extent to which the use of Twitter 
is associated with C-SPAN’s other social media platforms, Facebook and 
Instagram. Hence, we are limited to discussing only social media engage-
ment on the Twitter platform. As previously noted, Twitter’s technical 
design differs from Facebook and Instagram. It could be argued that due 
to Twitter’s megaphone design and the short life span of tweets, posts on 
Twitter may receive less engagement than posts on Facebook. Moreover, 
Instagram, with a platform focusing predominantly on video and images, 
may be a better test of engagement with C-SPAN video clips. Second, the 
study design did not incorporate all video content provided on the C-SPAN 
Twitter page, thus limiting the number of observations. That is, we did 
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not examine clipped video of members of Congress while they were in 
committee proceedings, as they are usually seated and body movement 
is limited. We likewise did not include video that did not have one clear 
speaker. While other research on nonverbal communication has included 
eye gaze or blinks (Burgoon et al., 1990; Shah et al., 2015, 2016; Sullivan 
& Masters, 1988), the C-SPAN footage is mostly not at a close enough 
range to study this phenomenon. Third, all the video was taken from one 
congressional session in which both chambers were controlled by the 
Republican Party, which does not allow for variation in party control.
Future research should consider examining coding for speaker’s ex-
pressed tone (e.g., positive, negative, or neutral) in the clipped video. 
Viewers of particular hand gestures or body movements may have viewed 
them as inappropriately exaggerated, which previous literature notes vio-
lates normative expectations and has an adverse effect on citizens (Bucy 
& Newhagen, 1999). Body language and hand movements could be ad-
ditionally coded as agitated, intense, or aggressive. As previously noted, 
the presence of the negatively signed coefficient in Table 9.2, instead of 
the predicted positive relationship between visual cues and Twitter en-
gagement, suggests that the tone or emotion behind visual cues may often 
be more negatively expressed than positive. In addition, future research 
should examine more than one congressional session, thereby increas-
ing the sample size. For instance, due to our small sample, there were not 
enough clips of members of Congress utilizing floor charts and props to 
reliably test whether this additional visual cue might have an impact on 
engagement. Last, a controlled experiment may be needed to further in-
vestigate the causal impact of the variety of nonverbal behaviors in the 
clipped C-SPAN video posted on Twitter.
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No issue content 38
Note: N = 144 clips.
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APPENDIX 9.2: CODING SHEET
Coder name: _____________________________
Tweet date and time: _____________________________
Date coding completed: _____________________________
Twitter Engagement
Record clip “likes”
Record number of “comments”
Record number of “retweets”
Record clip time in seconds
Nonverbal Body Language Cues Present (1) Absent (0)
Smiling with either upper or upper and lower teeth 
showing or corners of mouth turned upwards
Trunk/torso of body has fluid movement — arms are loose 
at sides or moving loosely around the torso.
Hand gestures used
Nonverbal Floor Charts/Props Present (1) Absent (0)
Floor chart
Prop
Control Variables Present (1) Absent (0)
Female speaker
Speaker is leader:











President (mentioned by speaker)
Web link (in tweet)
Senate (clip originated in Senate or was of senator)
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This volume presents nine studies that use the C-SPAN Video Library as 
the basis for their research. As we have observed from the beginning of 
the C-SPAN Archives, some 30 years ago, its uses would be varied. This 
collection bears that observation out. While there is a common theme 
around President Trump’s first year in office, the range of questions and 
methods varies substantially.
Each year, the author’s use of software to analyze the video and text 
increases in range and sophistication. The Archives captures closed caption-
ing text that authors use with text analysis programs to analyze. A perusal 
of this volume reveals a variety of software programs that the authors em-
ploy. New software is coming on line to analyze video, and we expect to 
see that employed in future volumes to detect the type of nonverbal cues 
examined by Lusvardi and Towner.
Not all of the hypotheses were substantiated by the research in this 
volume. That is the nature of social science: there will be as many nega-
tive results as positive results. Each advances our knowledge. A number 
of authors use anecdotal evidence of clips to demonstrate the phenomena 
they were seeking to analyze.
Each of the authors exploited features of the C-SPAN Video Library. 
Mentions, clips identified by a speaker and containing searched words, 
were the unit of analysis for Hoewe and Ziny, and Cann and Jett. All the 
authors used the search engine in some manner to zero in on President 
Trump’s joint news conferences to speech references.
The goal in creating the C-SPAN Video Library was to encourage 
cross-disciplinary research as represented by the research in this vol-
ume. Each year we sponsor a conference and publish the proceedings. 
The conferences are now under the auspices of the Purdue University 
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Center for C-SPAN Scholarship & Engagement in the Brian Lamb School 
of Communication. The managing director, Connie Doebele, with the 
support of the School of Communication head, Marifran Mattson, has 
sponsored a variety of programs to support teaching and research using 
the C-SPAN Archives, from undergraduate research to visiting fellows to 
public lectures to this conference. This volume helps further that mission.
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